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The Point of Destruction: Sabotage, Speech, and Progressive-Era Politics 
 
Rebecca H. Lossin 
 
 Strike waves in the late nineteenth century United States caused widespread property 
destruction, but strike leaders did not suggest threats to employer property as a comprehensive 
strategy until the I.W.W. adopted a deliberate program of sabotage. Contrary to historical 
consensus, sabotage was an intellectually coherent and politically generative response to 
progressive, technocratic dreams of frictionless social cooperation that would have major 
consequences for the labor movement. This dissertation treats sabotage as a significant 
contribution to the intellectual debates that were generated by labor conflict and rapid 
industrialization and examines its role in shaping federal labor policy.  It contends that the 
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Introduction: The Limits of Change 
This dissertation is about sabotage: its meaning, its historical importance, and the ways in 
which it persists and also remains hidden. It was inspired by my interest in the renewal 
and extension of Taylorism and the cult of productivity that accompanied the rise of the 
Internet and mobile, networked devices. Alongside the growing popularity of applications 
and devices that essentially brought the time-study into our most intimate activities was a 
resurgence of utopian thought in the form of so-called ‘luxury communism’ and fully 
automated ‘post-work’ societies. These developments, while dazzling at a technological 
level, were strikingly redundant at a conceptual one—a mindless reproduction of 
scientific management for a newly dispersed workforce and a recapitulation of Edward 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward with new gadgets. Given this cultural landscape, a serious 
consideration of the politics of technology seemed necessary. Machine-breaking offered a 
promising way to disentangle narratives of social progress from technological mandates. 
It has not been a simple task. The art historian Max J. Friedländer once remarked that 
“it’s easier to change your world view than how you hold your spoon.” Ideology is not a 
belief system but rather that which appears to be the natural condition of things. It is not 
one political position among many but the condition of political possibility itself—what 
can realistically be imagined. It is because technology is a concrete, daily practice that it 
is such a powerful means of ideological transmission. Hence, the pejorative use of the 
word ‘Luddite’ at the same moment that ‘anti-capitalist’ protest is a defining feature of 
the political landscape.  
 This is not to say that technology necessarily transmits a certain belief system to 
the exclusion of others, but that all this stuff forms an imperceptible yet definite 
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conceptual boundary within which we might imagine alterations to politics proper and 
outside of which is sheer wreckage. Sabotage posited a different horizon—the general 
strike and the end of capitalism. And it therefore suggested tactics that were aimed at the 
limits laid down by industrial capitalism. This is reminiscent of the debate about 
revolution and reformism, but sabotage was unique in that it was materialist in a 
particular and literal sense. Sabotage was concerned with demystifying capitalism. It t 
distinguished itself from other political interventions of the time, such as the single tax or 
political socialism, in that it went after the very things that naturalized these beliefs. It 
was not threatening because it criticized capitalism or state policy but because it 
identified a target in easy reach of every worker—the property produced under a 
capitalist state. At the same time, it wasn’t an emotional, individual reaction to working 
conditions but a class movement. As Arturo Giovannitti explained, sabotage “only 
becomes dangerous when it becomes the translated practical expression of an idea even 
though, or rather because, this idea has originated from the act itself.”1 Sabotage , as a 
theory, arose from longstanding practice that combined political economy and practical 
tactics into one word. In attacking the actual products of capital, it had located a chink in 
the economic system’s ideological armor. 
Sabotage was broadly defined but what differentiated it from other forms of direct 
action was that it explicitly recommended property destruction. This did not always 
involve physical wreckage—although it often did—but property was not always a 
physical entity. Property existed in the form of machines as well as the profits and 






always about the destruction of employer property in one way or another. This bears 
repeating because it has been so regularly and actively denied by historians.  
Sabotage flourished at a moment that preceded a consensus around efficiency, 
private property, free markets, and non-violence as the sine qua non of legitimate protest. 
It was one of the ways that workers, in the words of David Montgomery, “vigorously and 
explicitly challenged management’s pretensions” during a time when the “cult of 
productivity” had yet to fully coalesce.2 Progressive Era America was openly violent and 
repressive but in certain respects the conceptual field was wide open. The late Mark 
Fisher used the term ‘capitalist realism’ to describe “a pervasive atmosphere, 
conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and 
education.”  Capitalist realism is not an aesthetic but “a kind of invisible barrier 
constraining thought and action.”3 This particular form of realpolitik had yet to establish 
itself in 1905 when the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) was founded and so 
Progressive Era labor conflict offers us insight into how “the horizons of the thinkable” 
were established and what precisely those horizons might be.4 The active repression of 
the I.W.W. and the subsequent disappearance of sabotage from the lexicon of labor 
conflict, as well as the pages of labor history, limited the horizon of the American 
political imagination in complex and lasting ways. Sabotage now constitutes a sort of 
outside of what is considered realistic or even remotely possible. The philosophy of 
sabotage put forth by the I.W.W. gives us a sense of what needed to be expelled before 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 3.  
 





the conscious project that we now recognize as simple reality could begin to establish 
itself.   
In both its philosophical and material form, sabotage made several propositions 
that were incompatible with the capitalist economic system as well as the American state. 
As a philosophy, sabotage articulated a critique of private property and industrial 
efficiency. As a practice, it immediately and materially threatened them both. Sabotage at 
the point of production illuminated two fundamental aspects of capitalist property 
relations that employers went to great lengths to disavow: that material control of 
production was the privileged site of power and that private property was fundamentally 
violent. By explicitly addressing the violence inherent in the production and control of 
private property, sabotage undermined another foundational myth of the free market, 
namely that it was in any way free or independent of political and legal power. As the 
United States entered the First World War, sabotage increasingly became a vehicle for 
articulating the relationship between class power and state power and was folded into 
anti-militarist and anti-imperialist arguments. It was not, as its detractors claimed, a 
violent call to arms but something even more threatening: the contravention of the 
capitalist social contract. As such, sabotage could not be peacefully metabolized by a 
nascent administrative state. Instead, what began as scattered efforts at repression by state 
and local governments with the crucial support of informal, vigilante violence, 
culminated in a coordinated federal effort to destroy the Industrial Workers of the World 
(I.W.W.) and make the very idea of sabotage illegal.  
Repression of I.W.W. thought and expression was also an exercise and expansion 
of the capitalist imagination. For every law implemented to prevent the circulation of 
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literature, for every pamphlet that was seized, and for every deportation of a non-citizen, 
a whole body of discourse, legal and otherwise, was generated. It was not purely a matter 
of negating a harmful ideology, but of creating and strengthening a legal and ideological 
language that expanded the reach of nativism, business interests, and the capitalist state. 
This is perhaps most apparent in the abundance of literature produced by manufacturers’ 
associations. These organized coalitions of business owners devoted an enormous amount 
of energy and resources to justifying the natural economic conditions that enabled their 
existence. This was not the same as the limited public relations campaigns that we are 
familiar with today—BP’s effort, for example, to transform its public image to that of a 
‘green’ company in the face of climate change. This was a much more fundamental effort 
to vindicate capital and free markets themselves and to map the territory in which they 
operated. In the process, these business owners established the field of legitimate protest 
and negotiation as a non-violent and entirely discursive space of cooperation and rational 
discourse. 
Much has been written about the I.W.W. but very little attention has been paid to 
their writings on sabotage. Historians Philip Foner, Melvyn Dubofsky and Paul 
Brissenden have each claimed that sabotage was a minor and purely rhetorical aspect of 
the I.W.W.’s organizing strategy. This position necessarily corrected the contemporary 
exaggeration of Wobbly violence in the pages of a conservative press gripped by wartime 
patriotism. William Preston’s Aliens and Dissenters (1963) carefully considers the role 
that accusations of sabotage played in the repression of radicals and prosecution of 
immigrants during the Great War. Mike Davis, one of very few people to give I.W.W. 
writings on sabotage serious attention, drew on I.W.W. sources to argue that sabotage 
6"
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was a rational response to Taylorism. These are the only attempts to engage with 
sabotage as a significant idea. Laura Weinrib’s The Taming of Free Speech: America’s 
Civil Liberties Compromise, is an important contribution to our understanding of the role 
that labor radicals, and I.W.W. free speech fights in particular, played in the 
establishment of civil rights. Weinrib, however, does not include anything that the 
I.W.W. actually wrote about sabotage. The attention paid is so cursory that Weinrib 
misattributes Elizabeth Gurley Flynn’s contribution to these debates. In reproducing a 
long-standing omission—writing on sabotage by worker intellectuals—Weinrib, captures 
the importance of the economic threat posed by organized labor to early debates about 
expressive freedom, but severs the activity of radical labor from the content of its own 
radical speech. Other scholars, such as Salvatore Salerno and Francis Shor, have 
emphasized the culture of the I.W.W. and its role as a revolutionary social movement at 
the cost of its economic activities. Sabotage was threatening because it bound radical 
ideas to radical actions. It posed an economic threat because it was both a radical idea 
and an effective material strategy.   
The avoidance of sabotage as a subject and the near disappearance of the word 
from labor history (replaced by “direct action”) seems to bear out the pronouncement of 
one of its earliest advocates: sabotage, claimed Walker Smith, is so dangerous that the 
capitalist class does not want to mention it for fear that workers will learn its meaning. 
Alternatively, we might speculate that following the systematic and often violent 
repression of radicals and their writings, historians on the Left have unconsciously 
internalized the logic of their prosecution. Whatever the reason, the result has been a 
scholarly dismissal of sabotage literature. Even when it is talked about, it is merely 
7"
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glossed over. It is widely acknowledged that the I.W.W. made important contributions to 
the evolution of industrial unionism in the United States, held official positions on race, 
ethnicity, and gender that were far ahead of its time, and periodically demonstrated an 
incredible ability to mobilize so-called ‘unskilled’ workers.  At the same time, the general 
consensus seems to be that their intellectual or philosophical contributions lack 
seriousness.  Attentive and careful readings of I.W.W. and other  literature on sabotage, 
therefore, are sorely lacking. This dissertation addresses many things by way of sabotage, 
but its main contribution to scholarship is that it assumes the concept’s intellectual and 
political importance. 
It is widely acknowledged that the early twentieth century United States saw some 
of the most violent labor conflict on record. Several recent books have reconsidered the 
role of violence during this time period. Among them Beverly Gage’s The Day Wall 
Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror and Christopher 
Capozzola’s Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern 
American Citizen. Gage argues for the reinsertion of violence into a labor historical 
tradition unduly influenced by Howard Taft as a means of correcting a narrative that 
diminishes the extent of class warfare on American soil. Capozzola’s study of wartime 
vigilantism shows how violence against labor radicals was contiguous with nascent 
federal police powers. A study of sabotage adds to this literature on Progressive Era 
violence because sabotage itself was concerned with the very definition of violence.  
 Sabotage pamphlets were some of the I.W.W.’s best-selling literature. These brief 
tracts presented a number of claims about capitalist political economy in an impressively 
economic manner. One of the central organizing principles presented in all sabotage 
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literature was the division between ‘worker sabotage’ and ‘capitalist sabotage’. The 
former was aimed only at property, while the latter was violent towards people in the 
service of protecting property. These pamphlets thus addressed what we would now refer 
to as the difference between structural and individual violence. By attacking property, so 
the claim went, actual violence—violence that threatened injury and death—was 
prevented. Violence was not ontological but political and economic. Assigning violence 
to certain actors and activities served specific class interests. The concomitant disavowal 
of the violence of economic activity required the further claim that the economy was 
separate from the sphere of coercive political power and thus the state’s legitimate 
enforcement of ‘order.’  
 The power of sabotage as a philosophy was descriptive rather than prescriptive. 
Sabotage was itself a longstanding practice among workers but the larger critique of 
property relations and the morality that derived from them also reflected the political and 
economic landscape of the time. The violence that marked the early twentieth century is 
almost unrecognizable from the perspective of the early twenty-first. Not only is open 
and armed class conflict largely absent, the contest itself has been settled.  
*** 
The first two chapters of this dissertation are broadly concerned with establishing 
the occurrence and importance of sabotage during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. Chapter One analyzes the surprisingly understudied I.W.W. literature on 
sabotage. Sabotage was a simple vehicle for a sophisticated structural critique of 
capitalism that raised the disruptive practices of workers to the level of revolutionary 
theory. Distinct from the anarchist showmanship of the “propaganda of the deed,” it 
9"
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espoused a non-violence that drew a clear distinction between people and property and 
thus provided a vehicle for a radical critique of capitalist ownership. Contrary to claims 
made by many historians, sabotage occupied an important place in the self-understanding 
of the union. It was ubiquitous in the I.W.W.’s iconography in the form of the ‘sab-cat’ 
and the wooden shoe. It appeared regularly in the pages of the Industrial Worker and 
Solidarity and pamphlets on sabotage were some the organization’s most popular 
literature. Furthermore, the role that sabotage played was not merely rhetorical. The 
practice of sabotage is a feature of wage work and the notion that this literature had no 
bearing on practice is both unlikely and conceptually incoherent. Union organizing is first 
and foremost an educational endeavor and, as such, presupposes a relationship between 
speech and action. To claim that sabotage was ‘just’ a popular idea that had no significant 
bearing on the I.W.W.’s ‘real’ activity devalues the literature on sabotage and reinforces 
a false dichotomy between thought and action that the very idea of sabotage sought to 
undermine. This position also suggests that we ignore a rather extensive body of writing. 
It also furthers the idea that serious engagement with the philosophy of sabotage as a 
legitimate and intelligent proposal is lacking. 
Chapter Two also aims to correct the misapprehension that sabotage was either 
the misguided rhetoric of radicals or an invention of agents provocateurs. It looks at the 
use of sabotage by the non-revolutionary International Association of Bridge and 
Structural Iron Workers (I.A.B.S.I.W.) who regularly resorted to dynamite as a form of 
economic coercion. The dynamite campaign of the I.A.B.S.I.W. lasted almost five years 
and resulted in damage to over eighty structures before the 1910 bombing of  the Los 
Angeles Times building which led to the arrest and trial of the John J. and James B. 
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McNamara. While the L.A. Times bombing is a well-known incident, the dynamite 
campaign has received much less attention. The notion that the McNamaras were either 
innocent or working with anarchists is still quite prevalent. Like the disavowal of 
sabotage, this is symptomatic of an unacknowledged repression of the violent nature of 
property contests. While the guilt or innocence of the McNamara brothers and the 
presence of operatives employed by the Burns detective agency will perhaps remain 
debatable, the union’s knowing participation in violent and destructive tactics is difficult 
to refute. Furthermore, the association of the L.A. Times bombing—or dynamite attacks 
more generally—with anarchists rather than American trade unionists is a product of the 
propaganda campaigns launched by the many employers’ associations that were formed 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The attempt to excise violence and 
property destruction from the field of domestic labor relations by associating it with 
foreign anarchists was one of the ways that the employers’ associations naturalized the 
notion of an apolitical economy organized around individual liberty and freedom of 
contract. The I.A.B.S.I.W.’s dynamite campaign was part of an exceptionally aggressive 
contest between the union and the National Erector’s Association (N.E.A.). In the 
absence of legal protections extended to employers, the union leveraged the threat of 
property destruction. It was, for a brief time, successful. 
Chapter Three deals with the widespread strikes in the Northwest lumber industry 
in 1917. The lumber strike was in many ways the apogee of the I.W.W.’s organizing 
success. Because lumber was a war industry, and spruce was essential for a new 
American and Entente Air Force, the strike inspired widespread federal intervention in 
labor relations. This ranged from attempts at mediation by Progressive intellectuals to the 
11"
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creation of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumberman under the auspices of the War 
Department’s Spruce Production Division. Despite the fact that sabotage was 
downplayed in the I.W.W. press beginning with the war, the lumber industry was also 
particularly vulnerable to sabotage and there is a fair amount of evidence of its actual 
occurrence in both camps and mills. Furthermore, if sabotage was not encouraged, 
‘striking on the job’ was a tactic that was repeatedly suggested. The working and living 
conditions in lumber camps were so abject that lumber workers were almost automatic 
objects of Progressive sympathy and the lumber workers thus found many allies in the 
Wilson administration. However, the I.W.W.’s positions went beyond the  call to correct 
workplace problems such as filthy bunkhouses and inadequate food. The ways in which 
Progressive discourses intersected and significantly diverged from the radical philosophy 
of I.W.W. members and organizers were particularly apparent in the case of the lumber 
industry. It was this strike that led the Wilson administration to pursue a federal 
prosecution of I.W.W. members the following year.  
 Chapter Four examines the role of judicial review and changing conceptions of 
property in the composition of late nineteenth and early twentieth century labor conflict. 
It looks at the ways that private property shaped the content of what could be said and by 
whom vis-à-vis the enforcement of labor injunctions and freedom of contract. Here, I 
argue that speech has its own material conditions of production and that the repression of 
the I.W.W. cannot be viewed as either the suppression of radical ideas or the repression 
of economic activity at the point of production. Rather, the elimination of the 
organization required the suppression of its philosophy which was one and the same with 
its organizing strength. The First World War saw incredible state sponsored repression 
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and vigilante enforcement of patriotic duties, but sabotage is the only idea that was 
actually made illegal through the passage of anti-syndicalism legislation in 23 states.  
Chapter Five looks at the literature of efficiency and progressive reform, 
particularly that of F.W. Taylor and Thorstein Veblen. Sabotage was a constitutive 
element of Taylor’s management philosophy as well as a reaction to it. Veblen borrowed 
the I.W.W. definitions of worker and capitalist sabotage for The Engineers and the Price 
System and was sympathetic to the I.W.W.’s cause, an unusual position for an economics 
professor at the time. Nevertheless, his obsession with engineers as a class without class 
interests and his belief in the value of efficiency place him closer to Taylor than the 
I.W.W. This is not because Veblen was covertly anti-labor but because the celebration of 
efficiency and expertise as well as an aversion to conflict were hallmarks of progressive 
thought.  Taylor was no exception to this and while his name has become a stand in for 
oppressive managerial practices, his Principles of Scientific Management was a product 
of, not an exception to, a progressive tradition of thought that sought the collective good 
through cooperation and expertise. This chapter addresses ‘the machine question’ directly 
by mining the intersections between scientific management and progressive social 
programs and assessing the limitations that a reification of machine production placed on 
Veblen’s socialism. It also returns to the question of property as a social relation that is 
crystalized in, and reproduced by, machine technology. 
An examination of how sabotage was used and framed by different institutions, 
organizations, and individual actors highlights the stakes of workers' challenges to 
ideologies of technological progress. It draws attention to the ways in which economic 
interests and labor conflict underwrote our conception of civil liberties and sheds light on 
13"
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the ways in which American law has afforded corporate property particular 
protections. Sabotage posed a challenge to the conceptual and practical limits of a 
political imagination founded on principles of private property and the cult of 





Chapter 1: No Interests in Common:  
Sabotage as Structural Analysis 
Sabotage is a little word, 
Easily said and easily heard, 
Expresses much and means disaster 
When properly used against the master. 
 
Sabotage is a thing that’s banned,  
By labor fakirs throughout the land, 
By rebel workers used for ages 
To make the bosses increase wages 
 
Sabotage can always be used 
To gain justice when workers are abused: 
Bad bosses, too, are tamed in a day 
When a little sab kitten strays their way. 
 
If the strength of sabotage you should doubt, 
There are many ways of finding out, 
And if you think that is a lie,  
Ask pickhandle Johnson or Governor Spry.1 
 
“Sabotage” by Herbert Mahler, Industrial Worker, April 16, 1916 
!
Very few workers went to jail for committing acts of sabotage but thousands were 
arrested for talking about it. The practice of sabotage was not new but the word was, and there 
was something distinctly threatening about naming the disparate, rebellious practices of 
disgruntled workers. Sabotage gave an intellectual coherence and revolutionary meaning to 
activity that could easily be interpreted as irrational, impulsive, and apolitical. Much like the 
I.W.W. itself, it organized the disorganized and legitimated what appeared illegitimate. It also 
became a lightning rod for legal repression. Following the 1913 silk workers’ strike in Patterson, 
                                            




NJ, Frederick Sumner Boyd was tried for sedition, in part because he urged workers to 
incapacitate looms with vinegar. Boyd’s trial inspired a heated defense of sabotage as “the 
guerilla warfare of the working class.”2 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn’s pamphlet “Sabotage,” a direct 
response to the charges against Boyd, was one of many writings by I.W.W. organizers and 
worker intellectuals advocating sabotage as a non-violent form of worker control and a 
legitimate means of coercion.3 Property destruction had long been a regular occurrence during 
labor conflicts in the United States, but its open defense was a disturbing novelty.  
Sabotage literature consisted of songs, poems, allusions to ‘sab kittens’, and endless 
images of black cats and wooden shoes. Its traces were everywhere. A handful of pamphlets 
functioned as the intellectual core of this discourse. They were not numerous, but they were 
among the I.W.W.’s most widely distributed literature.4  Sabotage offered a sophisticated 
analysis of class conflict, presented in simple terms that were sung, recited, printed, stickered, 
and drawn across the complex landscape of American syndicalist thought. And it did not go 
                                            
2  Mike Davis, “The Stopwatch and the Wooden Shoe: Scientific Management and the Industrial Workers of the 
World,” Radical America, 9 (1975): 84. Popular pamphlets on sabotage include William Trautmann, Direct Action 
and Sabotage (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1912); Walker Smith, Sabotage (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing 
Bureau, 1913); Jersey Justice at Work: First Decision on the Advocacy of Sabotage in the United States Courts 
(New York: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1913); Elizabeth Gurley Flynn Sabotage (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing 
Bureau, 1917).  
3  Flynn ultimately regretted her advocacy of sabotage because of the dangers presented by legibility. While not 
going so far as to disavow sabotage, she explains in her memoir that her defense of sabotage was not a belief that is 
was effective, necessary or even desirable. It was very simply a defense—one inspired by a general obligation to 
defend I.W.W. members in general and Boyd in particular— of those who were being persecuted and prosecuted for 
advocating the tactic. Her pamphlet, published in 1915 and discontinued at her own request in 1917, resurfaced 
continually as proof of illegal intentions in her own political trials as late as the 1950s. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, The 
Rebel Girl: An Autobiography, 163-164; On the disappearance of sabotage from the pages of Solidarity see Philip S. 
Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States vol. 4: The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 
(New York: International Publishers, 1997). 
4     Phillip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, vol. 4: The Industrial Workers of the 




unnoticed by the public at large.  First mentioned in 1907, worker sabotage continued to generate 
headlines in major newspapers well into the 1920s.5  
Sabotage, as both a theory and a practice encompassed a critique of property, industrial 
progress, efficiency, and centralized bureaucratic control that enriched the understanding of class 
conflict in the industrialized United States of the early twentieth century. It destabilized the well-
established association between industrial efficiency and social progress by negatively 
reimagining that progress as something external to technological development and productive 
capacity.  Indeed, it suggested that social progress could be achieved by the interruption of 
industrial progress, the disruption of production, and the violation of property rights. Sabotage 
inverted one of modernity’s foundational myths: “the story of the industrial revolution…as the 
triumph of new techniques, and the inevitable march of progress.”6 According to Walker Smith, 
editor of The Industrial Worker, the word “sabotage” was so terrifying that the employer class 
did not even want to utter it for fear that the working class would learn what it was.7 This would 
appear to be true. Legal efforts to remove the word from circulation began in earnest during the 
                                            
5  Newspapers began reporting on sabotage as early as 1907 and continued to run stories decrying the odious tactic 
well into the 1920s. Most early articles reported on its use by French railway unions, but by 1912 major newspapers 
such as the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune had begun to report on its possibility and employment in the 
United States. After the US entrance into World War I, articles about sabotage generally linked the act to 
undermining patriotism and the war effort and ‘sabotage’ regularly featured in headlines that described the 1919 
prosecution of Haywood and other I.W.W. members under the Espionage Act. Some characteristic prewar headlines 
include: “Meaning of Sabotage: The Acts of Workmen who deliberately Spoil their Product”, New York Times May 
17,1909; “Ettor Harangues Meeting: Tells Strikers That They Must Fight and if They Lose, Then Sabotage”, Boston 
Daily Globe, January 29, 1912; “I.W.W. Will Advocate Sabotage in New York Strikes”, Los Angeles Times January 
19, 1913; “Plan Sabotage in Soup: Striking Waiters Threaten ‘Disgusting Time’ for Public”, New York Tribune 
January 22, 1913; “Driven Out by Sabotage: Manufacturers’ Exodus to South Explained by Coler”, New York 
Tribune February 8, 1913; “Sabotage Cooks Scheme to Make Mistress Kind”, Chicago Daily Tribune, July 14, 
1916. 
 
6  Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815-1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 9. 
7     Walker Smith, Sabotage: Its History Philosophy and Function (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1913), 




U.S. entrance into World War One through the passage of state-level laws that made speaking or 
writing about ‘sabotage’ a felony.  
   Workers in the United States clearly knew what sabotage was before it was named and 
they continued to employ it after the term fell out of fashion. They had flooded mines, set fire to 
rail yards, disabled engines, and variously rebelled against attempts by owners to increase and 
deskill production. Sabotage had been, and would continue to be, a relatively common 
occurrence during labor disputes. It was normal practice for journeymen to avoid exceeding 
stints by removing parts of the machine that they were using. The International Association of 
Bridge and Structural Ironworkers (I.A.B.S.I.W.) carried out a prolonged dynamiting campaign 
that resulted in the destruction of at least 80 worksites and culminated in the bombing of the Los 
Angeles Times building in 1910. Workers smashed looms during the Lawrence Textile strike in 
1912. In 1917, during the trial of William Haywood and nearly 100 other I.W.W. members, 
dissatisfied, itinerant farm laborers testified to the destruction of farm equipment and loggers and 
mill hands recounted the many ways to ruin lumber. In 1937, workers turned off refrigeration at 
Newton Meat Packing Co. destroying $170,000.00 worth of meat. Explosions were more or less 
the central negotiating strategy in the unionization of irregular, overland trucking by Detroit 
teamsters. The Teamsters unions maintained this tradition of property destruction, setting up 
roving pickets and disabling non-union trucks attempting to enter Detroit in 1970. Greg 
Shotwell’s account of union organizing in Southwestern Michigan opens with following 
anecdote:  
“A foreman who was new told us to get up and get to work.  
Right now, he said. ‘I’m the boss. We said Yes, sir boss. We went 
right to work. Thirty minutes later, every machine in the 




machines apart, left parts all over the floor, and went off to look 
for the missing parts. They didn’t come back.”8  
 
While organized labor does not—and indeed its more ‘legitimate’ organs never did—
officially endorse sabotage as a negotiating tactic or a form of worker control at the point of 
production, sabotage has always been an important weapon in the workers’ arsenal.9 In light of 
this, the veritable absence of a literature on sabotage is intriguing.10 Certainly, Smith’s 
formulation of sabotage as too dangerous to mention lent the word a certain cache, but the 
observation also has enduring analytical value and seems to be born out in the tortured efforts of 
historians to excise the word from the I.W.W.’s history.  
Writings on sabotage may have fallen victim to the ‘extreme condescension of posterity.’ 
Laura Weinrib has remarked that “theory of any type was never a Wobbly strong suit.”11 Indeed, 
writings on sabotage were playful, flamboyant, and remain difficult to square with academic 
sensibilities but they were also serious works of political economy. The effort to distance the 
organization from a word that became the focus of federal prosecutors and widespread public 
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hysteria is another explanation for minimizing the word’s importance. This legitimating move 
resulted in an over-correction by careful and sympathetic chroniclers of the I.W.W. that has 
produced its own significant and lasting blind spots.  
Recent literature has greatly expanded our understanding of the I.W.W. through the 
careful study of local organizing drives as well as the organization’s international composition 
and influence.12 But the New Left framing of sabotage has remained in tact. Melvyn Dubofsky 
argued that sabotage was only an attention-grabbing tactic and that its use has caused lasting 
confusion in studies of the I.W.W. The idea that bloodshed and destruction followed the 
dangerous hobo Wobbly, he argues, “died hard because I.W.W. rhetoric and songs fed the myth 
of the Wobbly as a wild and wooly warrior.”13 The reality, he writes, is that “Wobblies did not 
carry bombs, nor burn harvest fields, nor destroy timber, nor depend upon the machine that 
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works with a trigger.”14 But in 1914, the ninth annual convention of the I.W.W. passed a 
unanimous resolution instructing all speakers to recommend both slow downs and sabotage.15  
Philip Foner similarly suggested that the promotion of sabotage coincided with the 
organizations’ focus on the free speech fights waged between 1907 and 1916 in the Western 
portion of the United States. The word, he notes, stopped appearing in official publications in 
1917 at the same time that the I.W.W. decided to devote its resources to widespread strikes in 
war industries, particularly lumber. The implication here is that sabotage was, as Dubofsky 
claimed, a popular topic for soapbox speakers rather than a useful tactic and that it became 
unimportant, or even disappeared, after 1917 when the I.W.W. matured into a more effective 
organization. The consensus that sabotage was a passing rhetorical fad ignores what is difficult 
to prove but easy to infer. Sabotage was popular and Walker Smith’s pamphlet “Sabotage” was 
being advertised in the Industrial Worker as late as December of 1916. Joseph Murphey, who 
didn’t join the organization until 1919, recalled that “although organizing and teaching was a 
very good way of persuading people, you could not get along without the good old wooden 
shoe.” He and his fellow Wobblies would recite a poem reminding them “how to resist John 
Farmer”:  
If freedom’s road seems rough and hard 
and strewn with rocks and thorns 
Just put your wooden shoes on pard, 
and you won’t hurt your corns.16 
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In addition to demonstrating the continued importance of sabotage, Murphey’s anecdote suggests 
that the I.W.W.’s well-established oral tradition makes it unlikely that the removal of a word 
from a newspaper had much of an impact on that word’s use by its membership.  
The argument that Foner puts forth for minimizing the role of sabotage in the activities of 
the I.W.W. is similar to Dubofsky’s: “it is easy to be carried away by slogans, songs and stories 
of sabotage, and it is extremely difficult to separate rhetoric from practice.”17 But it should be 
noted that this is only a problem if “separating rhetoric from practice” is the operational 
framework for analysis. Even if instances of sabotage by I.W.W. members are difficult to locate 
and impossible to positively quantify, it is in no way misleading to give pride of place to an idea 
that was, if briefly, central to the writings, speeches, and overall project of the I.W.W. itself.18 
While positive proof of its occurrence might demonstrate its tactical importance in a particular 
dispute, the announcement of its mere, incalculable existence arguably had a political effect far 
greater than any single strike. In other words, its use—even if it was ‘just talk’—was 
significant.19 The word ‘sabotage’ was arguably the only difference between machine wrecking 
in 1910 and machine wrecking in 1890. Most importantly, it was a difference introduced to the 
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United States by members of the I.W.W. To diminish its significance in the service of 
evidentiary ‘truth’ requires ignoring what these historical subjects were actually saying—
repeatedly and with force. 
The particular formulation of sabotage by French syndicalists that was taken up and 
modified by I.W.W. leaders was distinguished by several ideas, one of which was an insistence 
on its theoretical importance. The historian’s impulse to separate rhetoric from practice therefore 
contradicts one of the central arguments put forth by the theory of sabotage itself. This idea is 
clearly articulated by Arturo Giovannitti, the Italian born I.W.W. organizer who translated Émile 
Pouget’s 1896 pamphlet “Sabotage” from French. In the introduction to the English version 
published by the I.W.W., Giovannitti notes that “sabotage is a certain simple thing which is more 
or less generally practiced… [It only] becomes a monstrous thing, a crime and a blasphemy 
when it is openly advocated and advised.”20 Rather than insisting that sabotage needs to be 
proven in order to have significance, we should take sabotage seriously as an idea that 
retrospectively organized a range of rebellious worker activity. Not because ideas necessarily 
have a material and historical force of their own but because they are—and this applies 
particularly to sabotage—both generated by practice and real in their effects.  Revolutionary 
slogans are “a kind of lifeline between writing and politics” that have the ability to move mere 
language into the realm of the real.21 Given the revolutionary intentions of the I.W.W., 
sabotage—even if it was just a theory—was not ancillary to their project but absolutely central to 
their efforts to mobilize workers towards the horizon of the general strike. Reflecting on the 
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organization’s influence, Foner notes that “although the I.W.W.’s membership was small, ‘as a 
spirit and vocabulary [it] permeates to a large extent enormous masses of workers,’” and the 
same logic might be applied to the word sabotage.22 If we think of the I.W.W.’s history as a 
“telling and making at once,” we can see that it was using sabotage to rewrite the moral, 
political, and economic history of the United States and that this revision was central to its 
revolutionary project.23 
Sabotage was compelling to marginalized, precarious workers for a number of reasons. 
Its etymology suggests that Pouget’s choice to use the word sabotage, rather than its Scottish 
equivalent Ca’Canny (an older term of which he was aware), was a conscious act of re-
appropriation.24 The popular, but false, etymology of sabotage is evocative. Workers, the story 
goes, would throw their ‘sabots’ or wooden shoes into a machine causing it to come to a halt. 
The word “sabotage” is indeed derived from wooden shoes, but the relationship between sabots 
and rebellion is not nearly so theatrical. Prior to its use by syndicalists, the word simply referred 
to the fabrication of wooden shoes. In the late nineteenth century “sabots” was turned into an 
epithet for the unskilled workers who wore them and took on the connotation of poorly executed 
work.25 The precise way that it tied revolutionary theory to everyday practices and linked these 
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practices to a population ignored by established craft unions, would have made it appealing to an 
organization that saw the intellectual development and political education of its marginalized 
membership as crucial to its on-the-ground organizing efforts. And, unlike other theories aimed 
at nurturing the class consciousness of workers, sabotage was also, very simply, a practice that 
was already in effect. It offered the I.W.W. a way of teaching political economy and 
revolutionary theory that didn’t violate the intellectual autonomy of its workers because it 
described, rather than prescribed, their actions. Quite to the contrary, sabotage depended on this 
very autonomy—on the workers’ ability to discern the proper forms of interference in their 
particular work environment. It assumed the expertise of a class that was generally described as 
‘unskilled’. It legitimated the tactics as well as the knowledge of les sabots. It also provided a 
way for a worker’s daily resistance to rise to the level of theory—for individual actions to 
become, through their very enactment, part of a revolutionary program—without any program of 
action being imposed from above. The “particulars” of sabotage, Pouget wrote, “must issue from 
the temperament and initiative of each one of you and are subordinate to the various 
industries.”26  
The Critique of Property 
Of the many things that sabotage could mean in practice, costly property damage and 
machine wrecking was certainly among them. Mike Davis has argued that the reason for 
“continued agitation around the idea of the workers’ right to employ retaliatory property 
destruction as a tactic, whether actually used or not, was to demystify the sanctity of property 
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and teach workers the methods of protracted struggle.”27 Sabotage, even when only threatened 
“taught an invaluable lesson in political economy.”28 What I.W.W. pamphleteers and orators did 
by advocating sabotage was to translate the socialist claim that workers should own the means of 
production into the simple claim that they did own them and could therefore act on this 
presumption with justification. Property destruction was more than justifiable retaliation—in this 
scheme it was the assertion of pre-existing, if not legally recognized, property rights. It might 
have been “legal for the bourgeoisie to keep [the instruments of production] in accordance to its 
own laws” but they had in fact been pilfered from the working class. “If it is just and right to 
force the capitalist to grant us certain concessions by withdrawing our labor and remaining 
inactive, why is it not equally just to render equally inactive our own machines, made by our 
own selves?”29 
Sabotage was, as Davis points out, a critique of property relations, but it was also a set of 
recommendations. It was a form of strong-arming that could be implemented when strikes failed 
and workers returned to work. It offered a type of rebellion that was sometimes more desirable 
than a walkout if replacement workers were readily available because it could be implemented 
by individuals and small groups in the absence of widespread organization.  Its most visible 
iterations are not, therefore, an accurate means of assessing its occurrence. Sabotage was 
certainly not the way to win the class war, but it was more than a pedagogical tool. The 
Industrial Worker repeatedly encouraged it and occasionally gave specific instructions. One 
small item suggests that emery or any other gritty substance such as sand or glass will cause 
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bearings to heat, and soap or washing powder will disable a boiler. It warns that putting lye in a 
boiler will only “benefit the boss by removing the scale.”30 Presumably this is meant to correct a 
piece of circulating misinformation and it does not seem unreasonable to infer that disabling 
boilers was a common enough practice that at least one worker had screwed it up. The Industrial 
Worker also gleefully reported that the Socialist Party’s recent membership clause banning 
sabotage was violated when arc light wires of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company were cut 
during an electrical workers strike in San Francisco.31 The paper reported incidents of stalled 
trains with boilers full of oil, encouraged lumber workers to spike timber, and insisted that the 
threat spiking posed to the sawyers was invented by someone who had never seen a sawmill.  
Sabotage was, in the final analysis, justified as a legitimate response to an inherently 
illegitimate system of property claims. “Imagine,” wrote Louis Moreau in 1911, “the accidental 
breaking of machinery or costly tools. Bum work…Deliberate blunders, delays, blockading of 
the means of transportation: in fact thousands of devices can be used to create havoc….If we 
cannot get all we produce, why let others have it?”32 
Defining Sabotage, Using Sabotage 
Sabotage made its way into the American vocabulary by 1907 at the latest—two years 
after the founding convention of the I.W.W. was held in Chicago.33 The term appeared in both 
Solidarity and the Industrial Worker for the first time in 1910. In 1913, it was the subject of a 13-
part article. A whole set of direct action tactics were brought together under the rubric 
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“sabotage” and given an intellectual coherence and revolutionary meaning they had heretofore 
lacked. It also transformed the lack of a union contract into an asset. Unlike trade-unionists, 
I.W.W. members were not hamstrung by agreements that obligated workers to, in effect, protect 
employer property.  
At the level of individual actions, sabotage was an impossibly capacious category. 
Quoting a pamphlet on its English predecessor, the “Go Canny,” Pouget wrote that it consisted in 
“systematically applying the formula: ‘Bad wages, bad labour.’” The following example from an 
1889 railwaymen’s strike—which Pouget claimed was the first manifestation of sabotage as 
sabotage in France—was an open threat by the union to “put the locomotives in such a condition 
as to make it impossible to run them.” 34 Sabotage was, in one example, precisely what it is 
typically understood to be: “a little sand or emery in the gear of those machines which like 
fabulous monsters mark the exploitation of the workers,” to render them “palsied and useless.”35 
In another example, sabotage was merely pickets to prevent the circulation of trains. Or, the 
changing of patterns before a strike in a fur factory. Printers could send uncorrected proofs to 
print and mix up cases of type. Wasting materials was another means of sabotage, reportedly 
practiced by Parisian bill posters who added tallow candles to their paste and used twice as much 
as was necessary. Painters could dilute and condense colors and anyone in a service industry or 
professional position could practice open mouth sabotage by announcing to consumers the 
“frauds and trickeries” of their employers.  
Smith referred to what amounted to a slowdown pegged to wages. Because of a 
widespread practice of sabotage in England, “the brick masons there,” he recounted, “lay, as a 
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days work, less than one third the number of brick required from their brother craftsmen in 
America. Any reduction in pay is met with a counter reduction in the work.”36 Workers could 
clock in and out for fellow workers; or, the time clock itself might “have the unaccountable habit 
of getting out of order.”37 Sabotage could thus be a secret show of solidarity amongst workers. It 
could also be symbolic and even whimsical. Smith gives us an account of a farmer who, having 
replaced a striking crew, visits his farm to find that the union men he had unknowingly hired had 
planted “1000 young trees…upside down, their roots waving to the breeze as mute evidence of 
solidarity and sabotage.” Or, a “gang of section men working on a railroad” might respond to a 
cut in their wages by having “two inches cut from the scoops” of their shovels and return to work 
with the proclamation “short pay, short shovels.”38 It was reported that during a strike in 
California's Imperial Valley, “every car on the local sidetrack Tuesday night, had its air hose cut. 
I.W.W. labels were also pasted on every glass of the many paned windows of the passenger 
depot.”39  
Apocryphal or not, the examples were both vindicating and plausible. Whether carried 
out by a group or an individual “by reason of his strong class desires,” sabotage was an 
expression of working class solidarity and “working class solidarity is simply the result of a 
consciousness of power.”40 In self-reinforcing fashion, practicing sabotage allowed workers to 
experience this power. So while “sabotage may mean the direct destruction of property” or 
“indirect destruction through organized inefficiency” or, conversely “may proceed from a greater 
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degree of efficiency than is desired by the employing class” the thing that made it sabotage and 
not vandalism was its “power to solidify labor.” The practice itself gave way to “a consciousness 
of economic might [that] springs from the knowledge…that employers have no force save that 
given by the labor of the slave class.”41 
Jack Miller, an itinerant agricultural laborer, explained how sabotage could be used by 
workers to control the length of their workday. For Miller, the distinction between the “conscious 
withdrawal of efficiency” and the destruction of property was immaterial. Interrupting the 
rhythm of machinery by disabling it was the withdrawal of efficiency. 
Sabotage meant the conscious withdrawal of worker efficiency. You might be 
working on a threshing machine. If you threw the bundles fast and in a certain 
way, there would be a lot of waste. Teeth in the machine might get broken off and 
the stacker could get clogged. The farmer saw that he would get less wheat in 
twelve hours than he could get in eight if we were working with more 
efficiency.42 
 
Flynn similarly argued that sabotage was “the withdrawal of worker efficiency” in any 
form: “Sabotage means either to slacken up and interfere with the quantity, or to botch in your 
skill and interfere with the quality…or to give poor service.”43 But in the end, sabotage could not 
be precisely delineated. There could be no program of sabotage, properly speaking, because it 
was always contingent on particular working conditions. “I have not given you a rigidly defined 
thesis on sabotage,” Flynn wrote:  
...because sabotage is in the process of making. Sabotage itself is not clearly 
defined. Sabotage is as broad and changing as industry, as flexible as the 
imagination and passions of humanity. Every day workingmen and women are 
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discovering new forms of sabotage, and the stronger their rebellious imagination 
is the more sabotage they are going to develop.44 
 
To lay out a program of sabotage would be as pointless as laying out a program for production in 
all industries or defining invention once and for all.  
What differentiated these activities from commonplace mischief and vandalism was their 
class feeling. Although from the perspective of legal authority, this sensibility did not need to be 
particularly evolved. Long before Pouget “baptized” sabotage, the French penal code recognized 
the threat and distinguished between vandalism generally and the destruction of an employer’s 
property by an employee, assigning to the latter a much more severe sentence.45  But according 
to Pouget, sabotage was something of a different order entirely. It is slightly, but crucially 
different from intentional destruction and inefficiency for the sake of leverage in a localized 
dispute. In 1881, telegraph operators in France had cut off all telegraphic connections, but this 
was the result of a “sullen anger” that had begun to “circulate among them” and caused them to 
resort to a “trick.”  Only after the CGT’s “theoretical consecration” in 1895, did sabotage “take 
its place amongst the other means of social warfare.”  Only when it was conceptually shifted into 
the register of a class conscious action did it become, in the words of Giovannitti, “a monstrous 
thing.” Or as Flynn put it, “Everything is ‘against the law’ once it becomes large enough for the 
law to take cognizance that it is in the best interests of the working class.”46  
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Worker Sabotage and Capitalist Sabotage: A Critique of Violence 
What distinguished sabotage from vandalism and even instrumentalized destruction and 
interference more generally, was its announcement or “baptism” as a source of working-class 
power. Sabotage, in its various practical forms, was elaborated into a theory through one central 
and predictable distinction—the working class and the capitalist class. Because of its precise 
location in workers’ interactions with the instruments of production, sabotage distilled these 
otherwise abstract categories into material terms. Articles, pamphlets, songs, and poems about 
sabotage not only threatened mischief, they effectively reduced class difference, class interest, 
and class conflict to an easily imaginable set of activities: ‘worker sabotage’ and ‘capitalist 
sabotage.’ This binary conceptualization allowed for the succinct elaboration of the central tenets 
of a Marxist theory of class while simultaneously identifying concrete examples of employer 
exploitation and suggesting immediate ways to assert working class power.  
The categories of worker sabotage and capitalist sabotage also offered a sophisticated 
analysis of how violence was defined and deployed under capitalism. Worker sabotage was a 
very particular form of violence that restricted itself to ‘inert’ property and defined itself 
against—indeed offered itself as an antidote to—the often unacknowledged, inherent violence of 
capitalism. In suggesting these terms, Pouget outlined what we would now refer to as structural 
violence:  
The detractors and slanderers of the working class were never scandalised and 
never show any anger against another sort of sabotage truly criminal, monstrous 




the capitalists which reaps human victims and deprives men of their health by 
sticking like a leech at the very sources of life.47 
 
Worker sabotage only appeared violent against the backdrop of an economic system 
dependent on wars, cheap goods, and disposable labor. By opposing the categories of worker and 
capitalist sabotage, the I.W.W. offered an analysis of objective violence and in the same breath—
the same word—a strategy for interrupting the smooth functioning of this catastrophic apparatus. 
It also applied the logic offered by this schema repeatedly in articles with headlines such as 
“Violence is Legal for Bosses; Illegal for Workers” and articles justifying theft through similar 
inversions of common sense understandings of ownership.48 The category of capitalist sabotage 
identified how intentional, specific, and subjective the systemic violence of capitalism actually 
was.49 And it did this by enumerating the bodily injuries and deaths of workers and showing that 
these were, in fact, performed by a  clearly identifiable agent.  It named systemic or objective 
violence and in so doing assigned to it a subjective character—that of the ‘the boss’. Individual 
acts of violence are appealing in their way because their causes are identifiable, finite, and 
therefore subject to correction. By defining capitalist sabotage, the I.W.W. not only made the 
tacit, ‘everyday resistance’ of workers visible, it made the tacit, ‘everyday’ forms of capitalist 
control visible as well. This went beyond the symbolic challenge that James C. Scott ascribes to 
visible, political resistance. In offering a framework for such a reversal, sabotage presented 
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something that was indeed “monstrous” to its targets: a clear announcement of the violence 
inherent to the smooth functioning of capitalist production and a declaration of workers’ ability 
to disrupt it without detection. Sabotage was thus a symbolic threat of continued tacit rebellion.50 
Worker sabotage, as one anonymous pamphlet defined it, was “anything that the worker, 
acting for his class interests, can do at the point of production or distribution to hamper the 
processes by which profit is made and capital perpetuated and increased.”51 These actions, 
however, were not without limits. Worker sabotage was emphatically non-violent if, that is, 
violence could be limited to harming persons. “It never results in the loss of life or limb.”52 The 
non-violent character of worker sabotage was constantly reiterated.53 “The workers strongly 
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insist,” wrote Pouget “on the specific character of sabotage which consists in hurting the boss not 
the consumer.” In many cases, sabotage was arguably in the service of the consumer, who was 
not so much exploited as extorted by the capitalist class. “Open mouth” sabotage was 
particularly effective in this regard; druggists and workers in the food industry should be 
sabotaging their bosses by announcing the myriad ways that food and pharmaceuticals are 
adulterated. Indeed, Pouget suggests that not engaging in this form of sabotage is a sort of 
criminal negligence: 
It is indeed deplorable to notice how often the workers lend themselves to the 
most abominable tricks against their brothers and to the detriment of public health 
in general, without their realizing the great responsibility that befalls them for 
actions which, though not within the criminal law, nevertheless do not cease to be 
crimes.54 
 
 That which does not fall “within the criminal law” yet does not cease to be a crime is an 
apt description of what French and American syndicalists dubbed “capitalist sabotage.” Like its 
working class counterpart, it encompassed a broad range of activities as well as failures or 
refusals to act at all. The term “capitalist sabotage” was assigned to a range of common practices 
by business owners so widespread and unexceptional that they collectively appeared normal, 
even natural.  
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The phrase “capitalist sabotage” was, in these formulations, almost redundant. 
Capitalists, so the arguments went, can’t actually run businesses without sabotage.55 The crucial 
difference between the two forms of sabotage was not tactical or formal. Capitalist sabotage was, 
like its workerist variant, dependent on restriction, reduction, and interference. Nor was the 
difference strictly economic even though capitalists were in a position to capture surplus value 
whereas workers could only reduce it. The primary distinction between the two was that of 
violence: capitalist sabotage caused harm to people—both workers and consumers—rather than 
property. Thus renaming industrial accidents as “capitalist sabotage” pointed to and subjectivized 
the systemic violence of capitalism—violence that was ignored in part through an obsessive 
attention to the apparently subjective violence of the workers. The repeated condemnation of the 
workers’ sabotage “against inert, painless and lifeless things” functioned as a means of 
maintaining a definition of violence that was not only class-based, but solidly in the register of 
the “subjective.” That is, identifiable instances of violence that, because of the agents’ relative 
social position as workers, ruptured the social fabric and threatened the integrity of the legal 
foundation upon which this other structural violence was constructed—structural violence, in the 
face of which “the detractors and slanderers of the working class were never scandalized.” 56 
Renaming the systemic violence of capitalism as “capitalist sabotage” allowed for an 
enumeration of activities that shifted the normal function of business from the objective, 
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background conditions of social organization—that which “constitutes the element in which this 
society breathes”—into a subjective register.57  
Capitalist sabotage included much more than the aforementioned adulteration of 
pharmaceuticals. Pouget provided a long list of the “saboteurs” toward which the bourgeoisie 
remained largely “impassive” and “indifferent.” It included bakers who adulterate flour, iron and 
steel barons who built faulty and weak boilers for war ships, building and railway contractors 
who endangered passengers and residents with subpar construction materials. All captains of 
industry were saboteurs “because all trick, fake, adulterate, defraud, and swindle.”58 From the 
injuries “inflicted by capitalist sabotage,” he dramatically concluded “it is human blood which 
gushes out in streams.”59  
 Smith provided a litany of capitalist sabotage as well and even extended his analysis into 
the realm of speech.60 Emphasizing the importance of propagandizing to both camps he wrote 
that “several of the so-called ‘muck-raking’ magazines have been forced to suspend through use 
of sabotage.”61 Sabotage, here, became a political activity but the loosening of its definition did 
not lessen its potency. The categorical linking of censorship to shirking and state power to 
misplaced or misused tools, legitimated and magnified the power of workers to disrupt an 
amorphous system with individual and very concrete actions. An open and political program of 
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sabotage thus had the power to legitimate the activities of the economically disenfranchised—to 
validate and thus encourage both their resentment and whatever actions were taken in relation to 
it—and to potentially multiply the acts of tacit everyday resistance that were both costly and 
difficult to detect. It not only raised practice to the level of theory, it anchored revolutionary 
theory in existing practices, amplifying an ideological disruption at the point of production. This 
was a terrifying proposition indeed, and one that was encouraged by endless references to the 
human cost of capitalist sabotage.   
William “Big Bill” Haywood provided one of the most notorious examples during a 1911 
speech given at New York City’s Cooper Union during which he unequivocally declared his 
solidarity with John J. and James B. McNamara who had recently confessed to dynamiting the 
Los Angeles Times building which led to the accidental deaths of twenty-one employees. 
The McNamara boys who went to San Quentin out of Los Angeles know what the 
class struggle means. They knew and for that reason my heart is with them. Let 
the Capitalists count their own dead. There are 21 dead in Los Angeles and we 
have 207 dead in Briceville, Tenn. The deaths in Briceville were just as much 
murder as any premeditated crime could have been. The mine owners knew an 
unventilated mine meant a mine ready to explode.62 
 
Haywood made further remarks concerning class war and the general strike and repeatedly 
announced that there was no reason for workers to be “law-abiding.”  
Haywood’s militaristic framing of the conflict through the comparison of human 
casualties on both sides, reflected the fatal reality of many industries, but sabotage was often far 
more mundane. Worker sabotage and capitalist sabotage often intersected, as in cases of open 
mouth sabotage where the worker’s interference was composed of announcing employer 
sabotage. The sabotage encouraged by Boyd during the Paterson silk strike—to adulterate the 
                                            




silk dyes using certain chemicals—provided a remarkable example of such a confluence. While 
discussing Boyd’s advice with the strikers, the I.W.W. discovered that this was, in many cases, 
precisely what the company was doing. Flynn recounts that an investigation by the I.W.W. into 
employer practices in the silk mills, revealed that “the sabotage of silk fabrics was being done as 
a usual practice by the employers.”63  
It would be a mistake to reduce sabotage to its most extreme expressions. It was not 
synonymous with the anarchist notion of “propaganda of the deed.” It did not always seek to call 
attention to itself. Likewise, gruesome industrial accidents, while tragically common, were 
hardly the sum total of exploitation and poverty. The literal explosions of violence on both sides 
of the class war were continuous with more subtle variations of conflict, control, and disruption, 
but the extremity of an event like the LA Times bombing can be misleading. When Giovannitti 
wrote that sabotage becomes a monstrous thing when it is named, he was not thinking of 
something so apparently monstrous as the death of twenty-one persons by dynamite but of 
something like Boyd’s advocacy of adulterated dyes. 
Certain forms of sabotage were less offensive than others. Giovannitti argued that 
slowdowns needed little justification whereas sabotage that would destroy a piece of machinery 
or make a product unsalable was “a real and deliberate trespassing into the bourgeois sanctum—
a direct interference with the bosses own property.” This form of sabotage “must create its own 
ethics.”64  
The working out of a new ethics, or the elaboration of a working class morality was a 
crucial aspect of the shift from mere vandalism to conscious sabotage. Violence is defined within 
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constantly shifting frameworks. It is generally within a legal framework that we distinguish 
between violence and non-violence and that legal framework does not permit inquiry into its own 
justification. A legal regime that seeks to monopolize violence must call every threat or 
challenge to that regime a violent one.65 The constant reiteration of the non-violence of sabotage, 
the distinction between harm to people and harm to property, reflected an understanding of the 
ability of sanctioned violence to appear as civil order or to disappear into ‘accidents’. Insisting 
that property destruction by workers was morally justified was not a tidy, contained, and finite 
proposition. It challenged the basis of the morality on which acceptable forms of violence rested 
by identifying this morality as a collateral product of property relations. The bedrock of 
bourgeois morality, it turned out, was nothing more than private property and by attacking 
property—literally and figuratively—sabotage threatened more than the profits tied to that 
particular piece of property. It threatened the very concept of property and thus the entire moral 
framework upon which the designations ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ rested. Sabotage was an 
expansive moral argument against the sanctity of property. “Even so-called sexual immorality,” 
wrote Smith, “is condemned while universally practiced, because it violates the principle of 
inheritance in property.”66 
It was not by any means unknown that capital was organized in its own interests. Walter 
Lippmann, a journalist, author, and ambivalent socialist, recognized that employers were 
“organized for obstruction” against unions and that labor was fighting a legitimate battle that 
required a certain amount of illegality and violence. “Perhaps it is true,” he wrote, “that there is 
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no such thing as peaceful picketing. There is no such thing as a peaceful coast defense or a 
gentlemanly border patrol.”67 But the I.W.W. was not content with merely asserting that a certain 
type of violence was justified in a certain situation. They insisted that property destruction was of 
an entirely different order—that violence should be strictly defined as bodily harm. The oft-
repeated call to “hit the boss where it really hurts…in his pocket book,” conveyed a meaningful 
displacement of workers’ anger from the body of their employer to his wealth. “Sabotage” wrote 
Giovannitti, “has nothing to do with violence.” It is a way of “chloroforming…the ogres of steel 
and fire that watch and multiply the treasures of king capital.”68 In other words, sabotage 
wouldn’t ‘hurt’ at all. It couldn’t. It was hoped that great structural disruptions would follow 
these attacks on inanimate objects, but it was not a call to revolutionary violence as such. Like 
the general strike in which it would play a central role, it was supposed to bring about a sort of 
bloodless coup.  
The emphasis on this distinction between property and people was not incidental or 
insignificant. Consider some of the other strains of revolutionary thought that would have been 
circulating at the time.  Johann Most’s “propaganda of the deed” was a close anarchist cousin. In 
Italy, Marinetti had issued the Futurist Manifesto—a romantic celebration of violence, war and 
the destructive potential of technology. Alexander Berkman’s attempt to assassinate Henry Clay 
Frick was not so far in the past as to be forgotten. The successful 1901 assassination of William 
McKinley by the self-declared follower of Emma Goldman, Leon Czolgosz also colored the 
moment of the I.W.W.’s founding. But the distinction between people and property was more 
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than a cynical attempt to avoid public disapprobation or distance the organization from its close 
anarchist cousin.  
That one could wage a class war without harming anyone was idealistic to say the least.69 
But the justification of sabotage compelled I.W.W. worker-intellectuals to elaborate an 
alternative moral system anchored in this basic division between human beings and inanimate 
property that had yet to be clearly articulated by even the most humanist iterations of socialism. 
The revolutionary proletariat had a “special mentality and hence a special morality of its own,” 
one that is principally organized around the benefit of the working class and into which sabotage 
could be seamlessly integrated. Sabotage was a moral affront, not because it was violent, but 
simply because it announced itself. It claimed that every bit of theft and destruction by workers 
that interrupted, slowed down, or prevented the accumulation of wealth by their employers, was 
a moral good. Not tactically expedient in certain situations—just good. As Giovannitti put it in 
appropriately religious terms: “A sin is absolvable only when it is confessed as such, but 
becomes a damnable one when an explanation is found for it.”70  
As a general practice that remained hidden and thus compliant with reigning definitions 
of legality and morality, sabotage was just such an absolvable transgression. It fit neatly into a 
legal framework of crime and punishment. Once it had been announced, justified, and 
“advocated as a good thing,” it exited the realm of confession and absolution. It was, to extend 
the metaphor, transubstantiated, emerging as a “dynamic and disintegrating force,” because it 
“[wrested] from the political state one of its cardinal faculties.” Workers, in other words, had 
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claimed for themselves what Max Weber identified as the constitutive function of the state—the 
legitimate use of force. The rejection of the state’s legitimacy, implicit in the appropriation of the 
use of force, made the existence of the I.W.W. incompatible with government. But its insistence 
on direct action and sabotage in the economic field as the primary mode of social transformation 
also placed it in direct conflict with other opponents of capitalist state power. In 1912, the 
Socialist Party effectively excommunicated the I.W.W. As an organization that both saw the 
state apparatus as the means of restoring power to the working class and had a considerable 
ideological and practical investment in demonstrating its own legitimacy as a political party, it 
could not tolerate the I.W.W.’s advocacy of sabotage. 
Socialism versus Syndicalism 
Sabotage was officially banned by the Socialist Party in 1912 by way of a simple but profound 
linguistic substitution. The denunciation of sabotage took the form of an amendment to the 
membership clause in the Party’s constitution. Up to that point, any advocacy of violence 
“against the person” resulted in automatic expulsion. The revised version replaced this injunction 
against harm to persons with “sabotage.”  
 From a purely instrumental perspective, sabotage threatened the Socialist Party’s 
electoral legitimacy. The desire to expand socialism’s reach by appealing to middle class 
progressives made disassociating with the I.W.W., and their advocacy of a practice that attacked 
the principle of private property, seem particularly urgent. During the election years of 1910 and 
1911, Socialist Party candidates had performed surprisingly well. The Party had elected “56 
mayors, 305 aldermen and councilmen, 22 police officials, 155 members of school boards, and 4 




Berger had already taken his seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.71 By the end of 1911, 
1,141 socialists held public offices in 36 states across 324 municipalities. Party membership had 
doubled between 1909 and 1911 and by 1912 it had reached a record 118,000 members. Eugene 
Debs was running for president for the fourth time and would poll over 900,000 votes—a 
striking 6% of the votes cast nationally.72 Given these electoral and membership gains, the party 
was understandably anxious not to alienate the voting public. This aggravated old antipathies 
between the Party’s far left, syndicalist members, epitomized by Haywood (who held a seat on 
the executive council), and its more conservative, reformist wing most visibly represented by 
Victor Berger and Morris Hillquit of New York as well as Job Harriman, whose promising 
mayoral campaign in Los Angeles had been recently derailed by the McNamara confession. In 
its broadest definition—encompassing slowdowns as well as property destruction—sabotage 
occupied ambiguous legal territory. As a philosophy, it suggested that a certain amount of 
disorder was a necessary component of change. More importantly though, it’s “advocacy and use 
[helped to] destroy the ‘property illusion.’”73 Sabotage was thus fundamentally incompatible 
with the ethos of a sympathetic, but comfortable and property-owning middle class whose 
experience of legal order was largely positive.  
Sabotage was, among other things, a repository for more general class anxieties. Debates 
over sabotage within the Party expressed what were essentially class positions as tactical 
positions. Hillquit’s evaluation of the membership base of the I.W.W., made clear in Socialism 
Summed Up (published one year later), is telling. “The Socialist Party,” he wrote, “recruits its 
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adherents mostly from among the better situated, better trained and more intelligent workers. The 
unfortunate ‘slum proletarians,’ whose energies, hopes and ambitions have been crushed out by 
misery and destitution, can only rarely be relied on to rally to the virile battle cry of Socialism.”74 
This then was not simply an argument about effective tactics, but a conflict between a better type 
of socialist and ‘slum proletarians’. On the one side were elections and political power; on the 
other, direct action and union power, each corresponding to a distinct class composition. 
Haywood, despite his membership and position on the executive council, firmly believed in the 
priority of union organization over political activity. The official organs of the I.W.W. regularly 
derided political participation and had little interest in encouraging workers to vote, viewing all 
state functions as a mere extension of capitalist interests and the law as a means of enforcing 
class divisions.  
Haywood was in the habit of making provocative speeches declaring workers exempt 
from laws designed to exploit them. Even though his work with the Socialist Party indicated an 
implicit belief in the possibility of a state and legal system that would benefit workers, 
Haywood’s faith in industrial unionism remained thoroughly bound up in a principled disregard 
for the law and its enforcement. Working in the political field did not detract from his conviction 
that direct action by workers was the most effective means of obtaining widespread social 
transformation. The potential political fallout from these actions, including sabotage, remained, 
in his view, irrelevant. In 1911, these beliefs were made abundantly clear: “I am not a law-
abiding citizen,” he announced to the crowd gathered at New York’s Cooper Union. “More than 
that,” he went on, “I do not think that you here ought be law-abiding citizens.”75 Such a position 
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was obviously untenable for a party invested in winning elections, but this announcement 
indicated a more fundamental disjuncture. While socialist and syndicalist beliefs concerning 
rightful ownership and the social organization of production were in concert, they operated in 
entirely different temporal registers generated by divergent strategies.  
The I.W.W. was operating with what might be called a vulgar labor theory of value—
insisting that the workers already had a right to the value that they produced. Socialists may have 
shared this belief but their claim on this property was politely deferred. Direct action, sabotage 
and strikes, did not occur in the future. These actions—the very locus and content of workers’ 
power according to the tenets of industrial unionism—did not slowly arise through small 
changes. They were not enacted within the terms—contractual, moral, legal—set by their 
antagonists. Sabotage was, in this sense, a sort of pre-figurative expropriation. It anticipated the 
moment in the future when property would be returned to its rightful owner and acted as if this 
moment had already arrived.  
Socialism, by contrast, existed in the future and was, by its very nature as a political 
party. It was constituted by the procedures, institutions, and laws that Haywood deemed 
illegitimate. Presumably, Haywood would have urged workers to obey just, socialist laws but 
these conditions were yet mere abstractions. The very logic of union power was intractably 
presentist. Asking workers to express themselves through political participation was, in some 
sense, demanding that they indefinitely defer control over their working and living conditions. 
“No Socialist,” Haywood asserted “can be a law-abiding citizen.”  Coercion was the only way to 
bring about socialism and acting within extant laws was not only ineffective, it was counter-




the columns of fighting organizations…he removes it from the class struggle.”76 The relationship 
between industrial unionism and political participation was not simply fraught, brought to its 
logical conclusion it was structurally unsustainable. 
Debs’ aversion to property destruction developed directly out of his experience as 
president of the American Railway Union (A.R.U.). Bound up as it was with his time organizing 
an industrial union, his views on the role of violence in labor agitation were more ambivalent 
than those held by party members with primarily political careers. Called to testify to the United 
States Strike Commission in 1894 following the A.R.U.’s strike against Pullman, Debs was 
charged with the difficult task of denying accusations that the union encouraged property 
destruction, while simultaneously defending the workers who had engaged in it. When asked to 
relate his “own observations as to riot, acts of violence, destruction of property, or anything of 
that kind,” Debs was initially evasive. In response, he reiterated the conditions that led to the 
strike, delicately explaining that concessions could only be won by organized coercion without 
referencing any property destruction: “The railroad companies have never increased wages of 
their own accord. I would like to have that put upon record as one of the reasons for any unrest 
and lack of confidence in the ranks of railway employees, for every concession the railway 
companies have ever made has been wrung from them by the power of organized effort.”77 After 
elaborating some of the specific conditions that led to the strike—the Santa Fe line, for example, 
had been in arrears to its employees for two to four months—he concluded, “any class of 
employees, working under such conditions, are almost right to enter a protest on behalf of labor 
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against the injustice of the corporations.”78 Debs was adamant, however, that by protest he meant 
a peaceful withdrawal of labor power and nothing more. “We want to win as becomes law-
abiding citizens; we have got a right to quit in a body, and our right ends there.” To this end, 
Debs and the union leadership responded to intimations of “trouble,” with a series of statements 
and documents that “appealed to our members throughout the country under no circumstances to 
countenance violence, but to keep away from the company’s property altogether.”79 His position 
on sabotage, “that there is nothing to be gained by violence,” remained consistent and in 1912, in 
response to Haywood’s outrages, Debs reiterated his dedication to lawful tactics in the face of 
laws that were, as he stated to the strike commission, “enforced without merit against the 
employees and are ignored with reference to their application to the companies.”80 Writing about 
the Socialist Party’s constitutional revision, he characterized sabotage as a “reactionary” tactic 
while defending industrial unionism in principle and reiterating his own disdain for capitalist 
property laws. “As a revolutionist I can have no respect for capitalist property laws, nor the least 
scruple about violating them. I hold all such laws to have been enacted through chicanery, fraud, 
and corruption, with the sole end in view of dispossessing, robbing, and enslaving the working 
class.”81 But Debs did have respect for these laws in practice. He had made this abundantly clear 
during his congressional testimony two decades earlier and held fast to his view that property 
destruction was never tactically desirable. This abstract understanding of injustice did not mean, 
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he wrote, “that I propose making an individual lawbreaker of myself and butting my head against 
the stone wall of existing property laws.”82  
Given his early alliance with the I.W.W. and his dedication to industrial unionism more 
generally, Debs must have found the prospect of a break between union and party distressing. 
Furthermore, Debs was far from being on good terms with Berger and his allies. But in 1894, 
when asked by the strike commission if there was “any specific rule in [the ARU’s] constitution 
or in the constitution of the different unions providing that a man shall be expelled who 
participates in any violence,” Debs found that he could only answer that the regulation of 
member behavior was left to the locals. When asked whether he thought that such a provision 
should exist he answered “yes.”83 
 Though their attitude toward the form and application of current laws was quite similar, 
Haywood and Debs couldn’t have been further apart on the practical question of legality in the 
labor movement. “[The worker] knows,” wrote Haywood and fellow I.W.W. Frank Bohn, “that 
the present laws of property are made by and for the capitalists. Therefore, he does not hesitate to 
break them.”84 This inducement to action was not simply tactical. Haywood and many members 
of the I.W.W. saw sabotage as essentially empowering: “a consciousness of economic might 
springs from the knowledge thus gained.” It was a way for individual workers to put theory into 
practice and thus experience power, however fleeting. Debs, by contrast, thought that tactics 
such as sabotage “do violence to the class psychology of the workers and cannot be successfully 
                                            
82  Debs, 1.  
 
83  Strike Commission, 34. 
 
84  William D. Haywood and Frank Bohn, Industrial Socialism, quoted in Eugene Debs, “Sound Socialist Tactics” 




inculcated as mass doctrine.”85 This reflects a persistent misreading of I.W.W. endorsements of 
sabotage as individual rather than class activity. Furthermore, it may be noted that the anxiety 
fueling the sabotage debate resulted precisely from the possibility that such tactics could be 
successfully inculcated as mass doctrine. And the issue of industrial unionism’s relationship to 
the Socialist Party—as a parallel but autonomous actor in the economic field—was given 
urgency by the fear that such tactics would be adopted. Or fear that they already had.  
Just days before the decision to add language about sabotage to the constitution’s 
membership clause, the left wing and supporters of Haywood had won a major victory with the 
adoption of a resolution put forth by the Committee on Labor Organizations and Their Relation 
to the Party. The resolution “reaffirmed the Socialist Party’s neutrality on ‘questions of form of 
organization or technical methods of action in the industrial struggle’… [and] called on unions to 
undertake the ‘task of organizing the unorganized, especially the immigrants who stand in 
greatest need of organized protection.’”86 It was all but an endorsement of the I.W.W. and an 
apparent setback in ongoing reformist efforts to unseat Haywood from the Executive Council. 
An attempt to repudiate Haywood had been made in March of 1912 “on the grounds that he had 
made certain statements deprecating political action,” which was certainly true, but the recent 
success of the I.W.W. led strike against textile manufacturers in Lawrence, Massachusetts made 
the resolution unpopular.87  
The singular goal of ridding the party of Haywood’s noisome presence gave the 
amendment added momentum but banning sabotage also reflected the conservative members’ 
broader ideological commitments. Among these was a preference for the A.F.L. over the I.W.W. 
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in spite of Gompers’s venomous opposition to socialism.88 Rather than supporting alternatives to 
the A.F.L., such as the I.W.W., many party members encouraged a program of spreading 
socialist doctrines among members of A.F.L. unions referred to as “boring from within.” This 
preference for the A.F.L. not only reflected the reformist conviction that extant institutions could 
be politically altered without disrupting their essential forms, it demonstrated an affinity with the 
U.S. government’s bourgeoning policy of conciliation towards ‘legitimate’ and allegedly law-
abiding unions.89  
The amendment that concerned the language of Article II, Section 6 of the party 
constitution, and changed ‘against the person’ to ‘sabotage’, was a clear statement of a deep 
aversion to the destruction of property regardless of the conditions under which that property was 
acquired and maintained. The Socialist Party position on sabotage was thus constructed in a 
manner identical to its articulation in anti-criminal syndicalism laws.90 William Preston goes so 
far as to refer to it as the “ideological forerunner” of these laws.91 The difference between 
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sabotage according to the I.W.W. and the state or the Socialist Party did not lie in their definition 
of sabotage as such, but in the moral distinction to be drawn between people and things. The 
Socialist Party, along with the state, assumed a sort of moral equivalence between the destruction 
of property and bodily harm. The revised version thus read: 
Any member of the party who opposes political action or advocates crime, 
sabotage or other methods of violence as a weapon of the working class to aid in 
its emancipation shall be expelled from membership in the party. Political action 
shall be construed to mean participation in elections for public office and practical 
legislative and administrative work along the lines of the Socialist Party 
platform.92  
 
W.L. Garver, a delegate from Missouri, who introduced the motion to “amend by striking out the 
word, ‘against the person’ in the second line and inserting the word ‘sabotage’” expressed his 
concerns as follows: 
The qualifying words “against the person” imply that if the crime is against 
property it might be permitted. Under such a construction we might be considered 
as advocates of dynamite. Under that construction we might be considered 
advocates of railroad wrecking. I contend that it is high time for this convention to 
take a distinct stand and declare that it is opposed to every form of crime and 
violence (great cheering). Why this committee composed as it is of representative 
men of the convention should put in a qualifying clause implying that crime must 
be against the person to be denounced I cannot understand. You all know that Jim 
McNamara said that he didn’t intend to kill anyone in Los Angeles; that he simply 
intended to injure the building that was blown up.93  
 
The debates that follow the motion are largely semantic—many delegates suggested that section 
two be stricken altogether for the sheer confusion regarding the meaning of the word. Others 
contended that it was perfectly clear what sabotage meant. Only one delegate spoke against the 
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constitutional amendment in terms that addressed the use of so-called legal force by organized 
capital and indicated the danger of formally disavowing a tactic that was being regularly used to 
imprison and prosecute workers and organizers. An attempt to amend the amendment by striking 
the whole paragraph was then introduced. Max Hayes of Cleveland, echoing the resolution on 
trade unions, argued that the Socialist Party should not be telling labor organizers what to do and 
should “leave the industrial field to the unions.”94  
 The argument failed. An open discussion of sabotage had made certain realities of labor 
power and class conflict unavoidable. The industrial field was murky legally speaking. If only 
because workers were operating in a landscape that was not of their own making, much of their 
activity was not ‘law-abiding’’ The distinction between violence against people and violence 
against property was central to a morality born of the realities of on the ground conflict. Its 
rejection for a simpler injunction to accept and obey “the current definition of crime,” revealed 
an insurmountable difference between those operating in a political register and the workers 
negotiating conditions at the point of production.95 In the words of one Wisconsin delegate, “the 
crime against property is a thing that this party cannot stand for.”96 
Conclusion 
 The avoidance of sabotage as a subject and the near disappearance of the word from labor 
history (replaced by ‘direct action’) bear out Walker Smith’s pronouncement that it is a term too 
dangerous to be mentioned. Sympathetic historians have unconsciously repeated and reinforced 
the systematic state repression of the philosophy of sabotage by attempting to distance the 
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organization from its advocacy. They have variously proclaimed that it played a minor role, 
entirely ignored it, attributed its advocacy to a handful of violent anarchists at the fringes of the 
organization and, most insidiously, declared that it was ‘merely’ speech rather than a practical 
tool for economic organization and resistance. In a sense, this could be seen as an internalization 
of the logic of its prosecution and thus maintained what Kristin Ross has dubbed a “police 
conception of history” —a repetition of the injunction to move along because there is “nothing to 
see here.”  
But there is something to see. By avoiding sabotage, we not only willfully ignore large 
amounts of writing, we suppress an argument about the relationship between violence and 
property that remains useful. And, we reinforce the liberal consensus that protest must be non-
violent—that property destruction is always illegitimate. Sabotage was not simply another word 
for direct action but a carefully articulated, radical critique of capitalist social relations that was 
inseparable from its existence as a tactic. Among other things, sabotage provided, and more 
importantly enacted, a critique of private property. As a consequence, the circulation of the word 
“sabotage” orally and in print was an unacceptable challenge to the status quo. A serious look at 
sabotage, and the vicious legal and extra-legal reactions that it elicited, exposes the relationship 
between politics, morality, and an economic order founded on private property. It suggests that 
property destruction constitutes a sort of limit to our collective political imagination—an 





Chapter 2: Job Conscious Sabotage: 
The Fiction of ‘Pure and Simple’ Unionism 
There is a titanic struggle now being waged…wherein two classes of society meet 
in industrial warfare, and crash and jostle each other like two great ships in a 
storm, where the workmen are striving with a courage and manhood born in a 
liberty-loving people to resist the oppression and tyranny of the employers. 
  -- The Bridgemen’s Magazine, February 1906 
 
I tell you that the honest working people in this country are being most brutally 
tyrannized over by certain elements in the labor union and are driven, in some 
cases worse than the slaves were before the war. The common man is made to 
suffer and pay the bills and in many cases the oppression is so fiendish and subtle 
as to make the citizens cry out for and demand relief. 
  -- C.W. Post, The Los Angeles Times, January 1906 
 
 
On October 1, 1910, the Los Angeles Times building exploded killing twenty-one 
people.1 A suitcase full of dynamite left behind the building ignited several barrels of flammable 
printer’s ink starting a fire that lead to a secondary explosion of the gas piping. In April of 1911, 
James B. (J.B.) McNamara was arrested along with his brother, the Secretary Treasurer of the 
International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers (I.A.B.S.I.W.), John Jay (J.J.) 
McNamara. Suspecting a frame-up, organized labor rallied to the brothers’ defense and by the 
end of the month, the A.F.L. had concluded that the explosion was caused by a gas leak rather 
than dynamite. Then, in December, the defendants unexpectedly changed their plea to guilty.2   
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the metal workers over what was known as the open shop—the name adopted by employers’ associations to describe 
workplaces employing non-union labor--and in June, the ironworkers called a strike.  





The bombing of a news outlet was a symbolically hefty gesture much closer to the 
anarchist “propaganda of the deed” than the many worksite explosions that preceded it. It even 
recalled the anarchist appeal to target individual capitalists for assassination (unexploded bombs 
were also found near the homes of Harrison Gray Otis and the M.M.A.’s secretary Felix 
Zehandelaar).3  But the Times bombing was not an expression of revolutionary ideals. It was no 
more than a particularly visible event in an ongoing conflict that was being fought soundly 
within the familiar idiom of free markets and fair shares by a united front of owners against a 
largely non-revolutionary labor force. Non-revolutionary unionism was a necessarily violent and 
destructive affair. The conflict between employers and their workers was not, as both 
sympathetic reformers and antipathetic employers would have it, a matter of miscommunication 
between naturally cooperative parties but a contest of power. Both union members and 
employers understood this and both workers and owners organized to maximize their coercive 
strength. This belligerence produced forms of communication and speech acts that both blurred 
the line between philosophy and action and exceeded the discursive limits of contract and liberal 
consensus. 
Between 1905 and 1911, the I.A.B.S.I.W. carried out between eighty-seven and one 
hundred and ten bombings. The targets were worksites that the union sought to secure for its 
membership. To borrow a phrase from Samuel Gompers, the explosions were a “pure and 
simple” defense of union territory. While every worksite explosion following an unmet union 
demand, occupied a liminal space between speech and action, the LA Times event represented the 
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straightforward use of “bombs as an argument.”4  Because the LA Times was a newspaper, 
dynamite was shifted into the register of speech and propaganda. This particular explosion was 
an explicit acknowledgement of the central role of propaganda in class conflict and the 
relationship between ideological and material control. As such, it functions as a sort of coda for 
the extensive bombing campaign that preceded it.  It was certainly not intended as the last 
explosion, but a newspaper as final act is narratively convenient and invites us to read these other 
explosions as articulate without assuming that anarchism or any other form of anti-statism was 
being expressed.  
This chapter examines the decade leading up to the LA Times bombing—a period that not 
only saw the systematic dynamiting of worksites but also the establishment and growth of 
several employers’ associations aimed at promoting the open shop on a nationwide basis. It was 
also a period of formidable growth for unions, including the formation of a national organization 
for ironworkers, the I.A.B.S.I.W..5 The growth of employers’ associations was, in part, a 
response to union growth and the militancy of both labor unions and employers’ unions was self-
reinforcing. It was at this moment that the very idea of “legitimate,” i.e. peaceful, non-militant 
labor began to emerge against an undesirable, socialistic, anarchist, radical, and generally 
dangerous element. In a 1915 report on the ironworkers for the Commission on Industrial 
Relations, Luke Grant observed that “it is puerile to contend that force and violence are not 
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accompaniments of strikes and lockouts. In the very nature of things they must be.”6 Over time 
though, the ready acknowledgment that force and violence were “in the very nature of things” 
was displaced by a discourse that made it possible to imagine an essentially pacific American 
labor movement that suffered periodic paroxysms of destruction and violence. This peaceful, 
law-abiding version of organized labor was constructed against a foreign, anarchistic, and 
essentially violent element. As many people observed at the time, violence was endemic to 
‘normal’ labor relations.  
Characterizing labor violence as ‘anarchist’ was an opportunistic and convenient means 
of stoking anti-labor sentiment but it also helped to conceal the coercive nature of an 
increasingly united front of employers backed by political and legal institutions. Casting union 
coercion as criminal, exceptional, and alien to normal, American economic relations allowed 
employers to cite this other, albeit largely fabricated, ‘labor’ composed of law-abiding, honest 
Americans with whom there was no conflict. Making violence foreign, in turn, made peaceful 
workers American, and supported the contention that class conflict did not exist in the United 
States. As one N.A.M. member put it, “we have no classes in our country.”7  
The I.A.B.S.I.W.’s use of dynamite reveals that ‘normal’ American labor relations were 
virtually organized around various forms of violence and coercion. Conflicts between unions and 
employers’ associations redefined violence and coercion along ideological lines, each claiming 
in turn, to be exercising their natural rights against the implicitly unjust actions of their 
adversary. In some cases, these contests entirely altered the legal status of certain organized 
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actions such as the boycott. In others, they led to a reconsideration of individual responsibility 
and harm in industrial settings. The I.A.B.S.I.W.’s ongoing conflict with nationally organized 
employers’ associations epitomized an era during which violence was both the engine and the 
object of a radical reorganization of economic and social relations. 
 
Emergence of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers  
 During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the replacement of wooden timbers 
with structural steel in the construction of bridges and its use in the erection of skyscrapers and 
other buildings created the need for structural steel work as a distinct trade. The I.A.B.S.I.W. was 
founded in 1896 at a convention held in Pittsburgh. It had its origins in a mutual aid society 
dating back to 1880 and brought together pre-existing locals from Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, 
Buffalo, and New York. Chicago’s Bridge and Construction Men’s Union, founded in 1891 
became local no. 1 of the new International. For several years, the International maintained a 
largely formal existence. Its officers were not paid fixed salaries and continued to work at their 
trades. Local unions continued to bargain and operated independently in response to local 
conditions. In 1901, the I.A.B.S.I.W. began to function on a more organized basis. It launched its 
official organ, The Bridgemen’s Magazine, in July of that year and elected a member of the 
Chicago local, future U.S. congressman Frank Buchanan, as president in September. Buchanan 
set the union on a course of national organization, attempting to win uniform contracts from 
nationally operating companies such as the United States Steel Corporation and setting uniform 
wage scales. Buchanan came into conflict with many union locals who wished to maintain their 





organizational cohesion was achieved alongside the local conditions. From 1901 forward, the 
I.A.B.S.I.W. proved itself a formidable organization.8  
The I.A.B.S.I.W. did not see itself as part of a political or social movement in the way 
that the I.W.W. did. It was not concerned with educating its members in the political economy of 
capitalism or encouraging them to think in terms of the general strike or the expropriation of 
employer property.  Ironworkers organized for wages, security, and working conditions and they 
were good at it. Structural ironworkers were not recognized as skilled laborers by other, more 
established trades. It was therefore difficult to obtain wages that reflected the physical risk 
entailed by their work.  However, in the course of a mere fifteen years, the ironworkers went 
from being the lowest paid trade in the construction industry to one of the highest among thirty 
unions with an average increase of twenty-one cents an hour between 1902 and 1914.9 This was 
due, in part at least, to the organization’s militancy.  
Collective Bargaining by Explosion 
 The six year dynamite campaign aimed at securing union demands or punishing 
employers and contractors for hiring non-union labor ended with the LA Times explosion.10 In 
1911, following the McNamaras’ confessions, forty-six members of the I.A.B.S.I.W., including 
the union’s president, Frank M. Ryan, were indicted in federal court on fifty-five counts of 
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criminal conspiracy to transport explosives across state lines.11 The bombing campaign was part 
of the union’s struggle against the nationwide open shop campaign led by the National 
Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.). It was a defense of economic and class interests fought 
by way of intimidation and economic coercion distinct from the anarchist ‘propaganda of the 
deed’ that preceded it or the I.W.W.’s defense of sabotage as the guerilla warfare of the 
revolutionary working class. It was what might be referred to as ‘job-conscious sabotage’. This 
does not, however, mean that the I.A.B.S.I.W. was apolitical. The strict division between job-
conscious and political unions is a retrospectively imposed and ultimately false dichotomy. 
Indeed, what this case shows is that business oriented, job-conscious unions cannot be 
disentangled from political investments any more than open-shop advocates could be said to be 
waging an apolitical economic campaign.  
It is worth noting that the membership of the I.A.B.S.I.W. bore some significant 
similarities to the workers that were often organized by the I.W.W. They were ‘unskilled’ and 
the nature of the industry required frequent movement from city to city to find employment. 
While official publications did not encourage, theorize, or celebrate dynamite, its use indicates 
the necessity of radical action, if not radical thought, for workers without either an established 
monopoly on skilled production or an institutional means of contract negotiation. The illegal 
dynamite campaign was continuous with a labor organizing effort that saw many of its legal 
channels blocked. It was meant, like a strike or a boycott, to obtain employment for union 
membership on union conditions. In 1908 Edward Clark, a business agent for local 44 in the city 
of Cincinnati wrote to John J. McNamara suggesting sabotage as a solution to unemployment: 
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Upon receipt of this you will kindly inform me what action the Executive Board 
took in the matter regarding financial help to this local. I have at present writing 
fifty or more members after me continually wanting to know….What I want to 
know is that we are going to do something that will help the whole membership at 
large to the Granger Company…but the truth of the matter is that we have got 
nothing at all in the treasure [sic]…There is nothing in sight but this viaduct work 
that Granger has got and we have made up our mind to go after him in the right 
way. I only wish to say that any money sent here will not be handled 
careless…Joe being well known here it would be a foolish thing for me to buy 
explosives. Could there be such a thing as you sending me such things as would 
be necessary for such work from Indianapolis. I have sized up the whole job here 
and I know it can be done. I am not drinking anything strong for some time and I 
know exactly what I am undertaking.12 
 
 On May 3, 1908, an explosion occurred in Dayton Ohio on a bridge being constructed by 
American Bridge Co within the jurisdiction of local 44. . On August 6th, the work of the Granger 
Construction Company in Cincinnati was dynamited as suggested. On December 11, 1905, in a 
more concise plea, George Hagerty of Cleveland wrote J.J. McNamara requesting that he “do 
anything for a few good strong armed men and clean this job and Duggan up. Work is getting 
scarce here.” 13 
It is obvious from the targets as well as the justifications given that the purpose of these 
‘jobs’ was immediately economic. That the bombings were not bound up in a developed theory 
of class warfare or revolutionary change does not imply that class feeling was absent or that the 
destruction of work sites was not ‘read’ through the lens of class conflict. It was understood that 
a conflict of interests was built into the relations between employers and workers, but it was 
framed as a simple matter of economic control and distribution. Members of the ironworkers 
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union did not, in general, condemn the dynamiting because the cost was borne by the boss, but 
they did not celebrate it as progress towards social change either.14  
This did not prevent William Burns of the Burns Detective Agency from claiming that 
the Iron Workers were actually anarchists carrying out a “masked war” in the guise of labor 
organizing. Significant differences existed between anarchists and dynamite-wielding trade 
unionists and Burns’ conflation of the two was a total fabrication. But this fiction was central to 
the narrative being constructed by the employers’ associations. The assertion that anarchists were 
“at war,” whereas so-called legitimate forms of organized labor were not, was an expression of 
an important and lasting ideological position that defines legitimate protest as non-violent and 
dismisses resistance that does not adhere to a strictly discursive form of contract negotiation as 
foreign and invasive.  
Burns claimed that the I.A.B.S.I.W. worked “hand in glove with anarchists to murder and 
destroy [and] fool the honest workmen supporting the union.”15  This was nothing less than the 
betrayal of “the workers of that union to Anarchists.” In this formulation, the dynamiting 
campaign had nothing to do with the interests of individual laborers or legitimate labor unions. 
Rather, “the war with dynamite was a war of Anarchy against the established form of 
government of this country. It was masked under the cause of Labor.”16  
Burns’ characterization of the I.A.B.S.I.W. was not, especially after the confession of J.J. 
and J.B. McNamara, entirely at odds with organized labor’s own official narrative, which also 
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cast the LA Times bombing as an unfortunate anomaly. The McNamaras were, according to 
Samuel Gompers, “two poor, misguided fanatics, out of two million workers.”17  The strike and 
the boycott—the two primary legal weapons available to organized labor—were non-violent 
means of securing the “two primary rights” of workers which were, according to Gompers, “the 
right to control the one thing they have to sell, their own physical labor; and the right to buy, 
with their own money, where they choose.”18  But the use of violence to achieve these rights was 
“not a recognized part of labor’s plan of campaign… Labor needs to be strong in numbers, in 
effective organization, in the justice of its cause, and in the reasonableness of its methods. It 
relies on moral suasion.”19 
The legitimacy of labor, in this view, rested on an ideologically invested fantasy of non-
violent, non-destructive methods of labor organizing. What the McNamara case and the 
dynamite conspiracy makes apparent is not, however, the pacifist nature of the labor movement 
at large, but the inevitability of violence and property destruction in the service of enforcing—in 
the absence of the legal protections and advantages granted to their adversaries—the non-violent 
methods of the strike and the boycott. Methods that were, in any case, under attack by the courts 
and whose legal status was ambiguous at best.  According to Louis Adamic, “at the time the 
destruction of property was a common thing in labor disputes. In telephone and telegraph 
troubles linemen cut wire cables; glaziers expressed their feelings against the bosses by smashing 
plate glass; and carpenters, in their effort to rise to a higher level, defaced fancy woodwork.”20 
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Whether or not ironworkers were aiming at the eventual overthrow of an entire economic system 
(they were not), the very purpose of labor organizing put workers in direct conflict with owners 
and bosses. It also put them in conflict with the state, which regularly intervened through the 
court system to issue injunctions, jail labor leaders for violating unevenly applied laws 
concerning interstate trade, and supplied, when necessary, armed soldiers and national 
guardsmen to break strikes. Demands as simple and non-revolutionary as the closed shop, the 
eight-hour day, accident compensation, and higher wages placed ironworkers on one side of 
what can only be fairly described as a class war that had absolutely nothing to do with anarchism 
or any other developed philosophy of violence. Property destruction, according to Adamic, was 
simply a tactic “resorted to only after the other methods to win their demands had failed.”21  
This may have been true but it would be more accurate to say that property destruction 
and assault regularly occurred alongside other methods such as the strike and the boycott in 
order to augment and secure the efficacy of these officially sanctioned activities. Slugging and 
dynamiting functioned as labor’s proxy for the legal tactics assembled against them by 
employers. It is not mere pedantry to insist on the simultaneity of violent and non-violent tactics. 
Figuring them as a last resort, as coming after orderly legal challenges, misrecognizes the 
character of the conflict between unions and employers who refused to acknowledge the union’s 
existence let alone their right to strike, collectively bargain, or peacefully picket. Certainly, 
unions were driven to extreme measures by unrelenting opponents, but non-recognition of unions 
meant that this was built into the so-called negotiation from the start.  According to Eugene 
Debs, the McNamara’s real crime consisted “in their having carried out the policy of Gompers’s 
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craft unionism to its logical conclusion.”22 Without radical changes to the political order, Debs 
suggested, union activity could only exist as warfare.  
It was not difficult to make this case. Despite the passage of the Erdman Act in 1898, 
which officially recognized the right of railway workers to organize, a majority of union activity 
was effectively criminalized. In 1905, courts in Massachusetts and Ohio had ruled against unions 
demanding the discharge of non-union men in one case and for paying the dues of new hires in 
the second (depriving the employer of his right to hire non-union men by automatically inducting 
them). Courts overturned legislation as well. A judge in Chicago ruled peaceful picketing by 
unionized typographers illegal, sentencing two officers to jail time and imposing the not 
insubstantial fine of $1500 on the union for contempt. In the case of Lochner v. New York, a law 
granting a ten-hour day to bakers was declared illegal for interfering with the rights of both 
employers and employees to freely enter into employment contracts.23  
Courts also saw fit to regulate the consumer behavior of unions. The unequivocally non-
violent method of the union organized boycott was deemed illegal by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1914.  In 1902, the American Anti-Boycott Association (A.A.B.A.) organized for the specific 
purpose of eliminating the secondary boycott. The organization, which was formed with the 
explicit purpose of pursuing court cases against unions and their members, claimed that it was 
“in the interest of good will between employers and employed.” The boycotts organized by the 
American Federation of Labor and “numerous bands of unionists” was, by contrast, “a method of 
combat that was eminently a method of ill-will...It is a gross interference with a just industrial 
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liberty…It makes good will between the employing class and the laboring class impossible.”24 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the now famous Danbury Hatters case, Loewe v. Lawlor, made 
it possible for companies to sue unions for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. It also made 
individual members responsible for trade union activities.25  
Rhetoric on both sides was pitched. Employers were fighting the ‘tyranny’ of the unions 
or ‘labor trusts’ and warfare was a common trope in union publications. Ironworkers repeatedly 
employed the idiom of warfare when describing their struggle.  In the pages of The Bridgemen’s 
Magazine, writers took aim at “the open and insidious warfare of the National Erectors’ 
Association.”26 An editorial declared that “thoughtful and unselfish persons among the farmers 
and in all walks of life already agree to the justice of labor’s warfare against injunctions.”27 
Boycott was a “legitimate means of warfare.”28  
This wasn’t just hyperbole. Describing labor conflict as war underscored the inherent 
difference between the interests of employers and workers respectively. It also implicitly 
contested the salience of regular legal categories and institutions. In this state of exception, 
militant labor activity was presented as a means of securing law and order against the state. 
Congress, the magazine reported, was nothing more than representation for “legalized looters” in 
all places save those where “organized labor is strong enough to carry on a constant warfare.”29 
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The LA Times bombing, precisely because it was not perpetrated by an organization with 
revolutionary intentions or even socialist affiliations, points to the practical impossibility of  
“keeping politics out of the unions” and disentangling straightforward economic demands from 
political conflict. 30 This is not the same as saying that union members who engaged in 
belligerent activity were anarchists, or that there is no functional difference between anarchism 
and trade unionism.  The I.A.B.S.I.W., if it is to be judged by the contents of its official organ, 
The Bridgemen’s Magazine, was wholly uninterested in abolishing private property, establishing 
a socialist republic, or fomenting broad-based political action of any kind. It didn’t celebrate 
violence and while one could infer, given the record of union activity, that phrases such as 
“keeping their hands full” and “taking proper action” were simply ways to euphemize violence 
and property destruction, the magazine offered very little to support such a claim. Most 
references to dynamite in the magazine were defensive, vociferously denying union involvement 
and pointing the finger at the companies themselves, scabs furthering their interests by 
“uncovering” plots by union members, or simple accidents spun into ‘plots’ by an anti-union 
press.  
Regardless of what the unions said, the conflation of anarchism with union violence was 
central to campaigns against labor. Employers’ associations, invested as they were in a nominal 
acceptance of labor’s right to organize, were keen to attribute violence to an anti-American 
radical fringe. Distinguishing between honest workers and “the anarchistic and revolutionary 
spirit breathed by the leaders in criminal unionism,” was crucial to maintaining their image as 
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supporters of republican freedoms.31 The conflation of “socialist labor agitator, anarchist and 
president-killer” functioned as inflammatory fodder while it towed the official line that a 
beneficial cooperation between employees and employers was desirable and possible in the 
absence of labor union violence.32 The use of injunctions, sedition charges, and armed militias 
were therefore not aimed at workers, but “president-killers.”  
The historical record has retained a residue of this faulty but powerful conflation of 
anarchy and labor militancy. One particularly hysterical Cold War account of the 1912 
‘Dynamite Conspiracy’ contains almost no information about the case itself. Instead, it provides 
an erratic history of anarchist thought and action that includes commentary on Emma Goldman, 
the McKinley assassination, recrimination of Governor Altgeld of Illinois for his pardoning of 
the Haymarket Martyrs, the fiction of Maxim Gorky, the attempted 1878 assassination of 
Emperor Wilhelm, an 1894 bombing of a church in Paris, and a U.M.W. strike in Widen, West 
Virginia. One chapter in a multivolume work on famous court cases is hardly a representative 
text, but it is evidence that the association between the I.A.B.S.I.W. and anarchy that was 
promoted by employers’ associations and the detectives hired by them persisted long after the 
fact. It also speaks to the ongoing desire to attribute all violence to foreign political philosophies 
when in fact dynamite, slugging, and assassination were integral to the class relations of the 
industrial United States.33 
 
The Organized Revolt of Employers  
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During the last decade of the nineteenth century, an increasingly self-aware class of 
corporate and proprietary capitalists emerged alongside the rapid growth of a permanent 
proletariat (i.e. life-long wage earners) demanded by mass production industries. The National 
Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.) was founded in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1895. A number of 
circumstances conspired to encourage the official organization of capitalists as a class during the 
late nineteenth century. It is not within the scope of this chapter to offer an economic history of 
the postbellum United States, but a brief, if incomplete, gloss on the conditions that shaped early 
twentieth century labor conflict is important. Conflict between workers and employers was not 
new, but the landscape within which the conflict between the N.E.A. and the I.A.B.S.I.W. 
unfolded was characterized by national, rather than regional, cooperation by employers as well 
as unions that had no precedent in the previous century.  
 Following the Civil War, federal debt management along with the creation of a national 
banking system encouraged the financing of business ventures that were not tied to an Atlantic 
economy of sugar and cotton exports. This led to investment in domestic industries traditionally 
not financed by banks and was supported by economic policies that encouraged the growth of 
domestic markets and transcontinental trade tied to westward expansion via the Homestead Act 
(1862) and railroad subsidies. The abdication of economic supremacy by the mercantile 
capitalists of the Eastern seaboard cities and the increasing integration of domestic industry and 
investment meant that cooperation between firms was increasingly possible and desirable.34  
Between the 1880s and the mid-1890s, the retention of market share required lower unit 
costs that could only be achieved through greater investment at a moment when capital’s total 
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share of non-farm income was being adversely affected by trends in labor productivity.35 
Employers found themselves faced with both an ideological and material problem of control. 
Worker militancy, buoyed by the continued monopoly on knowledge of shop-floor production 
processes and effective control of output by skilled workers, continued to be a problem for 
employers whose attempts to reorganize production and introduce new machines were met by 
strikes. Strikes that were local in nature frequently found community support. Community 
solidarity was due to more than conventional relationships and dependencies. An “uncanny 
coherence” existed in the grievances of disparate classes during the nineteenth century that can 
be traced to the conviction that consumption of goods was solely authorized by production.  
Between 1870 and 1900, “‘jackleg’ farmers, industrial workers, small entrepreneurs, and even 
certain proprietary capitalists used the same inherited language of ‘productive labor’ to argue 
that…one’s receipt and expenditure of income required one’s production of real value through 
work.”36 It was against such a republican tradition, rooted in popular understandings of a labor 
theory of value and backed by worker agitation, that American capitalists began to organize at 
the turn of the century.37  
This organization did not emerge naturally from economic considerations concerning 
supply and demand. The legal environment of the nineteenth century favored the growth of 
corporate power and underwrote its ideological project. In the early nineteenth century, the 
American state still “conceived of itself as the sole legitimate embodiment of the public interest.” 
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This power, though, was diffuse in comparison to European states. Despite the existence of a 
legal doctrine favoring the public interest over corporate interests, as well as the challenge to the 
state’s monopoly on legitimate authority that was posed by the proliferation of business 
corporations during the 1820s, legal institutions regarded corporations as “agents of the public 
interest.” In exchange for “privileges in the shape of subsidies, immunities, and franchises,” 
corporations would encourage private investors to meet public needs.38  They remained variously 
subject to local and state laws aimed at regulating operations and protecting local producers 
through the limitation of interstate imports, but out of state corporations could have their cases 
heard in federal court. In 1844, the states’ ability to impose local regulations was further 
weakened by the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson that “federal courts referred not to 
state law in deciding such cases but to a federal common law of commerce which they developed 
themselves.” The limitation of state police powers mitigated the uncertainty produced by 
variations in local law and thus supported and encouraged interstate business.39  
While granted an unprecedented level of prestige and a central role in social organization, 
corporations were not the state. This was a crucial advantage in their legal confrontations with 
unions and it was this status that made the massive public relations campaign that accompanied 
the legal maneuvers for the open shop possible and effective. Corporations, while brought into 
being through legal institutions were not of the state and therefore not, in theory, characterized 
by the coercive “vertical relationships” of power reserved for the state vis-à-vis private citizens. 
Business corporations, no matter how large, were governed by the allegedly horizontal 
contractual relationships of private citizens. Contracts, it was assumed, lacked the potential for 
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coercion embedded in the vertical relations between citizens and states.40 It was this logic—by 
which business corporations were private purveyors of public goods ‘horizontally’ contracting 
with workers and unions were intermediary associations exerting unlicensed ‘vertical’ control 
over workers and corporations alike—that was operating in the series of Supreme Court 
decisions that condemned unions for illegal, coercive interference with allegedly free, 
entrepreneurial activity.41  
The organization into manufacturers’ and employers’ associations that began in the late 
nineteenth century was a class-conscious and overtly coercive project that had as its object an 
obverse an increasingly militant, even militarized, workforce. Open shop propaganda ritually 
invoked law-abiding labor and cooperation between workers and employers. Manufacturers’ 
associations hired private detectives, pursued legal prosecution, lobbied against federal 
legislation that favored workers, organized advertising boycotts against uncooperative 
newspapers, and used private militias, national guardsmen, and police forces to break strikes and 
protect strikebreakers. There simply was no organization of the capitalist class, as a class for 
itself, without organization against unions. Employers’ associations had many functions, but 
their primary mandate in the early twentieth century was wresting power from unions through a 
national open shop drive. This required coordinated efforts among employers to eliminate union 
labor from job sites, produce non-union laborers on demand, transport and guard those laborers, 
and devote considerable resources to the production and dissemination of literature that 
presented the open shop as a social good.   
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 In 1902, there were employers’ associations in twenty-four large American cities.  Within 
a few years, most large and medium-sized American cities were home to an employers’ 
association engaged in promoting the open shop.42 Employers’ associations were joined by The 
Citizens Alliance and various, sundry anti-union formations ranging from local chambers of 
commerce to self-organized, vigilante businessmen. Advocates for the open shop couched their 
rhetoric in the reasonable language of compromise and hedged their position on unions by 
distinguishing between organized labor (acceptable) and union methods such as the boycott, 
strike, or the persecution of scabs (unacceptable). But what the employers’ associations were 
asking for when they demanded that unions bargain without coercion was, functionally speaking, 
the elimination of unions.  
 When N.A.M. met in New Orleans in 1903 with the mandate to organize a “crusade 
against unionism,” it adopted a ‘Declaration of Principles,’ outlining that it did not oppose 
‘organizations of labor as such’ but elaborating a set of restrictions on union activity that 
amounted to the same thing.43 Following the adoption of the open shop resolutions N.A.M. 
founded the Citizens Industrial Association of America (C.I.A.A.), which was intended to 
organize all employers interested in the open shop and the promotion of open shop propaganda. 
It publicly claimed to be safeguarding the rights of individuals to enter work contracts without 
the interference of organizations. But, like all other iterations of the employer combination, the 
C.I.A.A. was concerned with power and control, which was incompatible with the rhetoric of 
cooperation that characterized their public positions. They would ostensibly bargain with 
workers over wages and hours but in exchange there would be:  
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…‘no restriction as to the use of tools, machinery or materials’ unless they were 
unsafe, no ‘limitation of output,’ no restriction on the number of apprentices or 
helpers of the proper age, no boycotts or sympathetic strikes, ‘no sacrifice of 
independent workmen to the labor union,” and ‘no compulsory use of the union 
label.’44  
 
The open shop fight was not about lowering wages and increasing hours in the most transparent 
and immediate sense but about employer control. This included total control of job sites, workers 
and, importantly, the rate at which workers performed their labor—control over the “stint” being 
a perennial point of conflict between craft workers and their employers.45  It was also crucially 
aimed at dismantling union and worker power that had been established through the careful 
policing of craft jurisdiction—rules establishing who could do what type of work. The right 
sought by employers was not to decrease the rate at which skilled craftsmen were paid, but to 
replace skilled craftsmen with so-called ‘unskilled’ and presumably complacent laborers. This is 
clear from the principles adopted by N.A.M. and the predecessor to the N.E.A. for governing 
iron and steel construction: 
No change in wages; the eight-hour day where it was the custom and the eight- or 
nine-hour day as agreed upon with the workers elsewhere; time and a half for 
overtime; no restriction by workers in handling materials used in construction; no 
limit on the amount of work performed by a worker during working hours; no 
restriction on the use of machinery or tools; no person, unless authorized by the 
employer, to interfere with workers during working hours; the right of the 
employer to hire and fire but without discrimination against workers because of 
their union membership; the stipulation that foremen who were union members 
were not to be subject to union rules…the right of the employer to hire as many 
laborers as he saw fit and to use laborers rather than skilled workers…a ban on 
sympathetic strikes…the arbitration of all disputes; and a ban on strikes and 
lockouts pending arbitration.46! 
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It was to this end that the N.E.A. along with the Allied Iron Association (A.I.A.) established its 
own employment bureau to fill jobs that had been tied up by the ongoing strike declared against 
American Bridge in 1905. After the union struck for higher wages on several jobs in New York, 
the A.I.A. “specified that no housesmith was to be employed unless he had a valid card from the 
association’s employment bureau.”47  
Employers’ offensives were not new. Organized opposition to labor organizations in a 
particular industry or location had long been a common occurrence. What the open shop 
represented was a nationwide offensive against organized labor as such. 48  
To this end, many employers’ associations defined their jurisdictions broadly and 
organized in a manner mirroring the industrial unionism championed by organizations such as 
the Knights of Labor and the I.W.W.  Employers had, as an article in World’s Work put it, “been 
educated to appreciate the value of organization.”49  The founding of permanent unions in the 
late nineteenth century had made wage demands and union recognition into national rather than 
local affairs.50 The National Metal Trades Association (N.M.T.A.) included in its membership 
interests employing “machinists, millwrights, blacksmiths, boilermakers, pattern makers, 
carpenters, structural iron workers, iron ship builders, polishers and buffers, brass workers, sheet 
iron workers, machine operators and helpers.”51  By 1906, iron fabrication and construction had 
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its own well-established, open shop advocate, the National Erector’s Association (N.E.A.). 52 
The N.E.A. was originally organized as The National Association of Manufacturers and Erectors 
of Structural Steel in 1903. The renaming of the organization occurred when it launched its open 
shop campaign in 1906 and henceforth refused outright to recognize the legitimacy of the 
I.A.B.S.I.W. and negotiate with it.  
According to Philip Taft, the newly renamed N.E.A. “turned into a belligerent employers’ 
association” with the appointment, also in 1906, of Walter Drew. Sidney Fine echoed this 
conclusion, arguing that the N.E.A. was the “most class conscious and belligerent national 
employer association in the United States.”53 Drew was a lawyer who cut his teeth as an 
organizer of the Citizens Alliance of Grand Rapids, Michigan and chairman of the city’s Board 
of Trades’ Industrial Committee. He also served as legal counsel to the city’s Employer 
Association. Drew’s accomplishments included the 1904 defeat of a teamsters’ strike brought 
about by an alliance of team owners, the Grand Rapids business community, and the Citizens 
Alliance. In 1903, the teamsters had established closed shop conditions that were effectively 
overturned by this cooperation. When Drew spoke at the CIAA that year, he could claim legal 
expertise in labor matters. More importantly, he could point to his involvement with a real and 
successful instance of employer cooperation. According to Drew, the total defeat of the closed 
shop in Grand Rapids had attracted investment in spite of an undesirable location due to high 
freight rates.54   
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  The contradiction between the discourse of liberty, non-intervention, and free contract, 
and the actual practice of the associations, was apparent in Drew’s testimony during the 
dynamite conspiracy trial, although he said nothing all that extraordinary. The official position of 
the N.E.A. and other open shop advocates did not hold up terribly well under direct 
interrogation. During his cross examination, he dodged, equivocated, and lied when asked 
directly about the N.E.A. and its members’ attempts to enforce the open shop. He denied that 
U.S. Steel Corporation and the American Bridge Company threatened to cut off supplies of steel 
to employers who employed union labor.55 Senator J.W. Kern, serving as co-counsel for the 
defense, asked him repeatedly whether the N.E.A. interfered “with settlements that were about to 
be made with union labor organizations and contractors” to which Drew replied, “never to my 
knowledge.” When asked if he had ever heard of the N.E.A. or its members warning against a 
settlement with labor, he replied, “I do not understand what you refer to Mr. Kern. I don’t 
remember anything of that kind at all. Whenever we heard of any contractors that were 
considering the question of whether they should work open shop or closed shop, I would make 
whatever effort I could to get them to work open shop.”56 When asked about a telegraph he sent 
to an owner of the firm Marshal and McClintic, reminding them that the policy of the Erectors 
Association was to not recognize organized labor—and thus encouraging him to deny 
I.A.B.S.I.W. President Frank Ryan a meeting—Drew replied: “I don’t remember that 
circumstance. I think the telegram would show what it is if I said anything of the kind.” On the 
question of whether an open shop policy was effectively a refusal to bargain with any collective 
of workers, Drew repeatedly refused to answer, pointed out that he, personally, never made a 
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contract with an individual employee and instead stated repeatedly that the Association had a 
definite policy on wages and hours. In previous testimony, reflecting the well-documented 
position of the N.E.A. and other employers’ associations, Drew frankly stated that the N.E.A. 
and its members did not “treat with organized labor at all.”57  
 More than anything, Drew’s testimony is evidence of how important it was to employers’ 
organizations to deny that they had any interest in organizing for the maintenance of power and 
control. A frank admission of any acts of coercion or intervention would have undermined a 
position carefully aligned with the horizontal, non-coercive contractualism of so-called ‘free’ 
markets. It would also have shown that this power was maintained by way of class solidarity that 
required its own mechanisms of internal enforcement. To this end, employers were punished for 
negotiating with unions. It was understood, for example, that union labor might threaten a 
contractor’s steel supply and even newspapers were subject to strong-arming. The employers’ 
offensive extended from control over raw materials to control over the public discourse. The 
latter came in the form of advertising boycotts. Anti-union newspapers and magazines were 
given “patronage in preference to those whose columns and pages are filled with the cheap 
sensational trash tending to breed discontent, chaos and anarchy.”58 Not only did advertising 
boycotts pose an existential threat to newspapers—the overlap between the Citizen’s Alliance 
and the Advertiser’s Association was significant—these boycotts were, in turn, enforced in the 
business community through threats of withdrawn financing, supplies and patronage.59 N.A.M. 
members never walked into a boardroom and tossed ammonia in someone’s face or dynamited 
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worksites staffed with union labor, but they were effectively operating in a manner identical to 
the most disruptive and belligerent of unions.  
 
The Utility of Anarchism  
Regardless of the pronouncements made (or not made) by the I.A.B.S.I.W., employers 
read labor militancy as both a political and economic threat. This was an accurate assessment. 
Struggles over domination and economic exploitation are inseparable from institutions of 
political power. The economic ‘base’ is more than the technical forces of production. It “exists in 
the shape of social juridical and political forms—in particular forms of property and 
domination.”60  The open shop movement made this obvious while at the same time being deeply 
invested in denying it. The separation of the political from the economic allows production to 
appear “encased in eternal natural laws…at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then 
quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded.”61 
The depoliticization of production—its depiction as a site of purely economic negotiations over 
wages and hours—serves the interests of capital by disguising the political nature of its own 
economic activity. Conversely, economic interests are papered over by political rhetoric—
concern for ‘society’ and the ‘public’ in the face of “forceful men, preaching the vicious 
philosophy of organized force rather than of cooperative service as a means to industrial 
betterment.”62  
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Maintaining the appearance of this separation between economic and political activity 
was difficult in the face of union dynamiting, employers’ dependence on court issued 
injunctions, and unending references to warfare. Anarchism—foreign, political, and long 
associated with irrational destruction—provided a tidy solution. Members of militant craft unions 
could not have been further from anarchist philosophers, but through the literary production of 
employers’ associations and the popular press, the two were soldered together by the force of 
sheer repetition. Anarchism could both amplify the threat of militant unions in the public 
imagination and absorb the political nature of their activities by making it foreign to labor 
relations proper. Violence could, in turn, be ideologically expelled from economic activity. It 
provided a perfect foil against which organizations such as the N.E.A. could present themselves 
as defenders of liberty, liberators of labor, and guardians of society and natural economic order. 
The closed shop, wrote Drew, was secured “against the rest of society” by the use of “the crudest 
forms of violence.” It was established in “poorly defended” industries by a “small group of able 
and forceful men, preaching vicious philosophy of organized force rather than of cooperative 
service.”63 In a clever reversal of the language of organized labor, Drew declared that the closed 
shop resulted in the “common exploitation of the public.”64 Individual employers and employers’ 
associations repeatedly and explicitly disparaged unions as un-American. By contrast, they 
linked the open shop to citizenship (the language of patriotism is notably absent before the war) 
and fundamental American values such as freedom and cooperation. Employers were 
synonymous with the public good and general interest and both “the laws of business and the 
Constitution of our country.” And they were under attack. This is reflected in Louis Adamic’s 
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tongue-in-cheek account of the philosophy of the open shop or, as it was alternately called, the 
‘American plan.’ “The industrialists were for ‘Industrial Freedom.’ America was a free country, 
and any worker in America ought to be free to work for any wage, at any task, anywhere he 
chose. And so they fought the unions’ boycott with the blacklist, the sympathetic strike with the 
sympathetic lock-out, dynamite with gun-fire, and so on.”65    
The Danbury Hatters could thus be described as perpetrating a “tyrannical attack 
conspicuously contrary to the American sense of fair play.” Boycotting within communities 
during a strike was “un-Christian, un-manly and un-American.” The fundamentally offensive 
nature of unions was “plain to any American citizen and every supporter of equality of rights.” 
To any right-minded individual the “whole system [of union organization] looks wrong and un-
American.” This logic was easily extended to imply that labor organizations were not only un-
American in sentiment, but “agents of disorder and anarchy who are striving to undermine the 
authority of the government in this country through associations of workingmen.” 66 Promotion 
of the open shop was not limited to the in-house publications of employers’ associations. The LA 
Times, for one, had plenty to say about the open shop, hailing it as “all we have in sight which 
gives even the suggestion of a promise of industrial peace,” and embodying “the spirit of true 
Americanism.”67 
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In some sense, the open shop drive of the early twentieth century could be said to have 
produced the boilerplate for conservative American politics of the coming century. The 
ostensible classlessness of American social and economic life—where one was expected to be 
“an American first and a merchant, manufacturer, metal worker, or whatever else he be 
afterward”— was crucial to this politics of the apolitical for three interrelated reasons.68 It 
allowed for the proponents of the open shop to make claims (almost always in bad faith) that 
they were not against labor’s right to organize per se, but only its misguided and disruptive 
tactics. It facilitated the presentation of coercive labor activity as aberrant, un-American, and 
unduly political. And it obfuscated the class preferences of properly political, judicial, and 
legislative bodies, thus furthering the myth that capital—in reality supported by legislation, 
judicial decisions, and police powers—was an apolitical entity. Any preferential treatment of 
labor by courts or legislatures could thus be dismissed and derided for interfering with the 
natural state of things.  
Accidental Politics 
The I.A.B.S.I.W. was involved in what might reasonably be characterized as an ongoing, 
extralegal feud with individual employers and employers’ associations motivated by punishment 
and retaliation as well as the immediate end of securing material gains. The Weberian argument 
that “the state originated not in contract, as Hobbes and Locke argued, but in tort”, a legal system 
of injury compensation that replaced and regularized clan vengeance seems far more compelling 
in the context of the early twentieth century than the employers’ fantasies of freely contracting 
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individuals.69 The narrative presented by those, like Burns and his employers in the N.E.A., who 
wished to appear neutral on the question of the rights of the laboring classes, was dependent on 
the framework, both legal and ideological, of freedom of contract and the individual 
responsibility that it implied. But the way in which the struggle between the I.A.B.S.I.W. and the 
N.E.A. played out, with propaganda and legal strong-arming on one side and explosions and 
beatings on the other, indicates that what the employers’ associations claimed to be protecting 
was an instrumental fiction of their own making.  
 The I.A.B.S.I.W. did not propose an alternative to capitalism or capitalist modes of 
production and ownership, but it did, through coercive forms of negotiation that were not far 
from “collective bargaining by riot,” play a role in forcing state reorganization around questions 
of workplace safety, employer liability, and just compensation. The notion of individual 
responsibility that subtended the open shop labor contract was difficult to reconcile with a 
workplace accident rate that was quantitatively higher and qualitatively different than it had been 
in the past. Industrialization brought higher rates of unintentional injury. Workplace accidents 
are arguably part of work, but pre-industrial production made causation easier to determine. By 
the turn of the century, normal economic activity contained, as a structural necessity, high rates 
of human casualties with no identifiable, individual cause.70 Workers recognized and addressed 
this difference. At the thirteenth annual convention of the I.A.B.S.I.W., it was noted that: 
The old stage driver stood the same show in the courts for redress for bodily 
injury done to him in following his occupation as does the engineer on the fast 
limited train…The motorman on the fast speeding street car…has no better 
chance for relief in court if he is injured …than had the mule driver of a street car 
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a few years ago. Men who labor today must take chances which they never had to 
take before.71 
 
Ironworkers were the victims of what the I.W.W. referred to as ‘capitalist sabotage’ in 
exceptionally high numbers. At the turn of the century, approximately one in every thousand 
Americans died in industrial accidents each year but the accident rate for dangerous industries 
could be considerably higher.72 For local 1 in Chicago alone, the accident roll from 1905 
included twenty-three dead, seventeen fully disabled, and eighty-three merely injured.  During 
the same year, 16 died in the construction of a bridge over the Mississippi River and fifty-five 
were killed during the construction of the Blackwell’s Island Bridge in New York.73  The United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in the years between 1910 and 1914, “structural 
steel workers suffered twelve deaths per one thousand workers and 353.2 accidents involving 
permanent or temporary disability.”74  The union itself reported one death for every 199 
members over a period of nineteen years.75  Non-fatal accidents are difficult to quantify, but the 
rate of temporary and permanent disability was high, and it is likely that structural steel and 
ironworkers were not exaggerating when they claimed to be doing the most dangerous work. 
When accident insurance became more widespread in the 1920s, rates for ironworkers were 
between twenty-five and fifty percent higher than other trades. For a sense of what ‘more 
dangerous’ meant at the time, at least forty-two percent of workers involved in operating trains 
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were injured on the job annually. According to one report structural ironwork was not only more 
dangerous than other construction trades but more so than coal-mining as well.76 
The radicalism precipitated by a life-threatening workplace produced a distinct and 
articulate analysis of class difference and exploitation that was both inspired by and intellectually 
organized around the danger of the job. The resulting critique was sometimes strikingly similar 
to the one proposed by the writings on sabotage produced by the otherwise philosophically 
distant I.W.W.—that industrial capitalism favored, as a necessity of profit, property over human 
life. It even echoed and particularized the claim made in the I.W.W. manifesto that “the moment 
the laborer no longer yields the maximum of profits he is thrown upon the scrap pile, to starve 
alongside the discarded machine.”77 During the 1909 annual convention of the I.A.B.S.I.W., 
Minnesota’s State Commissioner of Labor, W.E. McEwen welcomed the men in attendance with 
an account of the “human wreckage in industry”: !
Let a derrick fall, let a hoisting engine break, let an accident happen in the 
construction of a building, the derrick is replaced, the old engine is repaired and 
construction again takes place, yet man fills the most important part of the plan, 
and if he dies his family must pay the penalty.78  
 
Evoking an image of the coal fire that warmed workers during the Minnesota winter, McEwen 
continued with his morbid calculation: 
The cost of exploring, the successful and the unsuccessful, the failures; all 
this…is figured scientifically. The labor, the dividends of stock and watered 
stock, everything is figured in the cost of production of a ton of coal except the 
human life that was spent in its mining, and the best statistics in this country show 
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that there are five men who are killed in every thousand miners in the United 
States.79 
 
The destruction of human life via industrial ‘accident’ does not excuse violence on the 
part of union members, but it deflates to a significant degree, employer claims to any asymmetry 
in the enactment of violence.  Even when looked at from the narrow perspective of accident 
rates, the existence of a pacific employer class was impossible because profits were bound up 
with worker deaths.  
Union leadership and membership was hardly innocent of counterviolence. The 
I.A.B.S.I.W. did not limit their violence to inert possessions of the employing class but regularly 
turned aggressive tactics toward other workers. Its members visited incredible violence on non-
union labor with the implicit and sometimes explicit support of union leadership for the purpose 
of securing job sites for union members. The dynamiting campaign that lasted from roughly 
1905-1911 may not have resulted in casualties, but a number of people were killed and scores 
seriously injured and permanently disabled by I.A.B.S.I.W. ‘entertainment committees’. If the 
violence of the rank and file can be explained, if not excused, by a combination of economic 
desperation and a working culture of physical risk, the I.A.B.S.I.W.’s active support, in the form 
of bail and legal fees, suggests that this violence cannot be explained away as an emotional or 
environmental response. Rather, it was, like its employer counterpart, consciously cultivated and 
institutionally supported.  Both violence and its authorization were integral to building solidarity 
and increasing power—not just wages. Under the direction of President Frank Ryan and 
Treasurer J.J. McNamara, the I.A.B.S.I.W. was actively and consciously fighting against the 
open shop with strategies that were only superficially distinct from those of its opponents. The 
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ends—making non-union construction more expensive and turning the open shop into a 
liability—justified the means. And the means included the destruction of machinery and 
structures by explosion as well as attacks on individual workers. Attacks on ‘snakes’ and ‘scabs’ 
working on non-union job sites were vicious and regular. Members were actively recruited by 
union business agents and paid to assault non-union workers and foremen. In 1906, members of 
the I.A.B.S.I.W. cut the guy ropes of a derrick on an open shop job and violently assaulted a 
guard. At least one strikebreaker died from a head injury inflicted by a union member, another 
strikebreaker was thrown into the Hudson River, and a foreman’s face was badly burnt with 
ammonia thrown at him by a man on roller skates.80  
Whatever the moral implications of dynamite, beatings, and extortion by ethically 
dubious walking delegates, this combination of strategies seemed to be working in the union’s 
favor. In 1900, the union had 1,731 members. This increased to 11,000 in 1902 and 16,000 in 
1903.81 Certainly demand and material innovations in construction had an impact on these 
numbers, but the rough strategies employed for union control were, at the very least, not hurting. 
As one member remarked in regards to extortion charges brought against delegate Parks of 
Chicago, he “‘may have made a bunch of money’…but ‘he didn’t get it out of us.’”82 According 
to John Commons, neither small-scale, local sabotage nor the McNamara scandal hurt organized 
labor. The membership rolls of the A.F.L. swelled between 1911 and 1913 and the Iron Workers’ 
membership grew from 10,928 in 1911-12 to 13,189 in 1913-14.83 
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 What emerged from the struggle over the open shop during the first decades of the 
twentieth century was a definition of organizational legitimacy based on non-violence. Open 
shop propaganda claiming neutrality on the right of workers to organize was a significant 
contribution to this legacy. An important historical truth is obfuscated by the argument that 
violence was a common, but not traditional, representative or official aspect of labor organizing. 
Both the employers’ claims to an affiliation between anarchism, terrorism, and union violence 
and labor’s claims that its sanctioned methods were non-violent, evolved into a conception of 
legitimacy that misrecognizes power as something equally distributed among individuals that can 
therefore be obtained through simple numbers. It is a fantasy that is consonant with a more 
general belief in electoral democracy and a liberal consensus that was, in reality, completely 
irrelevant to organized labor at the time. This is arguably still the case and evident in the aversion 
to even legitimate forms of labor militancy such as strikes. It is important to recognize the 
structural nature of violence during this earlier period and the open shop origins of the discourse 
linking non-violence to legitimacy. Organized labor’s power developed from and remains solidly 
anchored in its capacity for coercive enforcement. This is not to say that coercive enforcement 
requires assault and sabotage, but coercion is in the very nature of organized labor. Richard 
Hofstadter famously claimed that Americans “have a remarkable lack of memory where violence 
is concerned.” In the case of labor history, this amnesia performs a useful double function. It 
forgets the numerous forms of violence and expropriation at the heart of capital accumulation 
and the subsequent and often violent enforcement of those property interests. And it forgets the 





for the belief that America has a “history but not a tradition of domestic violence” argues 
Hofstadter, is that our “violence lacks both an ideological and a geographic center; it lacks 
cohesion; it has been too various, diffuse, and spontaneous to be forged into a single, sustained 
inveterate hatred shared by entire social classes.” The decades of industrial violence that began 










Chapter 3: From Everett to Everest:  
The 1917 Pacific Northwest Lumber Strike 
 
Sabotage in the woods might mean working slow on the job….Sabotage may 
mean misplacing the tools where they are not easily found…Sabotage may mean 
that logs are cut shorter than the required size…Sabotage may mean the driving of 
spikes into the logs or even the trees…We know sabotage does not appeal to 
you….Remember your mutual interests with friends Weyerhauser, Kirby, Clark 
and Long…You could be where Kirby and Weyerhauser are, if you had stolen the 
timberlands first. And don’t use sabotage. For the love of your boss and the glory 
of your soul, don’t use sabotage. 
 --Industrial Worker, “Don’t Do It, Boys!” December 26, 1912. 
 
“Perhaps the real history of the rise of the lumber industry in the Pacific Northwest will 
never be written,” mused Walker Smith in the opening lines of his account of the Everett 
Massacre. “But if that true history be written, it will tell no tales of ‘self-made men’ who toiled 
in the woods and mills amid poverty and privation and finally rose to fame and affluence by their 
own unaided effort.”1 The event that became known as the Everett Massacre was, like most 
violent, namable eruptions, singular only for its concentration in space and time. It was one 
incident among many during a period of relentless and extreme vigilante violence against 
striking workers, I.W.W. members, and their allies in the town of Everett, Washington. It lasted 
for months. And these months, in turn, were only one brief episode in the near constant violence 
against labor organizers and the I.W.W. in the opening decades of the twentieth century. 
On May Day of 1916, unionized shingle workers affiliated with the A.F.L. walked off of 
their jobs when a wage increase, demanded in relation to the rising price in shingles, did not 
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materialize. What followed was unexceptional: mill owners hired armed, professional strike-
breakers to attack pickets and escort scabs, while local law enforcement arrested striking 
workers. By the middle of the summer, most men had returned to work without union 
recognition let alone pay increases, and the few militant holdouts were repeatedly subjected to 
physical attack. On August 19, police escorted a small picket onto a bridge where they were 
hemmed in and attacked by hired thugs armed with brass knuckles and black jacks.2  
It was at this time that the I.W.W. began organizing by sending James Rowan and other 
street speakers to Everett in an attempt to reignite the strike and roll back the apparent open shop 
victory of the Everett lumbermen. The speakers were beaten, arrested, jailed, and forced to run 
gauntlets upon release. More speakers arrived and the process was repeated. On October 30, a 
boat carrying forty Wobblies arrived at Everett. They were immediately arrested. “That night 
deputies removed the prisoners from jail and took them to Beverley Park, a local forest preserve, 
where they stripped their captives and made the Wobblies run a gauntlet of several hundred 
vigilantes.”3 It was this event that was dubbed the Everett Massacre. In response, 250 Wobblies 
chartered the steamer Verona from Seattle to Everett where they were met at the dock and fired 
on by armed deputies. Melvyn Dubofsky put the number of dead and wounded at two and 
twenty-two respectively; Walker Smith claimed five dead and thirty-two severely wounded. An 
unknown number fell overboard and drowned. The casualties on the side of the deputies were 
roughly equivalent. Smith claims that it was fired by an agent-provocateur aboard the boat. 
Thirty-Eight Wobblies were charged with unlawful assembly and seventy-four with first-degree 
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murder. The deputies led by Snohomish County Sherriff Donald McRae were not charged with 
crimes.4 This was the atmosphere in which the lumber strike of 1917 began.  
Smith’s description of the lumber industry is pointed but hardly wrong. The lumber 
industry, he wrote, was built with:  
…the theft of public lands; with the bribery and corruption of public officials; 
with the destruction and ‘sabotage’ if the term may be so misused of the property 
of competitors; with base treachery and double dealing among associated 
employers; and with extortion and coercion of the actual worker…by any and 
every means from the ‘robbersary’ company stores to the commission of 
deliberate murder.5 
 
The 1917 strike was staged in an industry plagued by crises of overproduction, reliant on 
federal land grants, and addicted to the environmentally devastating practice of rapid clear-
cutting. It was dependent on cheap, itinerant labor facilitated by urban employment agencies that 
exploited the peripheral location of jobs to their fullest. And when the de facto coercion of sub-
subsistence wages failed to produce the labor power necessary to turn stumpage into use value, 
the U.S. Military sent conscripted men to fill in the void. The struggle culminated in the creation 
of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumberman, which grew out of the War Department’s 
Spruce Production Division. The S.P.D. was placed under the direction of Colonel Brice P. 
Disque, a former prison warden in Jackson, Michigan who had done several tours in the 
Philippines. This military, quasi-union procured “by mid-1918 an oversize division of more than 
25,000 enlisted soldiers, also in uniform who were armed with both rifle and woodcutting 
implements, and who were… subject to martial discipline. The bulk of the rank and file…was 
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composed of more than 100,000 civilians, mostly loggers and mill and kiln hands, who subjected 
themselves to the paramilitary authority of the union’s leaders more or less voluntarily.”6  
The war had augmented labor’s bargaining power. For the I.W.W., the needs of the state 
during wartime threw the importance of labor into relief. American soldiers could not “fight 
without food; without lumber, the military could not house recruits, transport them across the 
ocean, or challenge German pilots for control of the skies; without copper, production of military 
related hardware was hampered.”7 For its part, the A.F.L. saw an opportunity to ally itself with 
progressive tendencies within the Wilson administration against the growing popularity of the 
I.W.W.   
The itinerant nature of the lumber industry—not just its workers—required rapid 
construction of temporary camps that increased the problem of unsanitary and otherwise 
untenable living situations. It also produced its own incentive for overproduction—the rapid 
deterioration of lumber camps and equipment due to shoddy construction was an added reason 
for the policy of cutting as much wood as quickly as possible regardless of market demand.8 
Thus the industry’s two largest problems—rebellious workers and the inability to sell excess 
product at any sort of profit—were coproduced by its very organization. As one government 
report put it: “part of the problem is that of eliminating the business cycle.”9  
The wartime intervention in lumber began as an effort on the part of the War Department 
to procure spruce for aircraft. When this production process was interrupted by an intractable 
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labor force newly empowered by an increased demand for their labor-time, a massive apparatus 
encompassing the military, the academy, local law enforcement, patriotic and vigilante 
organizations, and employers’ associations, was set in motion for the purpose of obtaining 
dependable supplies of lumber.  
 The 1917 lumber strike was the last major show of organizing force by the I.W.W. It was 
at this moment that sabotage virtually disappeared from the organization’s literature and, it has 
since been assumed, from its tactical repertoire. The lumber strike’s success and the removal of 
the word sabotage from the Industrial Worker has been used as evidence of the strategy’s 
marginal role. But this conclusion is unsupportable. The theory continued to circulate and there 
is a fair amount of evidence that the practice of sabotage in lumber camps was a regular 
occurrence. In a less direct, but no less important way, the arguments contained in sabotage 
literature concerning the rightful ownership and theft of property and the concept of ‘capitalist 
sabotage’ permeated the conflict between radical loggers and mill hands and their employers. 
The Land 
 Timber procurement and production has been characterized by continual conflict and the 
ever-expanding frontiers of environmental destruction. By the early twentieth century, the giants 
of the U.S. lumber industry had depleted the abundant stores of timber in the Midwest and 
moved their operations south and west. The transformation of trees into lumber, and lumber into 
airplanes for a burgeoning American and Allied Air Force, was first and foremost the 
transformation of nature into value. When the U.S. entered World War I in 1917, the 
Northwestern states of Washington, Oregon and Idaho contained an estimated eleven billion 
board feet of spruce. But these board feet remained locked into scattered, if dense, stands of 
spruce trees. Forests could not be converted into the salable commodity “board feet” without a 
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labor force. And they would not be converted unless board feet were profitable. Until the demand 
for airplane lumber emerged, the industry had ignored the relatively inaccessible spruce for far 
more readily available fir trees to supply lumber for ships and military cantonments. Interspersed 
with other species, and often requiring the construction of expensive railroads, spruce trees 
presented a far greater expense than lumberman cared to invest.10 The lumber industry was 
producing approximately five million board feet annually at the start of the war and in spite of 
requests from France and England (as well as sales to Germany through neutral third parties) for 
massive amounts of milled spruce, the industry had little incentive to increase the production of 
an historically unstable commodity at a moment when it had become so precious.11  
The rudimentary infrastructure of the lumber industry was not organized around spruce 
production, and logging roads therefore had no relation to spruce stands. The industry needed to 
be persuaded to considerably reorganize their operations to substantially increase the production 
of this particular type of lumber. Jason W. Moore has argued that capitalism “is not an economic 
system; it is not a social system; it is a way of organizing nature.”12 Rising exploitation depends 
on the appropriation of what he calls “cheap natures”: labor-power, food, energy, and raw 
materials. The state does not aid capitalism by offering materials for production, it produces 
capitalism by facilitating the appropriation of “cheap natures” including, as a structural necessity, 
cheap labor for the transformation of cheap land into surplus value. The state procurement of 
timberlands—followed in this case by the literal state procurement of labor from the military—
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was not a one-way process of discovery, enclosure, and transfer from the state to private industry 
but itself a matter of state-making.  
…the capitalist state does not have a relationship with nature, it is a relationship 
with nature. Capital’s metabolic relationship with non-human nature is also 
always a relationship with the state, and mediated through the state. And, the 
capitalist state has always been an “environment making” institution. Managing, 
mediating, delivering, and producing the environment is a core and foundational 
feature of the modern, territorially defined, capitalist state. Furthermore, the state 
is central to the value form. If the utilities of non-human nature are important 
sources of wealth, which they are, then it is the state that delivers these to 
capital.13  
 
The lumber industry originally consisted of many small producers but by the late 
nineteenth century it had begun to be dominated by a handful of large firms. The high cost of 
maintaining private roads and other initial investments contributed to this concentration, but the 
lumber wealth produced by the Northwest was a matter of state sponsored infrastructure and land 
procurement from the start. The completion of the transcontinental railroad system coincided 
with the depletion of forests in the Midwest and provided the impetus to firms with a “’cut and 
get out’ philosophy of resource exploitation,” such as Weyerhaeuser to move their operations 
west.14  The firms benefited from railroad land grants but “lumber companies and speculators 
also amassed timberlands by manipulating legislation… [increasing] their holdings under the 
Homestead and Timber and Stone acts.”15  
The Weyerhaeuser Timber Company is a textbook example of state sponsored 
procurement. “Eighty percent of [their] land [two thirds of which was in the Northwest] 
originally had been part of the Northern Pacific land grant. Thus, the land grant policy of 
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Congress can be charged with direct responsibility for the two or three greatest private holdings 
of timber wealth in the country.”16 By 1910, Weyerhaeuser was one of three owners controlling a 
large majority of the timber in the states of Oregon and Washington, the Southern Pacific and 
Northern Pacific railroads being the other two. Among them, they controlled 191 billion board 
feet. Compare this to eighty-three other owners who had accumulated control over the not 
insubstantial one billion board feet each.17  
The lumber industry is one of the more striking examples of the state’s role in delivering 
value to members of the economic elite because here the bundle of rights being conferred was 
actual land. And through its many and various uses and users, the land generated an 
entanglement of legal rights, territorial claims, governmental regulations, and concomitant 
evasions that shaped the natural and social landscape in ways that were concrete and visible.  
The process by which lumberman acquired and harvested farmable timber was varied. It 
involved many different purchasing arrangements, holding and development agreements, and 
relationships with state and federal governments. Acquisition of lands occurred across a 
spectrum of legality from fraudulent entries made under the 1863 Homestead Act to simple theft 
of wood from public lands. The first non-indigenous interventions in the landscape of the 
Northwest were made by farmers. The area was steadily populated beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century by a steady flow of migrants who filed claims on land under the Donation 
Land Law for up to 320 un-surveyed acres or who purchased up to 160 acres of surveyed land 
for $1.25 per acre under the Preemption Act of 1841. Land laws were subsequently altered and 
varied from state to state, but the distribution of state-owned land favored farming and made the 
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acquisition of land for lumbering comparatively difficult.18 Forests, according to Richard White, 
“represented a special failure of the American land system.” Under the federal incentive system, 
prairie land was quickly settled, but seeing only farmland trees was conceived of as an obstacle 
on the road to productivity and profit. Federal laws reflected this view and “bore little relation to 
the realities of [regions] where the forests were the areas of real wealth.”19 Lumbermen therefore 
acquired stands of timber through fraud or simple theft—sending streams of dummy entry men 
to make small claims or logging forests for which they had no title.   
The Strike 
In July of 1916, the I.W.W. held a conference in Seattle during which they decided to 
devote considerable energy to an organizing drive in the lumber industry. The strike officially 
started on log drives in Idaho and Montana on April 1st, 1917, followed by a walk out at the Sand 
Point Camp in Idaho in June. They then called a strike for the entire Spokane district (Eastern 
Washington, Idaho, and Western Montana). On July 9th, owners of camps and mills throughout 
the Northwest formed the Lumberman’s Protective Association and its members agreed to fine 
anyone who granted the eight-hour day $500. On July 14th, industry-wide strikes were called by 
the A.F.L. and the I.W.W. Both unions demanded the eight-hour day, higher wages, and sanitary 
working and living conditions. By late July, the strike began to immediately interfere with 
cantonment construction and ship carpenters in Grey’s Harbor refused to handle lumber from 
ten-hour mills. Meanwhile, employers refused, under any condition, to grant the eight-hour 
workday.20  
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The strikes involved at least 40,000 workers and cut production by four fifths.21 Another 
estimate puts the shutdown at 75-90 percent of capacity for mills and camps in Oregon and 
Washington for the month of July.22 The strike officially ended in the fall of the same year, but 
members of the I.W.W. continued to ‘strike on the job’. After returning to work they “restricted 
production…They loafed, they pretended ignorance…they perpetrated ‘accidents,’ and they 
acted as though their eight-hour day demand had been won, quitting work after eight hour 
stints.”23 The I.W.W. posed a more substantial threat to lumber interests than the A.F.L. both 
because of its popularity in the industry but also because the practice of sabotage continued well 
after strikes were ended.24   
Sabotage was central to the 1917 lumber strike. Like any event, the strike had a long a 
complex organizational history and the reaction to it formed by equally extensive relationships 
and competing needs.  But the flurry of government reports, attempts to force employers to 
negotiate and, ultimately, the creation of the military workforce and quasi-union of the Loyal 
Legion was, in substantial measure, a reaction to worker sabotage. Wartime market demands, 
obdurate lumbermen’s associations, pressure from so-called ‘legitimate’ labor unions, and the 
efforts of progressive reformers were instrumental to the eventual institution of an eight-hour day 
and workplace reforms. But all interested parties were motivated in some degree by the real and 
alleged use of sabotage. It was the strategy of ‘striking on the job’ that proved impossible to 
circumvent by anything less than the total eradication of the I.W.W. within the industry and this 
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involved a far more extensive intervention in labor relations than mere regulation of wages, 
hours, and physical conditions. Furthermore, sabotage was galvanizing. Its elimination provided 
a common purpose for lumbermen and the state where there was otherwise, no common 
interests. Sabotage, as both a practice and a discourse—as a real threat as well as a repository of 
paranoia—permeated the conflict and its resolution.  
Sabotage, in its non-military usage, was a philosophy derived from the actions of workers 
that confronted capitalist property relations on their own terms—that is, as an assertion of 
legitimate control by force rather than a negotiation within the logic of a pre-existing regime. 
The definition may have been broad, but its meaning was developed by a revolutionary 
organization that did not, on principle, acknowledge the legitimacy of private property. And this 
notion of property extended to its criticisms of the War, which it held to be an imperialist project 
for the benefit of capitalists alone. Patriotism not only failed to be an incentive for cooperation, it 
was an added reason to prevent the production of goods for military uses. If ownership was 
control, then sabotage was a direct assault on the very idea of ownership—a sort of pre-figurative 
expropriation of the means of production justified by a philosophy that recognized private 
property as a type of theft. Or, at the very least, the preferential transfer of wealth to a privileged 
few.  
Words like ‘theft’ were not, in this instance, rhetorical hyperbole. Large swathes of 
Northwest timberlands were sold to lumber interests, and the railroads that made them accessible 
for a song, and transformed into wealth through sales to the state that had procured them in the 
first place. Sabotage was not a tactic limited to the dispute within the lumber industry, but its 
meaning was thrown into stark relief by the configuration of this particular landscape and the 
explicitly tautological nature of lumber wealth creation. The setting—vast old-growth forests in a 
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region where the transformation of land and trees into fungible commodities continues to be 
violently contested—is both evocative and significant. A forest, surveyed, valued, and 
appropriated by the state is not a theoretical commons but a sited one. 
The violence of capitalism was graphically inscribed on the bodies of workers in all 
sectors of the lumber industry. Evidence for the I.W.W.’s assertion that ‘capitalist sabotage’ was 
characterized by violence against people was abundant in the woods of the Northwest. Thus 
‘worker sabotage’ which only aimed to destroy the property and profits of the capitalist class, 
found ample sources of justification. Death on the job was frequent. Even the relentlessly 
positive Four L Bulletin, which printed death notices along with other regional, industry related 
news was unable to wholly avoid the gruesome reality produced by a landscape of concentrated 
exploitation. In a single issue of this monthly publication, we learn that Paul Delebasich, aged 
thirty, was instantly killed when “caught in the rigging and drawn into the drum of a donkey 
engine at camp 1 of the Aberdeen Lumber & Shingle company;” Thomas Hall was “instantly 
killed when hit by a flying log;” Jack Olson “fell eighty feet to his death…when he lost his grip 
on a line;” Hugh Rogers “fell into a sawdust bin and was suffocated;” John Severson was “struck 
by branches of a falling tree;” Dan Smith “suffered a compound fracture of both legs…when 
struck by a flying cable;” Sam Nassi “received a fatal injury from the fall of a tree;” Quinn W. 
Farr  “fell under a logging train while attempting to make a coupling;” and Victor Suhonen was 
killed “when struck in the head by a line which snapped in two.”25  
Death notices were printed, but we can only speculate on the number of lost fingers and 
limbs that could result from the work of lumberjacks and shingle weavers. Smith provides a 
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description of working conditions in the shingle mills that indicate the immanent dismemberment 
that faced workers on a daily basis:  
For ten hours a day the sawyer faces two teethed steel discs whirling around two 
hundred times a minute. To the one on the left he feeds heavy blocks of cedar, 
reaching over with his left hand to remove the rough shingles it rips off. 
He…cannot stop to see what his left hand is doing. His eyes are too busy 
examining the shingles for knot holes to be cut out by the second saw whirling in 
front of him…the saw on his left sets the pace. If the singing blade rips fifty rough 
shingles off the block every minute, the sawyer must reach over to its teeth fifty 
times in sixty seconds…he must reach over, turn the shingle, trim its edge on the 
gleaming saw in front of him, cut out the narrow strip containing the knot hole 
with two quick movements of his right hand and toss the completed board down 
the chute to the packers.26  
 
Erik Loomis has argued that the “impact of the timber industry on workers’ bodies [at] the 
meeting point of labor and nature” motivated men otherwise “indifferent to larger theoretical 
questions but desperate to improve their conditions” to join the I.W.W. and engage in organized 
actions. Borrowing a concept from Rob Nixon, he suggests that the lumber industry exemplifies 
a “slow violence… a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight…an attritional violence that 
is typically not viewed as violence at all.” But nothing about the violence of the lumber industry 
was slow or covert. Being dragged into a donkey engine and crushed to death is hardly 
comparable to lead poisoning. Indeed, the operative word seems to be ‘sudden’. We might also 
want to ask what made this violence invisible. Invisible to whom exactly? Certainly not the 
lumber workers who, as Loomis details in the opening paragraphs of his book, contracted 
gonorrhea in their eyes.27  
Workers bodies were subject to brutal violence. Working conditions were not a 
theoretical issue and this is precisely why the I.W.W. placed bodily violence by capitalists at the 
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center of the class analysis elaborated in its writings on sabotage. The separation between 
theoretical issues and environmental and bodily concerns did not—structurally, it could not—
exist within the framework of this analysis. There were certainly any number of lumberman who 
simply did not want to get gonorrhea of the eye or meet a speedy death by donkey engine, but 
these were the same issues being addressed by the A.F.L.; the same issues raised by progressive 
reformers; issues that could easily be solved without a theory of class conflict, a discourse of 
worker control, a critique of ownership or revolutionary rhetoric of any kind. This distinction 
leaves us to explain what exactly the I.W.W.’s appeal was and how physical suffering was 
transformed into impressive collective action against organized capital and the state.  
In the woods of the Northwest in 1917, the I.W.W. was apparently far more appealing 
than the A.F.L.—so appealing that it required relentless suppression by police powers at all 
levels. It is important to attend to the material reality of a worker’s body, but I would suggest that 
the I.W.W. and its talk of sabotage was appealing precisely because it appealed to the workers’ 
minds. I.W.W. halls provided places where workers could rest and socialize, receive mail, and 
learn from each other about camp conditions and particularly dishonest employment agencies. 
They were also stocked with literature that was read, discussed, sold, and presumably repeated. 
The importance of sabotage was that it enunciated a revolutionary theory through bodies; it gave 
bodies an importance that exceeded their particular experience of pain and suffering and 
combined this with the material, bodily activity of interrupting and preventing production. The 
experience of pain alone is not an organizing tool. If anything, the experience of physical 
suffering tends toward alienation because of its inherently inarticulate and strictly subjective 
nature. 28 Sabotage was not an intuitive, animal reaction to physical abuse but the raising of 
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activity to a coherent practice. It is perfectly fair to infer, as Loomis does, that physical health 
and well-being were more important to most workers than the revolutionary goal of 
overthrowing capitalism. Once the industry, under government pressure, managed to meet many 
of the demands for sanitation, bedding, and eight-hour workdays, enthusiasm for the I.W.W. did 
begin to wane. But coincidence is not causation. There were other reasons for the organization’s 
attrition, such as the expense of legal battles, the shuttering of I.W.W. halls, sustained 
harassment by vigilantes, the presence of federal troops in logging camps, and the difficulty of 
maintaining organized struggle over time under even the best conditions. Given all of this, the 
conclusion that workers never had any real interest in theoretical arguments because, at the end 
of the day, they were seduced by clean bedding and non-rancid butter, is unsatisfying.  
One could even suggest that foregrounding bodies has made the intellects of workers 
invisible. Of course, claiming that workers found the theoretical aspect of the I.W.W. appealing 
is a matter of speculation as well, but barring any concrete evidence of its rejection, it seems fair 
to entertain the notion that these organizing efforts had an intellectual impact. It is no less 
speculative to assert that they did not. And the former assumption has the virtue of pushing 
against the notion, wildly popular at the time, of itinerant workers as irrational ‘timber beasts’ 
whose immediate, physical needs comprised the horizon of their intellectual lives.  
For there is no denying that the 1917 strike was successful even if the organizing and 
coercion in the form of strikes, slow-downs, and sabotage—both real and threatened—did 
ultimately accomplish its ends through non-union institutions and organizations. The proportion 
of government reaction in 1917 is telling.  The I.W.W. had struck the lumber industry in 1912 
and 1915, but the 1917 strike was a “decisive factor impelling the Wilson administration 
toward… forceful repression of the I.W.W.,” and thus the last major action before the dragnet 
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prosecution of Wobblies under the Espionage Act in 1917.29 It also produced prosecutions under 
Idaho’s recently instituted criminal syndicalism legislation—laws aimed specifically at sabotage 
and its advocacy. Of course, pamphlets and revolutionary oratory were not the singular motor of 
the strike. Wartime labor shortages combined with rising profits—the fruits of full economic 
recovery from the Great Depression of 1873-1896—put organized labor in a relatively powerful 
position.30  While the legal and political campaign against radicals was well underway by 1917 
(citizens’ alliances such as the American Protective League and business associations such as the 
National Association of Manufacturers had already formed) the threat posed by a revolutionary 
labor union was now, because of the war and the success of the strike, fully felt. The lumber 
strike produced an environment within which the state and radical organized labor both 
experienced themselves in their fullest expression of power and their coexistence, never without 
serious and violent conflict, suddenly became untenable. Sabotage, difficult to prove and 
quantify in practice, presumably encouraged by word of mouth among itinerant workers took on 
a metonymic function for the forces of repression and large segments of the public at large. It 
absorbed anxieties about domestic and foreign threats alike and the word began to slip between a 
military and an economic register. By “employing sabotage against the employers,” Carleton 
Parker suggested “the Wobblies in effect were serving the Kaiser.”31 
Progressive Allies 
The lumber strike did not only produce legal repression. It was characterized by serious 
attempts to regularize industrial relations, bring recalcitrant employers to heel, impose the eight-
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hour workday, and address the labor question with something other than bayonets. It also 
occurred during a period of time when the federal government began to standardize and 
centralize police powers, and in many ways build the administrative state that is so often 
associated with the New Deal.32 At the same time that industrial conflict impelled the Wilson 
administration to acts of legal and military repression on a broad scale, it also generated attempts 
at negotiation, as well as the commission of innumerable investigations and reports on working 
conditions. This was, after all, a period of energetic progressive reform and the lumber industry 
became the site of vigorous activity by academics and military men alike.  
The Cantonment Adjustment Commission was a promising endeavor that had succeeded 
in settling disputes with the building trades associations for the satisfactory, expedited 
construction of military garrisons. As its examiner on the West Coast, Parker had “successfully 
mediated more than two dozen actual or incipient work stoppages.”33 U.S. entry into the War 
created conditions in which the anti-radicalism of Wilsonian progressives was given full vent. 
The repression of labor radicalism was not a simple, unilateral campaign by the government 
against workers in the service of individual, moneyed interests. To give a sense of how 
unflattering the findings of federally commissioned reports generally were to employers, one 
government investigation into the lumber industry was being read aloud by I.W.W. organizer 
James Rowan when he was arrested for street-speaking in Everett.34 The Wilson administration 
forged earnest, if strategic, relationships with ‘legitimate’ organized labor, namely the A.F.L. at 
the same time that it aggressively pursued the suppression and expulsion of the radical I.W.W. 
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This was, undoubtedly, the prosecution of labor by way of radicalism, but this is significant in 
itself. To the extent that the state acts in the interests of capital, it is the eradication of radical 
critique—not simply local labor disruptions and wage demands—that is important over the long 
term. The ‘pure and simple’ unionism of Samuel Gompers had many of the same demands as the 
I.W.W. and when they both called strikes in 1917, it was for better living conditions and an 
eight-hour day. But the lack of a political critique made negotiations between the A.F.L. and the 
Wilson administration possible. Indeed, Gompers had a privileged seat at the bargaining table 
and publicly positioned the A.F.L. as a legitimate alternative to the I.W.W. in hopes of gaining 
employer and government support for his organization. It was, however, a great show of real 
organizing strength on the part of vocal, propagandizing, revolutionary radicals that made the 
consideration of such unappealing demands necessary.  And sabotage—on the part of the I.W.W. 
and other dissatisfied laborers, as well as their obstinate employers, was arguably the impetus for 
this flurry of progressive intervention. In the face of on-going battles between labor and capital, 
the state intervened to support its own military efforts (from which business owners were 
profiting hand over fist) but also to force business owners towards some reasonable 
accommodation of labor’s demands.  
The labor conditions in lumber camps and sawmills were abominable and if lumber 
workers themselves were not easily assimilable to a charitable notion of the deserving poor, their 
living conditions were so wretched that progressive sympathy was a foregone conclusion. Parker, 
an academic based at the University of Washington, was exemplary of the progressive tendency 
in Wilsonian America and his theories concerning the causes of labor unrest directly influenced 
Disque’s approach to stabilizing labor relations. Parker’s success in preventing work stoppages 
in cantonment construction won him the esteem of government officials and other academics 
!
! 108 
adjacent to the Wilson administration. In the opinion of James A.B. Scherer, an economist and 
trusted advisor of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Parker was “probably a genius.” 35 Scherer 
was the first to alert Disque to the gravity of the Wobbly threat in the Northwest, and it was 
largely through him that the soon to be director of the Spruce Production Division was 
introduced to labor-management relations affecting the lumber industry.36 Scherer held a distinct 
and extreme anti-union and anti-Wobbly position and relayed to Disque his assessment of the 
extent of the I.W.W.’s penetration into western logging camps and mills: 
By his analysis, a dangerous proportion of the card-carrying I.W.W. members in 
the Northwest were hardened, devoted missionaries of the gospel of class warfare. 
Their activities among migratory California farm workers had resulted in bitter 
strikes only the year before. With the war declaration, Wobblies were responding 
to their pacifist principles by acts of sabotage in factories and arson in the fields.37 
 
Scherer’s proposed solution to this was the use of federal troops to repress the I.W.W. menace. 
Even Scherer was distressed by the attitude of lumber operators towards their employees and 
could clearly see the role that working conditions and low wages played in the disproportionately 
high number of strikes in that region of the country. Parker took this position even further, 
antagonizing his superiors with the suggestion that employers and obsolete labor laws were 
actually at fault for the disruptions. He approached his mediation work from the perspective that 
employers and employees must cooperate in the service of the public interest—which was 
paramount and should in no case be undermined by the profit motives and particular interests of 
either party. This won him the admiration of Gompers and the ire of the Lumberman’s Protective 
Association. Parker, despite apparent sympathy for the plight of workers in some of the worst 
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working and living conditions imaginable, was in reality a staunch anti-Wobbly and tepid pro-
A.F.L. intellectual whose major concern was an end to class conflict by way of its erasure. The 
underlying problem, as he saw it, was not exploitation but a failure of individual, humanistic 
sympathy. The belligerents in the class war simply needed to meet face to face as individuals in 
order to “emerge from the generalized abstractions of ‘boss’ and ‘worker.’”38  
 The particular form of Parker’s sympathy, expressed in a hybrid social theory combining 
popular Freudian analysis and Social Darwinism, is residually apparent in what might be thought 
of as a nascent but robust welfare scheme for the regularization of labor that resulted in company 
towns replacing many of the ramshackle temporary camps. Like Loomis, Parker was concerned 
with workers bodies and the environmental factors that threatened them. The overall project of 
the Loyal Legion bore the imprint of this philosophy of cooperation and concern with worker 
well-being. But Parker’s worldview was built on a belief in the pathological nature of 
revolutionary workers movements and the degenerate psychology that they displayed, rendering 
the most provisional consideration of their arguments and actions unnecessary. The labor 
problem, he wrote “is one of character-formation.” In the short term, western labor troubles 
needed to be solved for the war effort, but “the importance of the western labor problem is that a 
human, irrational, de-mechanized, dynamite-using labor type rose and functioned.”39 In Parker’s 
mind, the “startling” labor turnover and the whole range of union organizing activities from the 
formal demand for a closed shop to unofficial slowdowns, was the expression of subconscious 
desires that were not so much aggravated by working conditions, but more accessible and 
apparent because of the primitive nature and condition of the western worker. In other words, the 
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‘hobo’ was exempt from the repressive forces of civilization. In his capacity as advocate and 
functional mediator, Parker emphasized the importance of sanitation and a dignified level of 
compensation as solutions to the problem of recalcitrant workers. But the intention was not to 
provide just compensation. It was explicitly aimed at repression, albeit in a Freudian idiom. The 
so-called “bindle-stiffs” and “timber beasts” tended “by dissociation from social rule” to “[give] 
some liberty and dominance to the more primitive desires of the sub-conscious.”40  
The program of education and domestication (in the most ‘successful’ cases the literal 
emplacement in the domicile) taken up by the Loyal Legion was, in its most sympathetic form, 
one of containment and discipline. Labor reformers such as Parker saw themselves as part of a 
civilizing mission that located the problem in the behavior and psychology of the backward, 
barbarian workers. Labor trouble was not a self-conscious activity. It was “not pursued because 
of any deep realization of the ethical or strategic significance of the issue, but because it is a 
means of expressing resentment at the stresses and strains of their position.” Striking and 
sabotage was no more than “diverted energy” or “a relief activity…tending, curiously, to 
reestablish the unionist’s dignity in his own eyes.” [Emphasis mine.]41 The concatenation of 
irrational, de-mechanized, and dynamite-wielding is particularly revealing of a technocratic 
progressive mindset that was not limited to Parker. Howd found it unexceptional that migratory 
workers would be those “who lacked the mental ability to make the adjustments necessary for 
life in our complex social environment.”42 
Parker’s evolutionary theories might appear quaint or even bizarre to the contemporary 
reader, but a residue of this logic characterizes more recent scholarly approaches to lumber 
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workers as well. The overemphasis on bodies in Loomis’s otherwise insightful work sits neatly 
in this teleological narrative of progress from the material to the intellectual. The temporary and 
unsanitary living quarters certainly compounded worker dissatisfaction, but it is a mistake to 
assume that radicalism springs from a sort of primitivism. The presence of garbage piles and 
open latrines says far more about negligence, exploitation, and economic desperation produced 
under actually existing capitalism than it does about so-called stages of economic development 
or anti-social psychic states.43 Nor should it be assumed that the material characteristics of this 
deep woods ‘workscape’ produced intellectual or ideological isolation. Despite their remote 
locations, logging camps were tied to urban centers through their dependence on employment 
bureaus. The bureaus themselves were targets of I.W.W. organizing, and the itinerant and 
seasonal nature of camp labor meant that workers regularly came into contact with organizers as 
they passed through or wintered in cities. The free speech fights that were waged in cities along 
the West Coast laid an indispensable, theoretical groundwork for the 1917 strike.  
Parker’s diagnosis of pre-capitalist primitivism as a cause for radicalism is at odds with a 
vast and varied tradition of analysis that treats radicalism as a product of civilization and 
industrial civilization in particular. Melvyn Dubofsky has argued that Western coal mining cities 
were ripe for radicalism in part because of the “speed of the transition from a primitive to a more 
mature economy…from village to city, combined with the great instability of a mining 
economy.” A similar analysis might be applied to lumber—an industry that required intensive 
capitalization, especially in the form of railroads and large mills, produced booming towns in 
relatively short periods of time, and therefore offered a similarly distilled and exaggerated 
instance of capitalist development. These communities were subject to an accelerated shift from 
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a merely formal integration into circuits of exchange to wholesale changes in the technical means 
of production that made capitalism’s transitions and disruptions more obvious and violent. 
Still,the conflict did not arise from the confrontation of modernity with pre-modern folkways. 
Despite a low level of mechanization before 1920, lumber was an industry organized around 
large fixed investments that encouraged rapid deforestation, regular crises of overproduction, and 
abnormally severe incentives to keep wages as low as possible.44 An itinerant seasonal workforce 
was not an externality but a necessity. Subject to extreme profit fluctuations and production 
processes that could be idled for long periods by inclement weather, the ability to hire and fire 
crews at will was essential to the industry’s success. Only with the introduction of overhead 
yarding technology requiring more organized work by teams, did the lumberman’s habit of 
quitting without notice become extremely bothersome to employers. The convulsive rapidity of 
extractive social development suggested by Dubofsky is echoed in Robert Tyler’s suggestion that 
the history of the I.W.W. in the Northwest “reveals how a pioneer American society adapted, 
with some pain and confusion, to rapid social change.”45  
This still implies, however, a progression through a phase of initial social upheaval that is 
perhaps misleading. And it ignores the role of land in a mundane sense. In his analysis of the 
Everett situation, Smith astutely links “prolonged struggle” to a process of enclosure:  
So long as there was in the United States a large and open frontier to be had for 
the taking there could be no very prolonged struggle against an owning 
class…But on coming to what had been the frontier and finding a forest reserve 
with range riders and guards on its boundaries to prevent trespassing; on looking 
back and seeing all land and opportunities taken; on turning again to the forest 
reserve and finding a foreman of the lumber trust within its borders offering 
wages in lieu of a home, it was inevitable that a conflict should occur.46 
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The lumber industry was thus exemplary of an economic and social system subject to 
recurring crises of overproduction that paradoxically undermines subsistence, constructed on an 
edifice of primitive accumulation through the enclosure of land. The industry did not suffer these 
crises so much as it was built on them, even by them. In the late nineteenth century, stumpage 
values were rapidly appreciating. By the 1890s, the Great Lakes region had been cut over and 
timber magnates “took their methods and their wealth westward.”47  By 1915, “Douglass fir in 
the Northwest which had been obtained from the government at $2.50 an acre reached a value of 
$200.00 an acre.”48 The government was selling a square mile of timberlands that could produce 
an estimated capacity of 100 million board feet (approximately $1.5 million retail value) for a 
mere $1600.00.49 The sale of Northern Pacific grants to large lumber interests combined with the 
warning by conservationists (and certainly the recent memory of the Great Lakes region) that the 
land would soon be entirely depleted, fueled the speculative boom.50 
After 1910, however, the bubble burst. The industry was in a serious depression in the 
years leading up to World War I in part because of a turn to different building materials such as 
concrete. The result “was the building of an excessive fixed investment which became a burden 
on the operating industry.”51 Cutting lumber as quickly as possible was the solution, but this led 
to chronic overproduction.52 Lumber was a prime example of the perverse crisis, specific to 
capitalism, of “too much civilization.”  
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“Don’t Do it Boys!” 
According to Philip Foner, it was precisely at the moment of the 1917 strike that the I.W.W. 
began to distance itself from sabotage and other propagandizing efforts, such as the free speech 
fight toward organizing around ‘bread and butter’ demands. “From May 1917 advocacy of 
sabotage ceased in the Industrial Worker—and such concepts as ‘right or wrong does not 
concern us!’ In fact, they insisted that the organization could do with less propaganda and more 
activity.”53 This is only partly true and it does not mean that sabotage ceased in practice or 
disappeared from the working lexicon of its membership. Government officials certainly 
believed that the I.W.W. continued to engage in sabotage. Cloice R. Howd, author of a report on 
labor relations in the lumber industry, writes that “the I.W.W. practiced sabotage, not merely the 
‘conscious withdrawal of efficiency’ but the more destructive kind as well. The files of its papers 
from 1912 to 1917 are full of praise of sabotage and records of its successful use.”54 Even if 
organizational funds were shifted from the discursive to the economic field, the conviction that 
employers’ property claims were illegitimate was well entrenched in the organization as was the 
tradition of direct action on the initiative of individual members. I.W.W. halls had been 
distributing literature throughout the region for years and 1916, which saw the publication of 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn’s wildly popular pamphlet “Sabotage”, was hardly the distant past. 
Sabotage, furthermore, was always linked to a simple and militant theory of class that the I.W.W. 
never disavowed. If the word disappeared, it remains likely that the practice did not. And the 
basic political economic analysis—that property is a form of theft under capitalism had certainly 
not been eliminated.  
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How ‘educated’ in the political opinions of the organization any given individual member 
was, is impossible to evaluate, but organizers would surely have had, at the very least, a Little 
Red Songbook with them. The understanding that the land was ‘stolen’, that clear-cutting was 
par for the course, and that workers could disrupt material output did not disappear because the 
word ‘sabotage’ was no longer printed in the Industrial Worker.  
 Correspondence used as evidence for the indictment of Haywood, shows that Gurley 
Flynn’s pamphlet remained in circulation and was actively promoted by the organization well 
into 1917. Evidence of sabotage in lumber camps was ample. It consisted largely of pounding 
foreign objects into logs before they were shipped to mills. These were objects widely available 
in the camps such as the foot-long spikes used for the construction of flumes or metal wedges 
used to manipulate the direction of felled trees. The metal objects, not visible on the surface of 
the log, would break saw blades and entirely disable milling machinery. Logs would also arrive 
at the mill cut too short for use. One foreman employed by the Panhandle Lumber Company 
estimated that 35 to 50 percent of the logs were cut short during the latter part of 1917.55  
Lumber was vulnerable to targeted and very costly acts of sabotage by individuals and 
small groups—such as cutting boards to the wrong specifications—that were not possible in 
other industries where worker surveillance might be facilitated by their concentration on a 
factory floor. Logs came to mills from multiple camps making it impossible to tell where timber 
was being spiked, let alone who was inserting the spikes.56 It was also vulnerable to forms of 
sabotage that fell squarely within the definition of property destruction, making these actions 
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more offensive and detectable (even while hiding the culprits), than its more subtle variants such 
as soldiering. A further indication that sabotage in some form had not ceased to be an important 
tactic is the strategy encouraged by the leadership late in the strike. By September 1st, afraid that 
the strike was becoming financially unsustainable and worried that it left their membership open 
to replacement by scabs, I.W.W. leaders held a referendum, the content of which remains 
unknown, and directed their membership to return to work and “strike on the job.”57  
Instead of doing a day’s work they practiced ‘conscientious withdrawal of 
efficiency,’ shifted frequently from job to job, and in some cases engaged in 
sabotage. But attempts to run down acts of criminal sabotage on the part of the 
I.W.W. proved fruitless…There was evidence, however, that individual members 
did resort to such practices as driving spikes into logs to break saws, wasting 
materials through careless work.58  
 
Idaho’s anti-sabotage statute suggests that these problems were widespread enough in the 
state. Unlike other state level anti-sabotage and criminal syndicalism laws, largely identical to 
one another and as general as possible, Idaho passed a law that dealt with lumber specifically: 
Any person who willfully, maliciously or mischievously drives or causes to be 
driven or imbedded any nail, spike or piece of iron, steel or other metallic 
substance, or any rock or stone, into any log or timber intended to be 
manufactured into boards, lath, shingles or other lumber, or to be marketed for 
such purpose, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than five 
years or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than six months, or by fine 
not to exceed $5000, in the discretion of the court. 
 
This does not mean that business owners were solely concerned with punishing property 
destruction. Their attitude was preemptive. They were determined to prevent the circulation of 
ideas put forth by the I.W.W. Benjamin W. Oppenheim, the Boise attorney who drafted the 
Idaho law, put it this way: 
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At that time the I.W.W.s were very active in North Idaho, in addition to 
distributing literature, they were beginning to commit acts of sabotage. The 
lumber interests felt it necessary to take protective measures…My clients did not 
consider the poor dupes who generally committed the acts of sabotage as the real 
criminals, but the agitators who inspired them to acts as such. At that particular 
time it was more important to shut up the agitators and keep them off the job than 
it was to put them in a penitentiary.59 
 
Lumbermen also learned from their antagonists. They acknowledged that dangerous ideas 
continued to circulate among workers and that these ideas needed to be replaced. In a certain 
sense, employers began to argue with their employees about politics. In addition to actively 
lobbying for legislation that would criminalize the activities of Wobbly agitators, they began 
book drives and constructed reading rooms stocked with carefully screened material that would 
serve as an alternative to I.W.W. halls.60  
 The lumber worker’s lifestyle itself facilitated a form of disruption and delay at the point 
of production. Itinerancy and the abrupt departure from a job that it allowed was not necessarily 
an irrational response. Nor was it, as one government report speculated, a matter of “nervous 
disorders.”61 Like other forms of sabotage it was “an ordered, even rational response to a 
particularly competitive example of industrial capitalism.”62 While the living conditions in 
lumber camps were no less than abject, the high rates of labor turnover might productively be 
read “less as a reflection of loggers individual subordination than a function of the dialectic of 
control and resistance that characterized the employment relationship.”63  
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Labor turnover in lumber was extreme in the early twentieth century. It was estimated at 
500 percent annually. Turnover became more of a problem for the lumber industry as logging 
underwent technological and organizational changes that incorporated aspects of scientific 
management and acquired some of the characteristics of factory production.64 Logging was 
resistant to technological innovation and subject to seasonal vagaries, but the “overhead 
harvesting systems that were widespread by 1915 allowed almost continuous year-round 
operation.” Thus, the lumber strike came at a time when “new technology put a high premium on 
the ability of a crew to function as an organic production team.”65 While the efforts of Parker and 
Disque bore fruit, camp and mill owners were also inspired to keep workers on the job and 
reduce the “conscious withdrawal of efficiency,” specifically walking off the job without notice, 
through their own efforts at reform. This went further than simply tidying up the camps, it 
required a robust program of socialization that would produce dependable, disciplined workers 
who could be convinced to consent to the company’s methods of production. What capital 
needed were workers as disciplined as those provided by the Spruce Production Division in the 
absence of military obligation.  
It has been suggested that the absence of familial, ethnic, and other community 
obligations that might conflict with political commitments or otherwise encourage a certain 
parochialism in workers’ worldviews contributed to the timber workers’ radicalism. The 
footloose, hobo Wobbly, derided by bourgeois commentators for his lack of family and stability, 
and pitied by progressive reformers as a social misfit and idiot, was indeed a formidable social 
threat. Housing was not, in this context, a means of simple appeasement through the provision of 
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basic animal comforts but a normative project with an economic aim. This ‘lowest type of 
worker’, the hobo, 
present[s] the really dangerous element in the labor problem. They are foot-loose 
rebels who no longer recognize the ordinary conventions of modern society but 
challenge the whole industrial system of which the relation of employer and 
employee forms a part. That challenge may be but the dumb resentment of the 
failure and outcast against the man who has succeeded, or it may be the very 
much more dangerous challenge of the I.W.W., which has a very positive 
philosophy to take the place of laissez faire and respect for private property.66 
 
The strategy of sabotage and striking on the job, combined with the overlapping strategy 
of simply quitting, left the lumbermen frustrated. It was far easier to arrest leaders, deputize 
vigilantes, and deport pickets than it was to locate the problem within the camp. “As the autumn 
wore on, the production situation became a matter of grave concern because of the need for 
spruce for airplane construction,” and out of this emerged the U.S. government’s first major, 
administrative intervention in industrial relations: The Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen 
(4L). 
The Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen (4L) 
Environmental conditions may have been the cause of anger and dissatisfaction on the 
part of lumber workers, but radicalism per se did not arise from bodily needs. Recall Smith’s 
assertion that sabotage, practiced by individuals in the absence of political coherence or class 
consciousness, was not terribly threatening to employers. It was the organized advocacy of 
sabotage, the linking of practice to theory that was truly ominous. Employers were no longer 
faced with isolated, dissatisfied individuals who occasionally broke things, but with a mass of 
men who had—through their intellectual engagement with the I.W.W.—made a conscious 
decision to interrupt production and profit by any means. Despite the importance of material 
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conditions and the insistence by progressives such as Parker that this ‘pathology’ was due to an 
animal condition, the response by the Loyal Legion was robustly theoretical. The establishment 
of the Loyal Legion was a direct response to the intellectual life of workers. It marked a distinct 
shift from bodies to minds in the management of labor.  
 The army as strikebreaker was not unfamiliar, but the Loyal Legion was new and 
reflected an historically specific convergence of progressive values and the extension of the 
administrative state. Instead of protecting property and escorting non-union labor past pickets, 
the Army Corps was sent to work in lumber camps under the auspices of the Spruce Production 
Division, an agency under the authority of the War Department.  
The Loyal Legion was officially approved by the War Department on November 23, 
1917. Its official numbers were impressive. By January of 1918, 10,000 members were enrolled 
and by January 24, there were 300 locals. Each member was required to sign the following 
pledge: 
I, the undersigned, in consideration of my being made a member of the Loyal 
Legion of Loggers and Lumberman, do hereby solemnly pledge my efforts during 
the war to the United States of America, and will support and defend this country 
against enemies both foreign and domestic. I further agree, by these presents, to 
faithfully perform my duty toward this company by directing my best efforts in 
every way possible, to the production of logs and lumber for the construction of 
Army airplanes and ships to be used against our common enemies. That I will 
stamp out any sedition or acts of hostility against the United States Government 
which may come within my knowledge, and I will do every act and thing which 
will in general aid in carrying this war to a successful conclusion.67 
 
Originally conceived of as nothing more than a “propaganda agency to counteract the 
I.W.W.” and enlist workers in the patriotic project of war production, it proved insufficient to 
countering the I.W.W.’s ongoing practice of striking on the job. It was therefore decided that it 
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would provide actual workers whose patriotic credentials could be guaranteed—enlisted and 
conscripted soldiers who were unfit for combat.68 The Legion’s directors were commissioned 
officers, the soldiers were sent to work in uniform, armed and subject to martial discipline.69 In 
this way the Loyal Legion effectively eliminated any union presence in lumber until it was 
declared illegal under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.  
The basic assumption of progressive reformers, Parker and Disque among them, was that 
labor conflict was purely a matter of environmental concerns, i.e. housing, sanitation, length of 
workdays. Workers “became Wobblies out of unbearable environmental indignities and 
inadequacies,” and it was therefore assumed that the correction of these problems would bring 
labor peace. But despite the conviction, expressed in its most extreme form by Parker’s Freudian 
primitivism, that Wobblies were all bodily needs and irrational id, the Loyal Legion devoted 
considerable resources to ideological conversion. Judging by the pages of the 4L Bulletin, the 
organization took its membership’s intellectual investments in the labor situation as seriously as 
the I.W.W. did, encouraging them to read the Bulletin as regularly as socialists read The Call.70 
The content also reflected the extent to which socialist, syndicalist and other class-conscious 
ideologies permeated the community of loggers and mill hands. They ran a regular column 
detailing the conditions that encouraged animosity towards employers called “They Wonder 
Why [we are Red].” And they offered their own alternative explanations of labor relations in an 
appropriately class-conscious idiom, explaining that capital was neither moral nor immoral and 
cooperation between capitalists and workers was an evolutionary inevitability.71 “Real Evolution 
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is Going on and New Principles are Emerging,” one headline crowed. “Industrial democracy is 
an accomplished fact in this country. Employers and employees are working together in entire 
harmony.”72  Efficiency in production, the 4L noted, was not a technical but a social process and 
it was maximized by this attitude of cooperation for the greater good of maximum productive 
capacity. Efficiency schemes were bound to fail because they insulted the intelligence of 
workmen, but efficiency could be maximized by workers who “took an interest in their work.”  
Men with the proper attitude would take up the slack, report “duplication of men on the job” and 
instances of “material being poorly cut or inefficiently handled.”73 In short, they would report all 
instances of sabotage.  
Of course, the Loyal Legion did not end violence towards workers. Just as publishing the 
Industrial Worker didn’t provide a substitute for direct action. This war of ideas was not won on 
an intellectual field. The ideas expressed in the 4L Bulletin were underwritten by anti-radical 
violence at every level. In the very creation of the Loyal Legion, the disavowal of class conflict, 
central to the maintenance of employer power, was enforced by federal police powers.  
The progressive call to solve the labor problem by managing the environment of the 
workers was coupled with another, more insidious form of worker management. The 4L had 
origins in a tradition of ‘patriotic’, local, vigilante policing of Wobblies as much as it did in the 
appropriation of the union form, military expediency, and the writings of Veblenian academics. 
Patriotic organizations, composed of deputized community members, overlapped with the law in 
useful and flexible ways and were officially endorsed and organized, even if they could not be 
effectively controlled, by legitimate political power. In Washington state, for example, Henry 
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Suzzallo, president of the University of Washington, was appointed by Governor Lister to 
organize “a state-wide network of patriotic societies as a base for a state secret service system.”74 
The local cadres of deputies, police, sheriffs, and militia men did not fit conveniently into a 
centralized administrative apparatus—failing to follow orders or submit useful reports, for 
example—but the “management” of resident Wobblies by these groups did attenuate camp and 
mill owners’ anxiety about sabotage, dynamiting, and arson and relieved the state of taking more 
expensive, official action such as imposing marital law.75 Vigilante policing created the 
condition of possibility for civilized interventions and civilizing measures. At the same time that 
the military expanded its operations to encompass economic activity through the Spruce 
Production Division, thus expanding and strengthening a legitimate and rational administrative 
state, and the Loyal Legion was establishing a model for company unions and later experiments 
in corporate welfare, vigilante organizations were “[earning] a measure of state legitimacy.”76  
 
“You Dared Not Lynch Him in the Light of Day”77 
Violence against the I.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest did not begin with a sudden surge of 
patriotic feeling and it did not end with the armistice. The number of deaths that resulted from 
vigilante violence against I.W.W. members is unknowable because it was rarely, if ever, 
prosecuted. Thus, a handful of well-known martyrs have come to represent the systematic 
violence against radicals.  Some, like songwriter Joe Hill, are remembered because of a certain 
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measure of fame during their life. Others are notable because of the theatricality and public 
character of their death. The logger and I.W.W. organizer, Wesley Everest, occupies the latter 
category. Mythologizing individuals often functions to occlude rather than illuminate historical 
realities. But Everest’s life and death are instructive metonyms for the violence that characterized 
the Northwest lumber industry. They are also proof, if needed, that the mere provision by the 
Army of decent bedding and clean clothing was not a sufficient “cure” for radical politics.  
Everest was born in 1890 on his family’s farm in Oregon. He began working in lumber 
camps and saw mills in 1907, joined the I.W.W., and became an active organizer. An uncle 
recalled that he was “an apt scholar and honest, but that…he was so filled up with the I.W.W. 
teachings that he could talk of little else.”78  
 In 1912, he was involved in a strike in the Coos Bay region of Oregon where he was 
arrested for vagrancy. A 600 person mob retrieved Everest and another organizer, W.J. 
Edgeworth from jail along with B.K. Leech, a physician and I.W.W. sympathizer, and beat them 
severely and forced them to kneel and kiss the American flag.79 With the onset of WWI, Everest 
enlisted in the Army and served in Washington and Oregon as part of the Spruce Production 
Division. He was discharged in March 1919 and settled in Centralia, Washington where he 
helped to open an I.W.W. hall.80 
On November 11, an Armistice Day parade would pass directly in front of the new 
headquarters. Worried that participants would attack the hall, members began planning their 
defense and, despite a general and principled opposition to guns within the organization, Everest 
and at least two other men had armed themselves. The hall was attacked and shots were fired. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78  Tom Copeland, “Wesley Everest, I.W.W. Martyr,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 77 (1986): 124. 




While attempting escape, Everest was surrounded by a mob and fatally shot Dale Hubbard. He 
was dragged to jail by a belt around his neck and beaten severely. The mob attempted to hang 
him immediately but the police intervened. At 7:30 that evening, the lights went out in Centralia 
for about fifteen minutes during which time Everest was taken from jail in the trunk of a car and 
hung from the Chehalis River Bridge.81 His execution required multiple attempts. The first rope 
proved too short to snap his neck.  
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Chapter 4: ‘Caused to be Printed’: Civil Liberties, Security of 
Property, and The Industrial Workers of the World 
Of all the miserable, unprofitable, inglorious wars in the world, the worst is the 
war against words. Let men say what they like. Let them propose to cut every 
throat and burn every house—if so they like it. We have nothing to do with a 
man’s words of a man’s thoughts, except to put against them better words and 
better thoughts, and so to win in the great moral and intellectual duel that is 
always going on, and on which progress depends.  
 
 --From the cover of an anonymous I.W.W. pamphlet, “Jersey Justice” at 
Work: First Decisions on the Advocacy of Sabotage in the United States 
Courts 
 
Reflecting on the government repression and mob violence that characterized the First 
World War, Zechariah Chafee, Jr. argued that “the First Amendment had no hold on people’s 
minds, because no live facts or concrete images were then attached to it. Consequently, like an 
empty box, with beautiful words on it, the Amendment collapsed under the impact of Prussian 
battalions, and terror of Bolshevik mobs.”1  
The severity and scope of repression that accompanied the U.S. entrance into the war was 
shocking. It extended far beyond the radical labor agitators of the I.W.W. to ministers, school 
teachers, business owners, farmers, U.S. Congressman, socialists, pacifists, and anyone who 
spoke German. Persecution took many forms: fines, imprisonment, public humiliation, 
community harassment, vandalism, torture, and occasionally, extra-judicial ‘patriotic’ 
executions. Chafee’s retrospective diagnosis—that this failure of democracy occurred because 
the First Amendment had no concrete purchase on the American imagination—contained a grain 
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of truth. At least superficially, what we might consider constitutionally protected entitlements did 
not take a recognizable shape until the 1930s. The First Amendment was not incorporated until 
1923 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gitlow v. New York.2 It was not mentioned once in 
George Vanderveer’s opening statement for the defense in the mass trial of Wobblies under the 
Espionage Act, even though the grand jury indictment failed to include references to anything 
but ostensibly seditious utterances.  
This chapter argues that restrictions on expressive freedom had almost nothing to do with 
the lack of a robust free speech doctrine. Rather, the coordinated destruction of the I.W.W., 
beginning with its founding and culminating in a federal trial, followed by sustained prosecution 
under post-war criminal syndicalism laws, was inspired by something far less abstract than 
constitutional rights or expressive freedoms: the protection of private property. This is not to say 
that the repression of the I.W.W. had nothing to do with speech. On a certain level it had 
everything to do with what they were saying—particularly what they were saying about property 
relations. When America entered the war and expressive freedoms were explicitly restricted, 
repression was easily mapped onto the well-established terrain of ethnic and class divisions. 
What were economically distributed rights of speech expressed themselves politically through an 
increasingly organized administrative state capable of both legal repression on a national scale 
and the production of ideological consensus. In circular fashion, these political and ideological 
investments functioned to shore up established economic divisions, consolidating substantive 
rights to free speech for property owners. The disproportionate reaction to the I.W.W. shows that 
civil liberties are protected only insofar as they pose no viable threat to an established economic 
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order. It also vividly demonstrates the brutality with which the outer limits of free expression are 
policed. This policing, in turn, demonstrates that speech has its own very material conditions of 
production and effective prevention of undesirable ideas requires more than mere censorship or 
control of its consumption. The I.W.W.’s philosophy and organizing strategies, as well as the 
reaction to them, shows us that discourse is anything but abstract and that ideological control 
occurs at the point of production even when what is being produced is as apparently immaterial 
as language. It also demonstrates that production itself is not strictly economic—a matter of 
inputs, outputs, technical means, and bottom lines. On the contrary, the economic field was 
actively shaped, even brought into being, by political and social institutions.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the I.W.W. simultaneously demanded 
expansive rights to expressive freedom and control over the means of production. They 
questioned the very basis of capitalist power—ownership of private property—while organizing 
real, material threats to that property in the form of strikes and direct action. They also took 
controversial positions on social and ‘moral’ issues such as race and birth control. Because the 
I.W.W. devoted as much energy to education and propagandizing as it did to organizing strikes 
and other forms of economic direct action, its repression by local, state, and federal authorities 
necessitated systematic censorship as well as physical violence. While many unions organized 
their activity around obtaining increased access to property for their members, the I.W.W. 
rejected the very premise of property rights. The relationship between the suppression of political 
speech and the protection of private property was perhaps never so obvious before or since. At 
an historical moment marked by incredible violence between capital and labor, the brutality—in 
both words and actions—reserved for Wobblies was striking. The routinized zeal with which 





provides us with an exemplary instance of the mechanisms of repression and the economic limits 
of constitutional guarantees of free expression. That the organization was destroyed at the very 
moment that a discourse of civil liberties was emerging from the legal defense of organized labor 
suggests that the philosophy espoused by the I.W.W. shaped the boundaries of this new territory 
in real and lasting ways.  
Wobblies themselves understood and made much of the relationship between speech and 
material control. The kinship of words and deeds was expressed most clearly and forcefully in 
their popular pamphlets on sabotage. The various actions that might be gathered together under 
the umbrella of sabotage were not, each author stressed, particularly threatening in and of 
themselves. Sabotage only became threatening when all of this rebellious activity was given 
meaning—when it was linked to a revolutionary idea and publicly expressed. And this 
revolutionary meaning was, in turn, only significant because it had been generated by the 
instinctive and long practiced activities of the workers themselves.  
Anti-I.W.W. efforts culminated in the 1918 trial of 116 of its members and the passage of 
anti-criminal syndicalism laws in twenty-three states between 1917 and 1920.3  Aimed squarely 
at the I.W.W. through repetitive references to “sabotage”—a word that was almost exclusive to 
I.W.W. literature and speech—the criminal syndicalism statutes indicate that the wartime 
persecution and prosecution of the organization and its members had a particular significance 
beyond being one instance of repression among many. The language of these statutes—
ostensibly aimed at the prevention of physical property destruction—made it quite clear that the 
point was to silence spoken and written dissent, destroy the I.W.W.’s ability to function, and 
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eliminate both a set of ideas and the organizational capacity to disseminate and, possibly, 
implement them.4  
It is imperative to recognize that the violence that marked these early conflicts was not 
simply the result of a more repressive era in which ‘free speech’ had not yet been recognized as a 
basic legal entitlement. The right to public expression and free and open debate had long been 
central to the American political imagination.5  What was different in the early decades of the 
twentieth century was the economic content of that speech and a definition of expressive activity 
that extended to agitation, strikes, and boycotts. What would eventually be transformed into a 
general right of public expression began as an economic demand. It was “class war that made 
civil liberties the subject of sustained public debate and federal inquiry for the first time.”6 
Before public speech could be recognized as a constitutionally protected entitlement, it needed to 
be shorn of much of its class content. The relationship between First Amendment rights and 
labor agitation eroded over time but sabotage was a special case. Because it necessarily 
advocated illegal action, it couldn’t be reasonably defended under the most expansive definition 
of civil liberties. 
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 The I.W.W. saw, more clearly than most, the relationship between economic and 
expressive freedom. They understood that speech, like any material good, requires certain 
conditions for its production. It requires a speaker and a listener (who are, necessarily, embodied 
beings with their own material needs); space within which such an encounter can occur or across 
which words might travel; a common language; something to write on or, perhaps, a printing 
press. Members of democratic societies organized around a reasonable expectation of free 
expression tend to perceive threats to this freedom at the level of discourse—as a matter of 
intellectual content and its perversion or suppression. They therefore tend to be diligent in their 
opposition to censorship and any restrictions on dissemination and consumption are readily 
recognized as threats to these natural rights. What a common understanding of censorship—or 
even speech for that matter—tends to miss is that any effective control of speech must occur at 
the point of its production. It is a matter of controlling bodies in space and access to material 
resources as much as it is a matter of the censor’s pen. The suppression of I.W.W. speech needs 
to be understood as a project aimed at something other than speech alone. At the same time, the 
violent repression of I.W.W. activities and attacks on its members and meeting halls should be 
understood as part of a larger effort to curtail expressive freedoms and thereby limit the 
expansion of political possibility.  
Property rights and political freedom have been bound up with one another in varying 
degrees throughout the history of the United States. Property qualifications restricted voting—a 
quintessential political speech act—for white men until the mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, 
property ownership and suffrage were twinned demands for both women and African Americans. 





class, the association between a capacity for ownership and a capacity for speech and political 
participation runs deep. One of the most famous metaphors for the reasonable limitation of free 
expression—the corn dealer of John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty” uses the explanatory image of a 
hungry mob gathered outside of a corn dealer’s residence.  
 “No one,” Mill argued, “pretends that actions should be as free as opinions… even 
opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to 
constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act.”7 This limitation—one 
that attempted to locate the moment when an utterance might be translated into an act—
reemerged at the center of twentieth century debates concerning civil liberty in Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s formulation of suppression in the face of a “clear and present danger.”8 Indeed, 
determining the line between speech and action is the manifest content of most twentieth century 
debates about expressive freedoms. But it is worth considering the possibility that this liminal 
moment was a sort of false flag. Political speech is always aimed at a material accomplishment. 
As Holmes himself pointed out, “every idea is an incitement.” The I.W.W. intentionally blurred 
this line and sabotage, in particular, made the distinction between rhetoric and realization utterly 
useless. The “propaganda and practice of sabotage” was one and the same. It was conceptually 
and tactically “the forerunner of the revolution.”9  This is why Mill’s illustration of the moment 
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when an utterance might tip into the realm of “positive instigation” is so significant, for it speaks 
to the anxiously guarded limits of expression that, in fact, had little to do with an overdetermined 
gap between speech and action and everything to do with property.  
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but 
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled 
before the house of a corn-dealer.  
 
 Mill’s argument is certainly not that corn-dealers are not worthy objects of approbation 
or that property is never theft but that in a functioning democracy these conflicts and 
contradictions could be metabolized without recourse to arms, an idea that all but defined 
twentieth century progressive thought.  
The point at which speech begins to pose a clear and present danger could be figured in 
any number of ways—Holmes had a preference for fire metaphors.10 But Mill’s metaphor is 
instructive, if anachronistic, because it presents the reasonable restriction of expression under 
democracy in terms of property ownership and the actual historical occurrence of a working class 
“instigation to some mischievous act.” It would be a fair summary of the literature produced by 
the I.W.W. that it was collectively aimed at inverting the metaphor of the angry mob at the corn 
dealer’s door. An inversion that was accomplished most effectively in its use of the term 
‘capitalist sabotage; to refer to work accidents, strike breaking, and other employer activities 
authorized by the solitary fact of property ownership. Sabotage reconfigured the terms upon 
which harm was determined along the same lines as Mill but its mirror reflection asked a 
different set of questions about speech and violence. Is it not violent to deprive people of corn? 
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Would not the most vulgar utilitarian calculus determine that the needs of the gathered crowd 
counted for more than that of a single corn dealer?  
The labor movement at large had been the victim of an obvious asymmetry in the 
application of the law for decades. The I.W.W. provided one of many responses to labor 
exploitation and the class politics of legislatures and courts, but theirs was the only one to place 
property at the center of its analysis. “What Sabotage actually does,” declared one anonymous 
pamphlet “is to bring into evidence the fact that human life, liberty and happiness are in conflict 
with private property rights.”11  
Life, Liberty, and Property 
Unions could be maligned by employers precisely because constitutional understandings 
of liberty were so closely tied to security of property. Liberty of contract emerged in the late 
nineteenth century as a response to changes in the legal definition of this property. The 
emergence of the corporation, as well as several decades of conflict between employers and a 
growing labor movement, had combined to expand the legal meaning of property and to install 
the contract as the primary mechanism for determining obligation and liability. Rather than 
securing equitable agreements, the natural right of individuals to enter into contracts rapidly 
became a device for overturning any legislation that might regulate the terms of employment or 
create a legal environment amenable to the formation of unions. In a well-known refutation of 
the doctrine of liberty of contract, Roscoe Pound argued that the concept did not appear in 
important texts on constitutional law until 1891 when it was given extensive attention in 
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Spencer’s Justice. This is the first mention of “the right of free contract as a fundamental natural 
right.” Before this one sees “rights of personal security, rights of protection for honor, rights of 
property, rights of receiving aid in case of need,” but no right to a liberty of contract. In fact, one 
finds arguments for a restraint on that very liberty earlier in the century.12  
The elevation of contract to a privileged position was “the legal expression of free market 
principles” as well as a response to changes in forms of legally recognized property which had, 
in turn, their own adverse legal impact on labor’s capacity for organized resistance and 
bargaining.13 As the nineteenth century progressed, new forms of property that could not be 
delimited in space became increasingly important and judges sought ways to redefine property 
interference as anything that led to a reduction in market value.14 Thus crimes against property 
could occur at great distances in space as well as time.  
In parallel fashion, this loss of proximity led to a strengthening of the notion of contract 
as the only reasonable way to conceive of responsibility and liability in a landscape composed of 
absentee agents and their multitudes of representatives.15  Liberty of contract was presented by 
employers’ associations as synonymous with independence as such, and functioned as a primary 
argument against unionization. The abstract right of a person to enter freely into a contract 
regardless of substantial inequities was used to justify a whole host of policies and practices that 
favored employers over employees by arguing that regulating the terms of employment, rather 
than benefitting workers, subverted their natural rights. As a legal doctrine, it gave courts the 
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latitude to interfere with much more than unionization drives. Reviewing the accumulated effect 
of the perceived “inviolability of liberty of contract,” Pound found that courts had struck down 
legislation forbidding the imposition of fines; regulating the weighing of coal to fix 
compensation; forbidding company stores; requiring employers to pay wages in legal currency 
rather than company scrip; regulating working hours; and prohibiting contracts that would 
release railroads from liability for personal injury.16  
 The legal application of liberty of contract amounted to a series of unacknowledged 
confiscations of employee property. In cases regarding the weighing of coal and other piece-
work or payment in company scrip, this was a rather straightforward matter of wage theft. In 
other instances where compensation was kept low by a lack of hours and wage regulation, it was 
a more abstract expropriation of labor-time—a theft, as it were, of a property in one’s person. 
And then there was the literal loss of life and limb that should, ethically speaking, exceed 
calculation but certainly could be figured in terms of monetary loss. 
 Where liberty of contract did not provide sufficient justification for judicial intervention, 
the constitutional protection against undue property seizure was used to justify overturning 
protective legislation as well as interfering with all manner of legal agitation—strikes, pickets, 
boycotts—through the issuing of injunctions. Industrialization brought with it significant, 
incorporeal forms of property that demanded a redefinition of what, precisely, property 
interference could legally mean. In order to protect property in a complex and financialized 
economy, interference with property rights was defined as anything that would decrease a 
property’s market value. Abstract property made distinctions such as direct and consequential 
damages and remote and proximal liability far less useful. By the turn of the century, it was clear 
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that the definition of a “taking” needed to extend beyond physical incursions or the appropriation 
of titles. While clearly a legal necessity in the face of evolving material realities, this shift in 
legal approaches to property and the definition of takings “came to stand for the increasingly 
prevalent proposition that all restrictions on the use of property that diminished its market value 
were takings in the constitutional sense.” Given the future orientation of market value, the 
constitutional protection of property was nearly unbounded. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, courts were regularly operating under such an expansive definition of property 
interference that any activity threatening future income could be construed as a ‘taking’.17  
 Organized labor understood that their power was located precisely in their ability to 
decrease the value of their employers’ property by withdrawing their labor—the one form of 
property that was not accommodated by the ever-expanding definition of constitutional property 
protections. Given that every job action consciously threatened a loss of profits in order to gain 
some leverage in bargaining, the expansive notion of property as potential profits effectively 
sidelined constitutional protection of rights that came into conflict with these capacious 
definitions of property entitlement. Protection of speech and association was not conceptually 
underdeveloped, it was simply subjugated to property protection. Printed material such as the 
AFL’s “we don’t patronize” list was construed as interference with property rights and strikes 
and pickets were obviously anathema.  
 Because the definition of property was so broad, and market value impossible to locate 
and fix, the imagined consequences of any act or utterance, rather than its immediate 
consequences, made it subject to injunction. The defense of a constitutional right to free speech 
followed on decades of legal and extra-legal conflict between workers and employers that 
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occurred at the intersection of property rights, legislative reform, and expressive freedom. The 
containment of workers’ expressive rights within the mushrooming field of property protections 
did, however, make the class interests of the judiciary more visible. The apparent immunity of 
property from conflicting rights claims became increasingly obvious to many observers. During 
his testimony to the Commission on Industrial Relations, lawyer and founder of the Free Speech 
League, Theodore Schroeder remarked that “there is an utter incapacity on the part of the courts, 
except when dealing with problems of property, to understand what law and the due process of 
law clause of the Federal and State Constitutions means.”18  
At the same time, the contradictions that had to some extent remained hidden by physical, 
bounded property were becoming more apparent. If property had always been implicated in all 
other legal and social arrangements, its abstraction made these entanglements more visible. The 
very strengthening of property rights and liberty of contract made private property more 
susceptible to criticism by progressive legal scholars.19 The abstraction of legal definitions had 
“threatened to ‘propertize’ the entire world of legal relations” while at the same time 
encouraging “the earliest efforts to undermine and subvert the extreme conceptualism of 
orthodox legal thought.”20 Property relations—both their substantial effects and their abstract 
legal status—were therefore central to early twentieth century thinking about liberty more 
generally. ACLU founder Roger Baldwin suggested that the country’s history might be viewed 
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as “a conflict between the civil liberties of a political democracy and the economic power of 
property ownership.”21  
 It was this conflict, most explicitly expressed in the contest between organized labor and 
employers, that shaped early civil liberties advocacy. An individual’s right to express their 
opinions was certainly a concern but, as Laura Weinrib has carefully shown, figures such as 
Baldwin and Clarence Darrow and the people they defended “declined to distinguish labor 
activity from other exercises of expression… They rejected the principle that picketing and 
boycotts were ‘verbal acts’ susceptible of injunction when they unlawfully restrained commerce 
or caused irreparable damage to employer interests.”22  In other words, freedom of speech was 
initially defined as the right to contest property claims.  
Civic Investment 
Early twentieth century progressives, no matter how sympathetic to the plight of workers, 
were obsessed with the prevention of conflict and organized nearly all of their reform efforts, as 
well as their thought, around ameliorating the causes of disorder, disorganization, and conflict.23 
While their diagnosis of social problems and their answers to ‘the labor question’ were 
frequently indistinguishable from union demands—eight hour days, sanitary working conditions, 
regulation of industry, and social welfare programs—their efforts were aimed at rooting out the 
environmental causes of conflict between capital and labor which they imagined to be finite and 
correctable through interclass cooperation. Hull House founder Jane Addams, for example, 
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imagined that class conflict could be resolved by the recognition that “the dependence of classes 
on one another is reciprocal.”24 When pressed by John Dewey on the question of unavoidable 
antagonisms, she responded that “the antagonism of institutions was always unreal.” 25 
Organizations such as the I.W.W., or even strike activity more broadly, was part of the problem. 
Most Progressives blamed excessive individualism for a lack of social harmony and offered a 
limited class-inflected analysis that supported redistributive policies but, with rare exceptions, 
progressive reformers were decidedly middle class. The politics of anti-radicalism were often 
closely linked to those of reform which aimed to alleviate suffering but also to reconcile business 
interests with reformist, labor politics.26 The notion that one needed to have a stake in society—
which usually meant a property interest of some sort—in order to be trusted with its reform was 
common. Certain groups were simply not equipped to responsibly utilize their constitutional 
liberties for the greater good and while political legitimacy was not often explicitly linked to 
property ownership, the connection between the two was just barely repressed. Following the 
I.W.W. led textile strike in Paterson, NJ, one contributor to the Survey worried that “instead of 
playing the game respectably or…breaking out into lawless riot which we know well enough 
how to deal with”, workers were being led astray by “an anarchistic philosophy which challenges 
the fundamental ideal of law and order” and encourages “strange doctrines” such as “direct 
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action [and] sabotage.” Should such a philosophy take hold, they feared that “our whole current 
morality as to the sacredness of property and even of life” would be threatened.27  
In the progressive mind, expressive freedom was necessary for the robust public debate 
requisite to a smoothly functioning democracy. It was a way of advancing knowledge, bestowing 
legitimacy on the state and, presumably, it was an automatic consequence of a well-organized 
society in which liberty was equally distributed among properly socialized Americans. It was 
imagined that given the proper environment, problems would be rationally worked out through 
civilized debate. In many ways, the progressive movement simply could not see the violent 
apparatus necessary for the enforcement of civilized, rational, acceptable debate. Indeed, the 
regulatory bent of progressive reform required some willful ignorance of the character of the 
state power that it invoked for the implementation of its agenda. When the First Amendment was 
eviscerated for the purpose of wartime consensus, Progressives expressed outrage and a certain 
amount of surprise at what they reasonably perceived as a betrayal. For example, Chaffee wrote 
of Holmes’s decision in Schenck v. United States, which held that there were no valid First 
Amendment claims to be made by socialists protesting the draft, that it “came as a great shock to 
forward looking men and women.”28  Wilson had been elected on a progressive platform.29  That 
the state might itself be a violent, capitalist apparatus was unthinkable. Randolph Bourne’s 
observation that “war is the health of the state” was a rare exception to progressive faith in its 
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constitutional benevolence. The I.W.W. understood that violence was continuous with violence 
and that the legal repression of unappealing ideas was its logical conclusion—patriotic, 
progressive, or otherwise.  
Clear and Present Danger 
In 1912, the San Diego Tribune made the colorful and somewhat incoherent declaration 
that “hanging is none too good for [the I.W.W.]. They would be much better dead, for they are 
absolutely useless in the human economy; they are the waste material of creation and should be 
drained off into the sewer of oblivion there to rot in cold obstruction like any other excrement.”30 
Between 1907 and 1916, the I.W.W. organized around thirty free speech fights in the Western 
United States.31  The San Diego free speech campaign was one of the longest—lasting over six 
months—as well as the most brutal. The apoplectic tone of the Tribune’s editorial was not 
exceptional. Calls for citizens to follow an “unwritten law” and other thinly veiled appeals to 
vigilante violence were common and did not go unheeded. Wobblies were beaten by police and 
held in overcrowded cells. At least one man died in a hospital after being repeatedly kicked by 
officers while in custody.32  Emma Goldman reported that after vigilantes raided an I.W.W. hall 
and arrested everyone present, they brought them “to Sorrento to a place where a flagpole had 
been erected. There the I.W.W.s were forced to kneel, kiss the flag, and sing the national anthem. 
As the incentive to quicker action, one of the vigilantes would slap them on the back which was 
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a signal for a general beating.” The vigilantes then transported the Wobblies to a cattle pen on 
the county line where they were kept without food or water before they were forced to run a 
gauntlet, repeat the gruesome flag ceremony, and released. Thus expelled, they travelled to Los 
Angeles on foot. 33  
This sort of ritualized violence was standard. Goldman’s own manager, Benjamin 
Reitman, was tarred and tortured with a lit cigar by San Diego citizens. Hatred of the I.W.W. was 
not specific to San Diego residents. The atrocities visited upon the free-speech advocates—
particularly those that involved forced acts of patriotism such as singing “The Star-Spangled 
Banner” and kissing the American flag—were reported in newspapers across the country in tones 
ranging from unsurprised to gleeful. Violence against radicals was widely considered acceptable, 
if not necessary, and the status of extra-legal ‘policing’ was ambiguous. It was not, therefore, 
surprising to find press coverage that minimized what were objectively horrific crimes. In an 
article entitled “Spirit of San Diegans Still Remains Militant,” Louisville’s Courier-Journal 
reported that Reitman “had not been treated so badly as reported.”34  These expressive liberties 
had very real consequences.  
While eventually 113 members of the organization were given the privilege of a federal 
hearing, prominent members of the I.W.W. were also extrajudicially murdered. In a near 
admission to the role that vigilantes played in the enforcement of the state’s anti-radicalism, the 
vehemently antiwar I.W.W. member Frank Little was lynched in Butte, Montana and then tried 
along with his comrades postmortem. While sporadic and inconsistent accounts of workers 
arrested in a formal manner are legion, the total number of workers killed in confrontations with 
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police, company guards, and hastily deputized citizens is impossible to calculate. Itinerant, 
bureaucratically anonymous workers would leave few traces dead or alive. However, because 
non-fatal violence was so acceptable, we have an incredible record of physical assault and 
elaborate, often public, torture.  
The ‘clear and present danger’ of the written and spoken word was repeatedly 
demonstrated by the forces of so-called public order. The ritualization of repression—flag 
kissing, forced singing of patriotic songs and the occasional public display of dead bodies—
coupled with these literary performances of dehumanization demonstrate the imbrication of real 
and symbolic anti-radical violence. The thinnest of membranes separated the figuration of 
radicals as excrement in print and the actual covering of their bodies in sticky, black tar. The 
slippage between violent declarations and actual violence by the opponents of the I.W.W. goes 
some way to explaining the pathological obsession with eliminating politically threatening 
rhetoric. When Walker Smith declared that capitalists did not want to utter the word ‘sabotage’ 
for fear that the working class would learn its meaning, he was not being hyperbolic. The 
mutually reinforcing use of physical force and polemic on the part of vigilance committees and 
patriotic organizations and local newspapers provided living proof of the threat posed by the 
continued circulation of I.W.W. counter-narratives. There was plenty of evidence that radical 
ideas were being realized in the form of strikes and sabotage and the opponents of the I.W.W. 
understood, perhaps better than some of its champions, that its ideas were as dangerous as its 
actions. But it was the anti-radical press and the quasi-official enforcers of its positions that 
provided the best argument for the power of language to slip into the realm of material reality.  
Political speech never occurs in an abstract realm of pure discourse. It requires certain 





from the physical goods and tangible services created by labor. Likewise, as the I.W.W. itself 
repeatedly asserted, the abstract legal rights of workers, including the right to free expression, 
cannot be considered separately from the economic interests that such speech necessarily 
expressed. The repression of I.W.W. speech was, like strikebreaking, an assertion of economic 
power that was crucial to the maintenance of the status quo. Written threats to property, such as 
the advocacy of sabotage, were just as ‘real’ as a pitchfork in a thresher.  
Free speech fights were never about the abstract and individual rights of expression 
associated with the term civil liberty. At the time, ‘civil liberties’ were most often invoked in 
defense of the liberty of contract and signaled the rights of employers to interfere with union 
organizing. Wobblies did strategically invoke the Constitution. For example, they invited 
“footloose rebels,” to Missoula, Montana to “defend the Bill of Rights” in 1909.35 The fights 
though, were strategic campaigns intended to spread the message of the organization, increase 
agitation on job sites, and disseminate information about working conditions. In addition to 
functioning as recruitment drives and a method of revolutionary education, they specifically 
targeted employment agencies or ‘job sharks’. The free speech fights spread any number of ideas 
including those contained in the Bill of Rights. They were not necessarily specific to regional 
organizing drives or particular strikes. But they could not have been staged just anywhere. 
Organizing workers is a speech act but it requires access to the spaces where workers live and 
labor for its realization. Street speaking in cities in between job sites was crucial to organizing an 
itinerant workforce that often labored in remote locations.  
Street speaking was also, arguably, a form of sabotage at the point of production. But in 
the case of migratory workers, what was being produced was migratory labor itself. As Matthew 
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May has argued, the “exploitation of migratory workers was increasingly accomplished through 
the regulation of mobility...[by] an apparatus or system of relations through which seasonal 
migratory labor power circulated from regional production facilities and employment 
agencies.”36 The circulation of workers between employment agencies and job sites was a way of 
producing the “reserve army of labor” necessary to sustain these industries. Street speaking, May 
argues, interrupted this “circuit through which labor power was converted over and over into 
capital.”37 By understanding the machinery of itinerant labor, I.W.W. speakers were able to 
transform this circuit into a site of resistance. The free speech fights were not only occasional 
about sabotage, they were themselves a way of throwing a wrench into the machine.  
Civil Liberties and Uncivil Clients 
Progressive reformers as well as founding members of the ACLU such as Baldwin were 
well aware that the Bill of Rights had been used by courts to protect property at the expense of 
other liberties and that property protective interpretations of the Constitution actively harmed 
non-owners. Until the twentieth century, liberty was almost exclusively conceived of as freedom 
from property seizure. It would be misleading to suggest that the I.W.W. was the only 
organization fighting for the rights of workers to assemble and speak and to assign them an 
outsized role in shaping the ideological, legal, and strategic investments of a nascent civil 
liberties tradition. However, no other labor organization so loudly and explicitly made the 
connection between an individual and collective right to free and open discourse and the 
economic and social empowerment of workers. Nothing written at the time made so clearly 
connected the suppression of workers’ speech to property ownership as sabotage literature.  
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Sabotage literature was unique in its assertion that ideas had an impact on the power of 
the tactics they described.  It thus enshrined the notion of free expression as an essential adjunct 
to economic activity and agitation. “Sabotage is new only in name, and in the fact that for the 
first time it is being advocated openly as a class weapon to be used by all workers when they fail 
to secure their demands by strike and boycott. In the past it was a… thing done but not talked of. 
Its open advocacy involves its open use.”38  Furthermore, the Wobbly press argued that what 
could and could not be said was a direct product of property relationships. Property produced 
economic inequality and it produced morality as well. This recognition of the moral implications 
of property linked Wobblies to the older tradition of libertarian free speech defense and suggests 
a relationship between the moral policing of the Comstock Act and the maintenance of class 
bound property rights. The judicial preference for property protections and the obsessive 
maintenance of public morality may have been merely coincidental, but even if these two distinct 
uses of the law developed independently of one another, the imbrication of property and morality 
that runs through I.W.W. writings, and its explicit connection in the pages of sabotage 
pamphlets, suggests a structural relationship between the two.  The I.W.W. brought issues of 
‘morality’ that were excluded from progressive reform agendas back into conversations about 
power, control, and class oppression. Birth control, for example, was a regular feature in the 
heterodox pages of the Industrial Worker. And not just as a matter of hygiene and good planning. 
The right to speak about it publicly was a primary concern and its detractors’ bourgeois 
performances of familial ideals satirized. Sexual relations were also, according to the I.W.W., a 
matter of property relations—something lost by the apparent division between libertarian free 
love advocates and civil libertarian labor defenses and progressive agendas.  
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What type of expression should and should not be tolerated during war or times of peace was 
widely contested by a range of academics, public intellectuals, politicians, and policy makers 
across the political spectrum. Sabotage though—a practice that threatened material property and 
a theory that suggested the illegitimacy of the abstract rights that brought it into being—was the 
definition of intolerable. It undermined both the ideological and material foundations of the 
economic status quo. The I.W.W. advocated political and industrial change, not the just 
expression of unpopular personal opinions. However, its many unpopular and unsavory opinions 
were a product of its economic critique. The logical response to such a complete rejection of the 
social and economic order could be nothing less than the complete elimination of the 
organization. This was not the fate of other labor unions—even unions that had been found guilty 
of extensive dynamite campaigns and organized slugging. Clearly, what the I.W.W. was saying 
as well as what it was doing was seen as a formidable threat. After years of disorganized attacks 
by local governments, vigilantes, and quasi-official law enforcement agencies, the I.W.W. 
became the subject of systematic, official persecution. The law, essentially, absorbed the 
disorganized violence of the mob. This happened in two phases. First, the mass trial of I.W.W. 
members under the Espionage Act for seditious utterances, materially bankrupted the 
organization and placed many of its leaders in jail. Second, the passing of anti-criminal 
syndicalism laws in twenty-three states made use of the word ‘sabotage ‘or any remote affiliation 
with the idea illegal.   
United States v. Haywood  
On September 5, 1917, the Bureau of Investigation simultaneously executed forty-eight search 
warrants at I.W.W. offices across the country. It was a massive undertaking for what was, in 





state officials, as well as business owners had been lobbying for federal action against the 
I.W.W. for some time. I.W.W. members and meeting places had been subject to steady 
harassment and violence at the local level for years. But it was not until 1917, with the passage 
of the Espionage Act, that a coordinated federal effort to destroy the entire organization could get 
underway. This may sound hyperbolic and polemical but it is simply a fact. The United States 
Attorney General for Philadelphia publicly acknowledged that the raids were meant to “put the 
I.W.W. out of business.”39 
The Espionage Act empowered the postmaster general to deny second class mailing 
privileges to anyone in violation of the Act and given that it made attempts to encourage 
disloyalty as illegal, this mandate was broad enough to deny postage to newspapers and nearly 
all other materials including, importantly, solicitations for I.W.W. defense funds. The Espionage 
Act also significantly altered the terms of search warrants. Until its passage, the Fourth 
Amendment was generally interpreted to prevent the seizure of any property that could not be 
strictly shown to be evidence. This prevented the seizure of private papers that might be useful to 
the prosecution but were not materially involved in the commission of a crime. The Espionage 
Act opened a loophole in the ‘mere evidence’ rule and this allowed for the seizure of all I.W.W. 
papers and property.40 The legal scope of these searches was zealously embraced by local 
officials.  
 The records of the coordinated searches and seizures vary. Some are illegible scrawls on 
single sheets of paper; others are detailed, typed inventories. In Butte, Montana, Bureau of 
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Investigation officers seized: three bundles of the newspaper “Solidarity,” an I.W.W. 
membership book, a propaganda league record book, boxes containing 400 songbooks, 3000 
photographs of Frank Little, 500 I.W.W. constitutions in different languages, one Remington 
typewriter no. 10, and one box of miscellaneous papers among other things.41 The Chicago 
headquarters of the I.W.W., which functioned as its publishing bureau, was emptied of all 
literature and what plates could be found for the printing of pamphlets and illustrations. Agents 
also took subscription lists, account books, and typewriters. 42 The searches looked more like 
evictions than evidence gathering. The fifteen-page inventory of items seized in Omaha, 
Nebraska includes boxes of empty envelopes and a Victor phonograph.43 Material seized from 
the Chicago office alone amounted to five tons of papers and equipment. The raids were 
certainly meant to gather evidence for an indictment but they were also explicitly intended to 
deprive the organization of the material means of existence. This was the claim made by the 
defense as it began its opening statement. The case was only nominally about the actions of 
named individuals. In reality, it was “a case against an organization” and its intention was “to 
utterly shatter and destroy the ideal of which [the] organization stands.”44 This was achieved in 
the courts but also by the organized seizure of the means of communicative production. The 
Espionage Act enabled a widespread, state-sponsored expropriation of I.W.W. property in the 
service of suppressing speech that threatened property.  
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One hundred and sixty-six members of the I.W.W. were initially indicted on five counts 
of conspiracy and 113 were brought to trial in 1918. The Chicago trial was not the only trial of 
I.W.W. officers and members during and following the war—significant hearings took place 
across the country with notable cases in California, Kansas, and Nebraska—but it was the largest 
civilian trial in history. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn had encouraged members to have their cases 
severed. Individual trials would have made it difficult to prove guilt by association and would 
certainly have exonerated many members who had little to do with the correspondence and 
propaganda activity on which the prosecution’s case rested. Flynn, along with Carlo Tresca, 
Arturo Giovannitti and Joe Ettor were the only members to petition for severance. 45 
Unsurprisingly, there seems to have been a general consensus that strength would be found in 
solidarity even though, legally, this made no sense. In the end, ninety-seven defendants, William 
“Big Bill” Haywood among them, stood trial.46  
 The defense was led by a lawyer from the Pacific Northwest, George Vanderveer with 
Fred Moore, Caroline Lowe, Otto Chistensen, and William B. Cleary.47  Vanderveer had assisted 
the defense, led by Fred Moore, of the Wobblies accused of murder during the infamous Everett 
incident and the defendants had been acquitted.48  The prosecution was led by Frank Nebeker 
along with Claude Porter, U.S. District Attorney Charles Clyne and Bureau of Investigation 
Agent George Murdock.49  
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 The honorable Kenesaw Mountain Landis presided over the Chicago trial. Landis was a 
former State Department employee who had established his progressive credentials by imposing 
a stunningly large fine on Standard Oil for antitrust violations. He wore a suit in court instead of 
a robe and was known for his informality in court proceedings. But a progressive antitrust 
position and a relaxed ‘of the people’ demeanor did not make him an ally of radicals. Landis like 
the many progressives scattered throughout the Wilson government, held virulently anti-radical 
views. Earlier in 1917, he had sentenced 121 ‘slackers,’ who he referred to as “whining, belly-
aching puppies,” to hard labor for failing to register for the draft. He later oversaw socialist 
congressman Victor Berger’s trial under the Espionage Act. Landis not only sent Berger to 
prison for two decades, he later announced to an American Legion convention that “it was my 
great disappointment to give Berger only 20 years in Leavenworth…I believe the law should 
have enabled me to have him lined up against the wall and shot.”50  
The grand jury’s indictment doesn’t mention a single completed crime. The conspiracy 
charges were, in the nature of unrealized conspiracies, flexible and broad. Instead, its language 
was such that nearly all I.W.W. activity could be construed as a violation of the law and it is 
difficult to read the charges a century later without some condescension. Some of the evidence 
seemed aimed at proving the absurdity, rather than the legitimacy, of the charges’ logic. One of 
the “overt acts” in relation to the first count (conspiracy to overthrow the present industrial 
system by force and violence) was a letter written on behalf of evicted miners in Bisbee, 
Arizona. That it was put in evidence against a group charged with, among other things, 
“depriving citizens of the United States, or rather threatening, injuring and oppressing citizens of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





the United States in the exercise of privileges and rights secured to them by the Constitution,” is 
nothing less than astounding.51   
        July 13th, 1917 
President Wilson,  
Washington, D.C. 
More than two thousand men who were dragged from their homes and forcibly 
deported from Bisbee, Arizona, are adrift on the desert at Hermana, New Mexico. 
These men are miners, useful citizens, residents of Bisbee, Arizona. The United 
States can ill afford to permit these Russianized methods to go unchecked. We 
demand that these men be cared for and restored to their homes and families. 
 
Wm. D. Haywood 
General Secretary-Treasurer Industrial Workers of the World.52  
 
The document is full of letters like this one—anodyne requests for minimal restitution or 
statements that are critical only to the extent that they draw attention to inequity. Other 
documents are more damning.  The second count, charging that the defendants interfered with 
the rights of citizens to fulfill contracts with the Government and the fifth count which charges 
the I.W.W. with using the mails to defraud citizens through the distribution of literature 
criticizing capitalism and the US government could be backed up by mountains of evidence.  
 It is easy to read the trial as an overreaction—the symptom of a hysterical, reactionary 
moment in American history—but it is far more productive to take the charges seriously as a 
measure of the threat that was posed by the so-called dangerous classes. The grand jurors 
describe the I.W.W. as “two hundred thousand persons being almost exclusively laborers in the 
many branches of industry necessary to the existence and welfare of the people of the United 
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States and of their government.”53 [Emphasis mine.] It is an argument made repeatedly by the 
I.W.W. itself. A circular printed on June 22, 1917 implores workers to “stop furnishing the 
master the material of which the war structures are made of.”54  What the trial made clear is that 
guilt or innocence did not rest on conflicting interpretations of what was or was not done or said, 
but conflicting class interests. This was not a conflict that could be meaningfully resolved within 
the terms set by a criminal trial, yet that was what was being attempted. U.S. v Haywood was 
confronting incompatible notions of justice and right through a mechanistic legal procedure 
unfolding within a framework established by a federal law designed to sanctify the moral 
authority of a wartime state. Should this statement have been written as a question—is it moral 
and just that labor should own everything?—the Espionage and Sedition Acts would have 
answered “no.” As Pouget wrote, “from the radical difference, the persistence of which we have 
noted, between the working class and the capitalist class, there is naturally derived a different 
morality.”55  In his introduction, Giovannitti similarly declared that “the proletariat has a special 
mentality and hence a special morality of its own.”56 Incapable of reconciling two incompatible 
moral registers the trial, in a sense, failed to fulfill its function of discovery and deliberation. But 
while its conclusion was inevitably identical to its starting point, it was something other than 
empty, cynical ritual even if it amounted to the same thing. It was, above all, a failure of 
translation: a doomed effort to represent and resolve class struggle in a legal register of guilt and 
innocence utterly unequipped to account for the terms of the actual dispute. Nebeker, in an 
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attempt to prevent Vanderveer from summarizing the findings of the Commission on Industrial 
Relations argued that “general industrial conditions in this country are not involved in this case 
at all. That whatever those industrial conditions are, are based upon law,” and are, in circular 
fashion, therefore right.57  
Sabotage, on the contrary, claimed that “if private property rights are in conflict with 
human happiness, then private property rights come second. If we must choose between injuring 
profits and property, or undergoing growing degradation and starvation, then we will injure 
profits and property.”58 The centrality of sabotage to the indictment cannot be overstated. That 
sabotage would have provided a form of speech that seemed to promise destructive actions is 
certainly key to this emphasis. The way in which this term crystalized the anxieties of both state 
power and the public at large made it a useful metonym for a whole host of perceived threats to 
national security and stability. That it was disavowed by the Socialist Party and placed outside of 
the acceptable discourse and tactics of the left itself made it practically indefensible. But the 
length at which Pouget’s pamphlet is quoted, combined with the preoccupations of the document 
as a whole, indicates that the state was concerned with more than a reduced and restricted 
definition of sabotage as mere property destruction and foreign interference with the war effort. 
The jurors, it seems, were interested in what sabotage meant. The state took the theory of 
sabotage seriously. Too much of Pouget’s pamphlet was quoted to be reproduced in full here, but 
it is worth noting that the list of recommendations for actual ‘overt acts’ of sabotage that are 
included in the pamphlet—such as temporarily disabling bread ovens and sprinkling emery 
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powder in machine gears—is truncated here and takes up very little space in comparison to the 
long passages quoted from Giovannitti’s more abstract introduction. The selections begin, 
strangely, with a passage that might describe precisely what the Grand Jury was in the process of 
doing: 
Of all the words of a more or less esoteric taste which have been purposely 
denaturalized and twisted by the capitalist press in order to terrify and mystify a 
gullible public, ‘direct action’ and ‘sabotage’ rank easily next to anarchy, 
Nihilism, Free Love, Neo-Malthusianism, etc. in the hierarchy of infernal 
inventions.59  
 
The indictment goes on to quote the following two paragraphs where we find the explanation for 
this misrepresentation. It is an indictment of the indictment—a document aimed at defining 
sabotage as a criminal conspiracy. It is in the “vital interest” of the capitalist class, wrote 
Giovannitti, to throw suspicion on such terms “as soon as they begin to appear” precisely 
because they know exactly what they mean and the power that they hold. The “twisting” of these 
terms is expressly for the purpose of checking “the growth of their propaganda.” This obsession 
with semantics is, according to Giovannitti, characteristic of the capitalist class. In addition to 
controlling the means of production, the capitalist class exerts control over narratives: seizing on 
words the moment that they appear and “before they are understood,” manipulating meanings 
and disseminating a calculated definition that effectively directs the threat away from itself. 
These pamphlets were “not written for capitalists nor for the upholders of the capitalist system” 
because capitalists already knew full well what sabotage meant. The work to be done by the 
I.W.W. was one of clarification for the working classes. The writings were a reclamation of 
meaning and one might characterize the whole of I.W.W. propaganda as a narrative intervention 
in the common sense of free market ideology.  
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Vanderveer’s opening statement was a similar intervention. Perhaps understanding that 
an evidentiary approach was a lost cause, he turned the opening gambit of the defense into an 
attack on the industrial system. It was, in some sense, an attempt to organize the jury—to 
convince them of the justice, rather than the legality, of the I.W.W.’s actions. To make his case 
against industrial capitalism, he discussed the findings of the Commission on Industrial Relations 
at length. It was a text that the I.W.W. also cited regularly. Portions were reprinted and discussed 
in the pages of the Industrial Worker and its findings were popular with soap boxers. Vanderveer 
cannily referred to it as “the bible of the I.W.W.” in an attempt to argue that their positions were 
nothing more than reflections of conclusions drawn by an impartial, government sanctioned 
authority. What the I.W.W. was doing, Vanderveer went on to argue, was not in the least 
political: “it is not aimed at the government, or governmental functions, [it] is purely social and 
industrial, and aims to break up this thing which is sapping our national industrial and economic 
life.”60 
 Haywood “caused to be printed” many articles, letters, and other material that mentioned 
sabotage as well as the stoppage of work in the service of interrupting an immoral war at odds 
with the interests of the working class. Sabotage slipped easily into a military context without 
losing its original meaning because job action was a way of enacting pacifist beliefs. It could 
“paralyze the machinery of murder and make it impossible for the ignorant man-killers… to 
gather their toll of the life blood of foreign slaves.”61  Not only was the I.W.W. vocally anti-war, 
it was actively and openly sabotaging the war effort with economic action.  
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 The ‘overt acts’ listed by the jurors begin with the entirety of the Preamble to the I.W.W. 
Constitution which the defendants also “caused to be printed.” The second overt act is a letter 
showing that Haywood suggested that Pouget’s sabotage be translated into Finnish. The letter 
indicates that the Workers Socialist Publishing Bureau of Duluth, Minnesota had asked for 
recommendations for literature to distribute to its membership during a general strike of iron 
miners. “I trust that the work of translation will be carried out, as it is a necessary and valuable 
work, and must be done sooner or later.”62 The phrase, “caused to be printed” was the only 
reasonably verifiable ‘act’ that could be assigned to this assortment of writing, but nearly every 
piece of evidence suggests the entanglement of writing and actual organizing, and the selection 
of evidence produced by the grand jury from the many tons of material seized seems alert to this 
closeness. “I think,” wrote Haywood on September 5, 1917, “for a while we ought to carry on an 
educational campaign thru [sic] our literature on the Range, and spread all kinds of leaflets and 
pamphlets amongst the miners in all languages…then they will be easier to organize.”63 
What is on display here is more than the expansive definition of speech that Weinrib 
attributes to Progressive Era civil libertarians. When Vanderveer made his opening statement, it 
was clear that he was doing something other than defending civil liberties—no matter how 
broadly defined. He understood that the case represented a fundamental ideological disagreement 
that was only superficially concerned with legality. While there was some room for defending 
the I.W.W. against accusations of actually participating in the “unlawful, tortious and forcible 
means and methods, involving threats, assaults, injuries, intimidations and murders upon the 
persons and the injury and destruction…of the property of such other classes, the forcible 
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resistance to the execution of all laws, and finally the forcible revolutionary overthrow of all 
existing governmental authority,” it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to show that 
they hadn’t openly advocated for all but murders and personal injury.64  Most of the evidence 
gathered and presented consisted of confiscated print material that encouraged any number of 
ideas and activities that were explicitly aimed at accomplishing a revolutionary reorganization of 
society. Of course, one could quibble about the exact meaning of property destruction and argue 
that “forming the structure of a new society within the shell of the old” through economic action 
wasn’t precisely the same as overthrowing a sitting government but the notion that the 
organization saw itself, as Nebeker put it, as a “government within a government” was just as 
objectionable.65 Whatever the case may have been in regards to the overthrow of government 
authority, the I.W.W. was hardly innocent according to the terms of an indictment that defined 
illegality as a conspiracy of verbal criticism of capitalism, government, and the war. And 
uncomfortable as it may be for those who want to defend the I.W.W. within the terms set by the 
law, a good faith denial that this criticism ever escaped the realm of the purely speculative is 
simply not possible.  
 Their guilt was particularly apparent in the charge that they had interfered with 
government procurement of materials necessary for prosecuting the war. This is perhaps the 
closest the charges come to an actual crime, in the sense that the I.W.W. did materially, and very 
intentionally, interfere with production rather than simply advocating such interference. This was 
particularly true in the lumber industry, where I.W.W. organizing strength was arguably at its 
peak in 1917. Their actions, not just their speech, were in direct violation of several 
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congressional acts enabling procurement of both labor and supplies for various branches of the 
military and appropriations for the construction and maintenance of aircraft. The industries in 
which I.W.W. members worked provided the raw materials needed for fuel, aircraft, and 
cantonment construction as well as basic subsistence. Even though, as Nebeker himself 
suggested, the organization’s actual reach may have been exaggerated by the indictment, the 
concentration of this “perambulating population of wage workers” in agriculture, lumber, and 
metal and coal mining made them disproportionately obnoxious to the federal government.66  
Wartime needs thus transformed legally ambiguous activity, such as striking and picketing, into 
unambiguously unlawful behavior. None of these activities could be reasonably separated from 
‘mere’ speech acts because organizing workers, as Haywood’s letter to the ironworkers 
demonstrated, consisted of disseminating ideas. The interference with the war effort was not 
accidental. The relationship between labor and preparedness, the grand jury’s assertion that 
I.W.W. members and other workers were essential to the execution of the war, was recognized 
and the withdrawal of worker efficiency—sometimes referred to as sabotage—was suggested as 
a means of ending the war. As one headline from May of 1916 declared “General Strike Can End 
War: Down with Wars and Military Preparedness! Let Us Prepare to Make an End of Them!”67 
These ideas often forged a strong link between anti-war activity and strike activity. Not 
only did the Industrial Worker declare that striking workers could end the war, patriotism was 
reframed as disloyalty to the working class. Fighting in Europe meant that you were not fighting 
the class war. Just before his death, Frank Little addressed a crowd of striking miners in Butte, 
Montana. Recounting a conversation he had with the Governor of Arizona, Little said, “I don’t 
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give a damn what your country is fighting for; I am fighting for the solidarity of labor.”68 He 
then went on to threaten paralyzing strikes—40,000 men in agriculture would join the 50,000 
lumber workers that were already out. “We will keep the troops of the United States Government 
so busy they won’t be able to go to France,” he concluded.69  On the one hand, these were 
separate wars to be fought in separate theaters. On the other, the conflation of the military with 
other enemies of labor was evident in the material entanglement of industrial production and the 
needs of the state and this, in turn, was reflected everywhere in the organization’s attitude and 
language. Little, for example, was in the habit, unexceptional among I.W.W. members, of 
referring to members of the military as “army thugs” and “uniformed scabs.”  
Criminal Syndicalism 
The Espionage Act enabled the coordinated prosecution of the I.W.W. for general 
conspiracies at the federal level. The importance of the Chicago trial cannot be underestimated 
but it was not the only, or even the most significant, legal mechanism for the prosecution of 
I.W.W. members. Just before the 1917 raids, individual states began to pass criminal syndicalism 
laws that were explicitly aimed at diminishing the power of the I.W.W. Idaho was the first to 
pass such a law. Minnesota quickly followed suit, and over the next decade, twenty-three states 
passed criminal syndicalism laws. What distinguished anti-criminal syndicalism legislation from 
other repressive measures was the specificity of its target, its obsession with the word ‘sabotage,’ 
and its distinctly economic nature. Unlike broader conspiracy doctrines, criminal syndicalism 
laws were not couched in the airy language of state security. They explicitly outlawed the 
advocacy of “political and economic change.” They were also as often the result of the direct 
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influence of prominent industries in the state as they were the result of lobbying by patriotic 
groups such as the American Legion.70 They were mostly passed in states where the I.W.W.’s 
influence was significant and they dropped out of use when its strength was flagging.71 Idaho’s 
prototype, for example, was drafted by a Boise attorney employed by the lumber industry who 
was perfectly straightforward when explaining the purpose of the laws:  
At that time the I.W.W.s were very active in North Idaho, in addition to 
distributing literature, they were beginning to commit acts of sabotage. The 
lumber interests felt it necessary to take protective measures…My clients did not 
consider the poor dupes who generally committed the acts of sabotage as the real 
criminals, but the agitators who inspired them to acts as such. At that particular 
time it was more important to shut up the agitators and keep them off the job than 
it was to put them in a penitentiary.72 
 
In respect to implementation, the laws were incredibly broad. Like other conspiracy laws, they 
criminalized language and association and allowed for widespread, specious, and politically or 
economically motivated criminal prosecution. Unlike their federal cousins, however, the 
language they concerned themselves with was specific to I.W.W. literature and the word 
sabotage was key. The broadest and most severe of these statutes was passed by the state of 
Montana in 1918. The language of the Montana act was typical (with slight variations, most were 
copies of the Idaho statute) but significant because of its severity and because it served as a 
model for the 1918 amendment to the Espionage Act commonly known as the Sedition Act.73 It 
is worth quoting at length:  
Any person who, by word of mouth or writing, advocates, suggests, or 
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teaches…crime, criminal syndicalism, or sabotage, or who shall advocate or 
suggest…any act of violence, the destruction of or damage to any property, the 
bodily injury to any person or persons, or the commission of any crime or 
unlawful act, as a means of accomplishing…any industrial or political ends, 
change, or revolution, or who prints, publishes, edits, issues, or knowingly 
circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any books, pamphlets, paper, 
handbill, poster, document, or written or printed matter in any form whatsoever, 
containing, advocating, advising, suggesting, or teaching crime, criminal 
syndicalism, sabotage, the doing of any act of violence, the destruction of or 
damage to any property, the injury to any person, or the commission of any crime 
or unlawful act, as a means of…bringing about any industrial or political ends, or 
change…or who shall openly, or at all, attempt to justify, by word of mouth or 
writing, the commission or the attempt to commit sabotage….or who organizes, 
or helps to organize, or become a member of, or voluntarily assembles with, any 
society or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate, or which teaches, 
advocates, or suggests the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, sabotage, or…any act 
of violence… is guilty of a felony.74 
 
 The laws speak for themselves and reiterate the logic of Oppenheim’s explanation. What 
they are concerned with is less the prosecution of criminal acts of property destruction than the 
spreading of a doctrine. They were meant to “shut up the agitators.” But they were effective 
because the word ‘sabotage’ allowed them to appear as if they were preventing acts of physical 
property destruction when, in fact, they were protecting the property rights of a specific class in a 
much more fundamental manner. The connection between these two registers—the critique of 
property in the abstract and definite acts against individual pieces of property—was precisely the 
function of sabotage. It was what gave it its distinctly threatening power. But it was clearly this 
latter threat, the one located in a discursive register, that motivated the “better class of citizens of 
the northern part of [Idaho]” to pass “legislation that would give protection to parties investing 
their money in business enterprise,” against the I.W.W.75 
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The I.W.W. used the word ‘sabotage’ to denote a set of job actions aimed at leveraging 
lost profits for bargaining power. But it also used the word to elaborate a radical critique of the 
capitalist property relations that not only made illegitimate claims on wealth and property 
produced by workers, but generated a perverse morality in defense of what was, in effect, 
legalized theft. The function of sabotage was, therefore, not only to reduce profits through direct 
action, but also to name and enumerate the various mechanisms of exploitation on which this 
property regime was constructed.  
 Crucially, naming both capitalist morality cum property regimes, as well as the varied 
acts of sabotage itself was integral to the success of this so-called ‘guerilla warfare of the 
working class’. Sabotage was not mere speech, nor was it simply a set of actions. It was both and 
this makes it nearly impossible to defend the I.W.W. on legal terms without diminishing their 
economic, political and dare we say, moral importance. The dog whistle function of ‘sabotage’ 
as a means of prosecuting Wobblies and their allies was effective because almost no one else 
advocated a program of political and economic change that included sabotage as a philosophy 
and a tactic. There was no other organization that encouraged its members to consider the 
morality of property and act on the thinly veiled injustice that it both represented and produced.  
Criminal syndicalism laws are a horrific artifact of legal repression and perhaps the most 
dramatic instance of the failure of civil liberties to date. But to read them as anomalous or 
anachronistic both assumes an otherwise triumphal history of free expression and ignores their 
real significance. There was, “contrary to any progressivist reading of the development of the 
law in [the area of civil liberties] that would explain these decisions by the immaturity of civil 





laws on constitutional or other grounds.76 Appeals following criminal syndicalism convictions 
included just such constitutional claims that the laws violated guaranteed rights of association 
and speech and that they were “an impermissible form of class legislation.”77  Perhaps the most 
famous of these cases, the trial of Anita Whitney, made its way to the Supreme Court. Her 
argument that the statute violated the equal protection clause because there was no equivalent 
criminalization of similar words in defense of the status quo, was dismissed. A state might make 
such distinctions, the court concluded, as long as they are ‘rational’. The free speech and 
association claims were also dismissed with Holmes and Brandeis concurring that Whitney had 
engaged in speech that presented an imminent danger to public safety and state security.78   
What criminal syndicalism laws showed was precisely what the I.W.W. had always 
argued: that the state and the courts were inseparable from capitalist class interests. It was no 
surprise to them that legislatures as well as the judiciary would be willing to censor specific ideas 
when those ideas pose fundamental threats to capitalism. By ignoring “what is perhaps the most, 
explicit, straightforward, and altogether remarkable effort in modern America to use the power 
of the state, backed by law, to stamp out a radical organization”, we fail to discern the actual 
limits of liberty.79  
 A century removed from the widespread class violence of the Progressive Era, it is worth 
remarking that the I.W.W. and its ideas were taken very seriously. This is not only apparent in 
the extreme legal and extra-legal reaction to the organization as whole, but it is also reflected in 
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the language of the laws themselves, which were precise inversions of I.W.W. pamphlets on the 
subject. The way that they were written underscored the I.W.W.’s argument that threats to 
distinct units of property occurred by way of action, but a threat to property in general was 
accomplished in language; that sabotage as it was formulated by its proponents was not mere 
material destruction but a threat to the very notion of property; and that property itself was not 
simply material, but a legal construct shored up by morality. This morality extended far beyond a 
belief in the sanctity of property. It was expressed through the institution of marriage, hygiene, 
living arrangements, the impropriety of racial mixing, and attitudes towards foreign customs and 
languages. Whitney had not been arrested for giving a speech in support of sabotage or even 
advocating the regulation of labor. She was arrested for a giving a speech on “The Negro 
Problem” that “advocated civil rights and condemned the lynching of blacks.”80  This, of course, 
reflected the dragnet character of such laws, but it also indicates the complexity and breadth of 
the social customs and practices that were necessary for the perpetuation of economic control. 
The I.W.W., with its ethnically diverse membership, multilingual literature, disdain for 
traditional living arrangements, articles condemning anti-black racism, support for birth control, 
critiques of marriage, economic explanations of prostitution, and hatred of nationalism was, even 
in the absence of its organizing strength, an abomination from the perspective of capital. The 
I.W.W.’s real crime was pointing out that behind all of these bourgeois pretensions and 
reactionary positions was the singular goal of maintaining a system of property rights dependent 
on the exploitation of labor and supported by legislatures and courts. And they had a plan for 
ending the racism and sexual exploitation that kept the wheels of this machine well-greased: it 
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could be put out of order with a little bit of emery dust, a bruised bushel of apples, and some 





Chapter 5: Veblen’s Soviet 
How dear to my heart are those chimes in the morning, 
That yank me from bed with melodious thrill; 
How sweet is the sound of the regular warning 
That yells that it’s time that I hike to the mill. 
Without it I’d sleep till the sun had arisen 
Be late to the job that my boss lets me use; 
Get canned, perhaps steal, Maybe land in a prison 
If the chimes didn’t hustle me out of my snooze. 
What a blessing it was when the thing was invented 
It beats the slave-driver who came with his stick; 
It rests on the shelf in that shack that I rented 
It never gets hungry; it never gets sick. 
 
--“The Dollar Alarm Clock” The Little Red Song Book (1919) 
 
Sabotage literature did not develop in a vacuum. Unique in its call for a direct attack on 
property and its assumption of the intelligence and agency of the so-called ‘unskilled’ workers it 
addressed, it was also one of many the theories put forth to explain the particular political 
economy of the early twentieth century United States. At the time, socialism had real political 
purchase. Henry George’s wildly popular single tax schemes attempted to eliminate unearned 
increments while maintaining private property. Institutional economists and legal scholars such 
as Robert Hale were turning their attention to coercion and property rights in an attempt to 





ideology of free markets, only sabotage proposed to restrict production and destroy employer 
property on the basis of its absolute illegitimacy. It was also one of the only critiques of property 
rights that developed from the observation of workers’ methods for exerting control at the point 
of production. Sabotage was a practice before it was a theory and its value was inferred from its 
ongoing use. “When men do something instinctively, continually, year after year,” wrote Gurley 
Flynn, “it means that that weapon has some value.”1 
Sabotage was anathema to even the most strident progressive indictments of inequality. It 
implicitly rejected the authority of experts, derived its power from interference rather than 
efficiency, and precluded the possibility of cooperation between classes. By 1920, sabotage was 
well on its way to disappearing from the political landscape as a result of systematic repression. 
Throughout 1919, Thorstein Veblen wrote a series of articles for The Dial that dealt with the 
problem of ‘capitalist sabotage’. Compiled and reprinted as The Engineers and the Price System 
in 1921, the essays took aim at the “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency” that he viewed as 
endemic to normal business practice. This was the last substantial appearance of the theory of 
sabotage. The Engineers was Veblen’s most controversial and widely read book.2 Veblen was 
clearly excited by the argumentative utility of the I.W.W.’s division of sabotage into its capitalist 
and workerist variants and, while hardly calling for the overthrow of capitalism by the working 
class, he recognized the theory of sabotage as a useful diagnostic tool that supported his own 
arguments about the wasteful nature of capitalism.  
Far from proving the residual influence of the I.W.W.’s theory of sabotage on American 
thought, or a synthesis of syndicalism and progressive reformism or institutionalist economics, 
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Veblen’s handling of sabotage demonstrated the hegemonic effect of over a decade of state 
repression. In Veblen’s version, we see the last traces of the word’s syndicalist origins while also 
witnessing its transformation into a term so general that it would eventually be used to refer to 
one’s failure to adhere to a diet and/or meet deadlines. Sabotage lends a radical aura to Veblen’s 
thought, but detached from its significance as a method of asserting worker control over the 
means of production, it means nothing more than an impediment to efficiency and productive 
potential. Veblen’s version of sabotage bears a much closer resemblance to the theories of 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, who also saw rationalized industry as a net social benefit that would 
transcend class, than it does to its Wobbly origins. The Engineers is a critical text to the extent 
that Veblen’s sympathies remained with those who were deprived of wealth, but it also 
represents an emerging consensus around efficiency, managerial control of production and the 
natural and inevitable progress of machines themselves. Veblen’s text, read alongside Taylor and 
against I.W.W. writing on sabotage and efficiency, suggests that the ideology of efficiency that 
emerged from the Progressive Era—a habit of thought cultivated by progressives sympathetic to 
radicalism as well as anti-labor managers—is perhaps the most effective vehicle for policing the 
boundaries of political thought.  
The suggestion that efficiency was the answer to inequality is as old as capitalism. Since 
the development of mass production, the potential for a universal satisfaction of needs by 
industrial technology has been a central component of utopian thinking. This faith in 
technological solutions to social problems is regularly renewed from every imaginable angle 
with politicians promising increased employment in developing economic sectors and 
intellectuals speculating about the possibility of fully automated luxury communism. The basic 





summarized as follows: having overcome natural limits with technological innovation, poverty 
and want should no longer exist. Scarcity, so the logic goes, may have been an unfortunate 
reality at an earlier time when human want was constrained by seasons, plagues, floods and 
droughts, but by the nineteenth century at the latest, we had learned how to harness nature and 
transform it into productive power. We had, to borrow a phrase from Peter Kropotkin, conquered 
bread. Industrial progress was not a matter of machinery alone. It was always also a production 
process that had, at its core, the division of labor. Celebrated by Adam Smith for giving the 
lowliest of European peasants more wealth than an African king, and loathed by Marx for 
playing a significant role in our estrangement from our ‘species being’, the division of labor and 
its relationship to mechanical ingenuity is a perennial preoccupation. Edward Bellamy made a 
similar argument for the irrationality of poverty in his wildly popular novel Looking Backwards, 
which described a utopian future in which a combination of technology and efficient state 
management had solved the problem of inequality and overwork. Given a properly managed 
system of distribution and some pneumatic tubes, the poverty and want that allegedly drove the 
violent conflicts of the Progressive Era would disappear. Published in 1888, the novel anticipated 
important aspects of twentieth century progressive reform movements. Specifically, the book 
imagined a lack of conflict and a generalization of the middle class brought about by a 
benevolent state that had rationalized production and consumption. The faith that a well-
managed society would produce rational, unselfish, socially responsible people was one of 
Bellamy’s most important didactic claims. That all of this was ‘rational’, and that selfishness and 
self-interest were the irrational products of an irrational society, made the novel paradigmatically 
progressive.3 
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Veblen was a great fan of Bellamy’s novel and his political sympathies were with “those 
who have urgent use for more than they own” rather than the “absentee owners of much 
property” whose material interests constituted the overriding concern of the state.4  His disdain 
for the idle classes was hardly hidden and he had a clear understanding of the role that the state 
played in maintaining economic privilege. Like Bellamy, Veblen’s view of industry itself was 
cornucopian. And like Bellamy, he organized much of his thought around the irrationality of 
scarcity, self-interest, and the conflict that it created. The increase in productive capacity brought 
about by mechanical advances was, despite its misuse, a boon to society. The United States was 
not providing for its population because ‘vested interests’ were preventing this industry from 
running at full capacity. Maldistribution was a management problem, not a class problem. 
Veblen does not cite the widely circulating pamphlets on sabotage but this is likely due to the 
general lack of direct citation that was conventional at the time, rather than an indication that he 
arrived at the idea independently. Veblen had written about the I.W.W.’s use of sabotage in a 
strikingly sympathetic report on “Farm Labor and the I.W.W.” undertaken for the Food 
Administration’s Statistical Division in 1918. Given the chronology of I.W.W. publications 
(Giovannitti’s translation of Pouget (1912), Smith (1913) and Gurley Flynn (1915)), we can 
safely assume that these texts served as his sources for framing inefficiency along lines of 
worker and capitalist sabotage.  
Sabotage gave Veblen a way to emphasize the waste inherent in financial capitalism, but 
the waste that inhered in capitalist production was only one aspect of the I.W.W.’s theory. 
Furthermore, sabotage was not just a theory—it was a tactic and as a tactic, could not be 
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divorced from class conflict and destruction of property. Intentional waste of the products of 
capitalism by workers was an indispensable aspect of sabotage. Worker sabotage proposed waste 
as a solution—as a necessary component of achieving economic equality.5  When the Industrial 
Worker complained that “carloads of potatoes were destroyed in Illinois recently; cotton was 
burned in the Southern states; coffee was destroyed by the Brazilian planters; barge loads of 
onions were dumped overboard in California…. all to raise prices,” they were speaking Veblen’s 
language.6  When Wobblies practiced sabotage by throwing pitchforks, scrap metal and bunches 
of burlap into the cylinders of threshing machines, Veblen could only understand them as an 
unfortunate symptom.  
In noting the inefficiency of capitalist sabotage, Veblen casts the profit motive as 
irrational, when it is, in its own terms, highly rational. He realizes, that to survive in competitive 
markets, capitalists needed a return on investment:  they must, that is, make more money than 
they originally invested into production. The extent to which they also produced commodities in 
this process can vary but the imperative to accumulate and expand was constant and enforced by 
the dynamics of interfirm competition. If the production of fewer or shoddier commodities 
translated into more money, then the logic, or rationale, of capitalist accumulation was satisfied. 
Veblen was aware that businessmen were subject to these structural economic demands, what he 
did not acknowledge was that the way that machinery produced relative surplus value was itself 
constrained by these demands. The social relations crystalized in large scale industry were of a 
particular kind that made no sense within a social context freed of the need for surplus value 
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production. These factories, in turn, made their own demands on the organization of production. 
The excess of shoddy, machine goods that drove down the price of all commodities in the same 
category and therefore required the artificial constriction of production or prolongation of the 
working day and depression of wages was a problem specific to industrial capitalism. This 
abundance was as much a feature of capitalism as its artificial restriction. Continuous production 
processes—the very processes that Veblen sought to perfect—were a feature of financial 
capitalism. They were not the product of an independent technical evolution that had somehow 
outpaced social relations. Furthermore, the machinery of financialized capitalism and the system 
of absentee ownership that Veblen so vehemently opposed was just that—machinery. The same 
machines simply would not produce in the same manner under different economic conditions. 
The same machines would not exist. Making them work better was no solution at all.  
Veblen essentially recast a moral critique of economic exploitation—which can’t actually 
be accommodated by even the most well-meaning call to efficiency—as a technocratic concern. 
Veblen’s notions of resource distribution were naively normative and demonstrated an outsized 
faith in instrumental rationality, planning, and technology. By turning sabotage into a mere threat 
to efficiency, Veblen reified the abundance that ‘naturally’ issued from capitalist modes of 
production. According to him, class conflict, a term he almost never uses, is largely the product 
of industrial change outpacing legal and economic institutions and the cultural conventions they 
created. Like many of his peers, he took theories of evolution for granted and his contribution to 
the field of institutional economics bore traces of this evolutionary thinking.7  
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Veblen, like the I.W.W., saw sabotage as endemic to capitalism and argued that it had “a 
large share in the ordinary conduct of business.” Business and commerce would not be able to 
function, he wrote “without some salutary restraint in the way of sabotage on the productive use 
of the available industrial plant and workmen [because] it is altogether unlikely that prices could 
be maintained at a reasonably profitable figure for any appreciable time.”8 Industry, according to 
Veblen, had reached a level of sophistication and productivity that made it impossible to produce 
at full capacity without flooding the market and depressing prices. The use of sabotage by 
“vested interests” to the detriment of “the community” was thus the undesirable and unintended 
consequence of industrial evolution outpacing the social and economic apparatus under which it 
was organized.  
Capitalist sabotage—or the elite production of unnecessary scarcity—provided Veblen 
with an explanation for a situation that he found baffling and frustrating: that industry could 
reach such an advanced stage and still manage to leave those “who have come through the war 
and made the world safe for the business of the vested interests” deprived of “a supply of the 
necessaries of life.”9  The enrichment of the business class to the detriment of the community 
was, though, not a matter of exploitation or naked avarice but a social failure of the “price 
system.”  Businessmen were the “creatures and agents” of a system that was likely to eject them 
if they were to “allow the community’s needs to unduly influence their management style” 
because they were beholden to profit margins.10 Without some sabotage, the businessman would 
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surely face insolvency and to avoid such an outcome he was compelled to interfere with a 
potentially perfect system of production. 
The mechanical complexity of industry, and the interlocking nature of production over 
geographic space that necessitated the widespread coordination of sabotage, led Veblen to argue 
that sabotage required the intervention of the state. “Even a reasonable amount of collusion 
among the interested business concerns,” he wrote, “will not by itself suffice to carry on that 
comprehensive moving equilibrium of sabotage.”11  It follows therefore, that the state “will have 
some share in administering that necessary modicum of sabotage that must always go into the 
days work of carrying on industry by business methods for business purposes.” The protective 
tariff is the “great standing illustration of sabotage administered by the government” but, having 
recently withdrawn from military conflict, the state’s specific interest in sabotage—the 
“withdrawal of efficiency from work that does not fall in with the purposes of the 
administration”—was also readily apparent at the moment of writing. Wartime production 
occasionally resulted in “half concerted measures…in the interest of the nation at large” but 
these were exceptional. The result, as he saw it, was that “civilized people are suffering 
privation” because the “industrial system is deliberately handicapped with dissention, 
misdirection, and unemployment of material resources, equipment, and man power, at every turn 
where the statesmen or the captains of finance can touch its mechanism.”12 
The commercial interests of “one-eyed management” was interfering with the optimal 
efficiency of a technically advanced mode of production. By contrast to its syndicalist usage, 
sabotage was, for Veblen a purely material and mechanical problem with a technical solution 
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that “begins and ends in the domain of tangible performance.”13 It was simply the most serious 
symptom of the interference of financial interests in technical operations. That which threatens 
efficiency is necessarily bad, so while we might sympathize more with worker sabotage than 
capitalist sabotage, any conscientious withdrawal of efficiency threatened the common good.  
Veblen’s solution to this appropriated analysis—one also drawn from the radical 
handbook—is a brief general strike by the only group in society that is not engaged in some form 
of ‘salutary’ sabotage in the service of their own interests—the “technological specialists.”14 
Because it is this group that is “in possession of the requisite technological information and 
experience”, and are therefore an “indispensable factor in the everyday work of carrying on the 
country’s productive industry…any question of a revolutionary overturn in America” hinges on 
“what the guild of technicians will do.”15 Veblen’s solution to class conflict is to imagine a class 
of people with no vested interests. That is, to suggest that there is the possibility of existing 
wholly outside of the class structure. If the businessmen are the accidental product of a profit-
seeking system, the engineers were the product of industry—the human expression of machine 
efficiency. They were not members of an interested class. Their actions were not motivated by 
wealth accumulation. Rather their allegiance was to efficiency itself. Machinery itself had no 
interests outside of its tendency to increase material production through technical advancement. 
As the human expression of mechanical mandates, it follows that the “material welfare of all the 
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advanced industrial peoples rests in the hands of these technicians.”16 In Veblen’s imagination, 
the social machine was malfunctioning because industrial machines were malfunctioning.  
Sabotage was not something that could be eliminated by engineers and their religious 
adherence to maximum efficiency because sabotage was “born of class struggle—of man’s 
inhumanity to man… [its history] shows the irreconcilable antagonism between capitalist and 
laborer—master and slave.”17 Sabotage was proposed as a way for those without property to 
seize the means of production and it was used by property owners to maintain control of their 
wealth.  
The notion that industry, like the class of engineers, was evolving independently of 
capitalism was antithetical to the way that the I.W.W. conceived of industrial technology. Rather 
than being an impediment to industrial progress, the preamble to the I.W.W. Constitution 
asserted that “social relations and groupings only reflect mechanical and industrial conditions.”  
In other words, technological change shaped society rather than having advanced independently 
of it. Food and wages were galvanizing issues, but in articulating a form of revolutionary 
violence aimed at property rather than people, the I.W.W. was not merely lodging dramatized 
complaints about a lack of bread. They were also elaborating a crucial distinction between 
inanimate material and living beings and reasserting a hierarchy of values that privileged living 
over dead labor. The rational organization of labor desired by Veblen’s engineers, and embodied 
in machine production, were implicit targets.  
While simple tools, as well as machines, could become the objects of worker sabotage, 
Veblen’s unintended misuse of the I.W.W.’s theory reveals the critique of technology embedded 
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in actual worker sabotage. Veblen was convinced that technology served an ideological, 
socializing function. Through exposure to rational, machine processes workers would 
themselves, he believed, become more rational. Writing of the Arts and Crafts movement, he 
suggested that its proponents were sentimental and mistaken—not because of a romantic 
attachment to beauty but because a creative reorganization of work along nonindustrial lines was 
precluded by a naturalized notion of technological advancement and the increasingly 
technologized mind that it produced. The inevitability of technology subtends the whole of 
Veblen’s thought.  If, he writes of the Arts and Crafts movement, “art and labor is to go into 
effect under modern circumstances, it will have to mean the association of art with the machine 
process…Modern industry is machine industry.”18 Proponents of Arts and Crafts, such as 
William Morris (who, incidentally, did not like Bellamy’s novel), were concerned with more 
than beautiful objects. Objects, they suggested, were beautiful when produced “on the basis of 
work undertaken willingly and cheerfully” in an environment that organized around “pleasures, 
bodily and mental, scientific and artistic, social and individual.”19 Veblen finds the notion of 
recovering a sense of pleasure in unmechanized labor absurd. 
The machine process has come, not so much to stay merely, but to go forward and 
root out of the workmen’s scheme of thought whatever elements are alien to its 
own technological requirements and discipline.  It ubiquitously and unremittingly 
disciplines the workmen into its way of doing, and therefore into its way of 
apprehending and appreciating things. ‘Industrial art’ therefore, which does not 
work through and in the spirit of the machine technology is, at the best, an 
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exotic…It has no chance of life beyond the hothouse shelter of decadent 
aestheticism.20 
 
Taylorism, Sabotage, and the Machine Question 
In the introduction to The Principles of Scientific Management, Frederick Winslow 
Taylor wrote that “what we are all looking for… is the readymade, competent man; the man 
whom someone else has trained. It is only when we fully realize that our duty, as well as our 
opportunity, lies in systematically cooperating to train and to make this competent man…that we 
shall be on the road to national efficiency.”21 Taylor lacked Veblen’s awareness of the larger 
political economic field in which industry operated. No critique of the economic advantages 
afforded to ‘substantial citizens’ will be found in his Principles, but the logic of efficiency is 
stubbornly narrow and Taylor’s managers are almost indistinguishable from Veblen’s engineers. 
Now associated with brutal, profit driven speedups, Taylor’s first chapter opens with a promise 
of equity: “The principle object of management should be to secure the maximum prosperity for 
the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee.”22  
Mike Davis has suggested that sabotage was a response to the imposition of the Taylor 
system and other efficiency movements—an organizational reaction to imposed speedups and 
the introduction of mass assembly technologies. The prominence of sabotage in I.W.W. literature 
between 1910 and 1913, he argues, coincided with I.W.W. led strikes in industries that had 
imposed the Taylor system or some other form of speedup.23 This may overstate the case. The 
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precipitating event for strikes in Paterson, New Jersey and Lawrence, Kansas were wage 
reductions and neither sabotage nor I.W.W. influence was limited to Taylorized industries. 
Furthermore, the organization had broad appeal for itinerant workers in industries such as lumber 
that might best be described as irrationalized. But however the actual practice of sabotage 
distributed itself across industry, its theorization was a response to the real relocation of job 
control in the hands of management. The most concrete manifestation of this power struggle was 
large-scale machinery, which was not a symbolic stand-in for management but, as workers knew, 
a realization of employer control over production methods derived from the division and 
appropriation of their labor.  
The modern, rationalized factory of the 1900s was, on the whole, cleaner, better lit, and 
safer than its nineteenth century counterpart.24 And there is no way to know to what degree 
Taylor’s management techniques were implemented. Like sabotage, scientific management is 
difficult to locate and measure. What we do know is that factories and, by extension, the number 
of people employed in large scale manufacturing, were growing dramatically and the very size 
and complexity of their operations demanded, as Veblen would have certainly pointed out, 
expert management and standardization.  
Sabotage could be employed against a fruit tree or an assembly line. But modern 
machinery was the clearest material and symbolic manifestation of the system under which 
laborers were exploited. The increasing importance of machine production was central to the 
logic of industrial unionism: “Trade lines have been swallowed up by the common servitude of 
all workers to the machines that they tend.” In this respect as well, the role of machinery differed 
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greatly for the I.W.W. It had a causal role and an impact on the organization of social and 
economic relations. It did not trundle along in parallel fashion waiting to be made more efficient. 
It created classes, required the development of management systems and constituted the means 
by which a worker’s skill and knowledge could be appropriated, standardized, and represented as 
physical property—as the ‘natural’ evolution of industrial production rather than the conscious 
skill of the workers themselves. In the words of I.W.W. poet Covington Hall, “capitalist society 
is theft and piracy organized and brought to a science.”25 
If possession is indeed nine tenths of the law, then the machine-breaking saboteur, in 
effect, possessed through destruction and thereby expropriated machinery from its legal owner—
if only in a rough fashion and for a short time. Sabotage was an act of reappropriation—the 
taking back of an object that was produced by labor and therefore rightly belonged to it. But this 
property contest did not limit itself to physical objects. It extended, perhaps more importantly, to 
the ownership of knowledge. Sabotage was an assault on intellectual property that was, in the 
early twentieth century, being systematically expropriated through management systems and 
mechanization. Taylor was obsessed with knowledge appropriation and he conceived of this 
knowledge as the property of a class, not an individual. Most work methods had been “almost 
unconsciously learned,” and the “ingenuity and experience of each generation” passed down to 
the next as a “mass of rule of thumb or traditional knowledge.” Efficiency is clearly shown here 
to be inseparable from class power. The ‘ingenuity’ that workers demonstrated, in the twin tasks 
of slowing down and hiding their knowledge of production from management, raised important 
questions about the relationship between the laboring and the owning classes. It also raised 
questions about the role of machinery and efficiency in that relationship. Sabotage, “the 
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chloroforming of the ogres of production,” asked whether the domination and exploitation 
inherent in capitalist property relations could ever be effectively separated from the machinery 
that capital owned and managed.   
One definition of sabotage offered by Pouget was “any skillful operation on the 
machinery of production intended not to destroy it…but only to temporarily disable it and to put 
it out of running condition in order to make impossible the work of scabs.” Explicitly linking 
worker control to disruption and destruction produced a workerist narrative that was antithetical 
to the very idea of technological progress. This was, importantly, a ‘skillful’ operation not 
“clumsy and stupid destruction.” It required that the worker “know thoroughly the anatomy of 
the machine which he is going to vivisect.” 26  Sabotage was a powerful and concrete realization 
of specialized knowledge in spite of encroaching managerial control.   This could, of course, be 
said of any well-organized work stoppage or job action, but in addition to demonstrating 
workers’ power, sabotage underscored the fragility of an industrial system of production. What 
becomes clear in Pouget’s litany of possible forms that sabotage could take, are the number of 
ways that an industrial system of production could break down—its vulnerability increased in 
direct proportion to its potential efficiency. Constant capital was subject to all the disadvantages 
of visibility and symbolic, political action. Machines were the most legible sites of revolt. This 
was one of sabotage’s most salient insights and the point of departure for developing and 
demonstrating a new locus of worker knowledge.  
Sabotage, by encouraging direct physical intervention in industrial progress, was 
incompatible with the reification of efficiency inserted into the concept by Veblen. Contrary to 
progressive notions of socially beneficial and well-managed industry, it suggested a need to 
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revisit a real debate about the actual effects of industrial machinery—not its idealized, future 
form but its actual impact in the present. Veblen’s effective removal of the working class from 
his analysis made it impossible for him to recognize crucial forms of social failure that could not 
be corrected by efficiency. Barring total and perfect automation, machines in perfect working 
order still worked against their operators. The I.W.W. did not espouse a romantic, pre-
mechanical worldview, but they were decidedly not convinced that machines or advances in 
machinery could solve class problems. The logic of worker sabotage was, in part, that it saved 
workers from some of “the ‘lost’ and ‘unnecessary motions’ made necessary by the very 
existence of capitalist society.”27 Like every other word, ‘sabotage’ included, ‘efficiency’ meant 
something substantially different depending on the class employing it.  
 Perhaps this attitude toward efficiency would have been different under entirely different 
economic conditions, but such counterfactuals are moot. During the early twentieth century, 
machines were logical objects of hatred and important sites of contestation and control. Capitalist 
progress was understood as a series of “wonderful leaps in the way of extracting a greater day’s 
work from those who toil.” Efficiency was thus understood as extending the interests of capital 
rather than being an uninterested and merely mechanical possibility. Because progress was 
exploitation, and efficiency only a means of extending this relation, sabotage could be figured as 
a form of efficiency whereby workers, like their capitalist counterparts, got the most out of their 
working day. “We must be so efficient,” announced the Industrial Worker, that we will not allow 
ourselves to be ‘speeded up’ and we must knock down every scheme of the master to get more 
out of [us].”28  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  Hall, page missing 





Efficiency and mechanization were at the center of the I.W.W.’s philosophy. To assert, 
wrote Hall, “that ‘machines do not make morals’ is to assert that which is denied by the whole 
history of the race, written and legendary.”29 The “proletariat of the twentieth-century [is] a 
machine proletariat,” and “the modern trust is…clearly the child of the machine.”30 The 
Manifesto of the I.W.W. begins by locating primary social divisions in industrial machinery. 
“The great facts of present industry are the displacement of human skill by machines and the 
increase of capitalist power through concentration in the possession of the tools with which 
wealth is produced and distributed.”31 This assertion was not, in some ways, significantly 
different than the claims made in the Communist Manifesto. Capitalism creates the conditions for 
its own destruction—impregnating itself with a revolutionary proletariat through the 
establishment of a factory system. But the image here was not one of spatial concentration of 
bodies into the common space of a factory. The great facts of industry in 1905 were the machines 
themselves—their existential and active role in the consolidation and reproduction of the 
capitalist power to exploit.  
Well before the I.W.W. had been established, sabotage was used against Taylor himself. 
When Taylor became a foreman at Midvale Steel, he attempted to increase output in a number of 
ways. He fired intransigent workers who refused to bust the piece rate and then trained new 
workers to run lathes at a faster pace with the promise of higher wages if they could resist social 
pressure to maintain the established rate. In response, the workers intentionally broke their 
machines: 
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Every time I broke a rate or forced one of the new men whom I had trained to 
work at a reasonable and proper speed, some one of the machinists would 
deliberately break some part of his machine as a an object lesson to demonstrate 
to the management that a fool foreman was driving the men to overload their 
machines until they broke. Almost every day ingenious accidents were planned, 
and these happened to machines in different parts of the shop and were, of course, 
always laid to the fool foreman who was driving the men and the machines 
beyond their proper limit.32  
 
To remedy the situation, Taylor imposed a system of fines even though “they could always show 
every time an accident happened that is was not their fault and that it was an impossible thing for 
them not to break their machine under the circumstances.” It took, he recounted “three years of 
hard fighting” before they were able to become “friends.” 33 
“Sabotage,” wrote Smith in 1913 “offers the best method to combat the evil known as 
‘speeding-up.’”34 It not only offered a response to deskilling and speedup, but also focused 
analytical and tactical attention on the material expression of capitalist power. And while, 
depending on the industry, this could be anything from food to a lathe, the preoccupation with 
industrial machinery that appears in the Preamble, inflects the calls to sabotage that followed five 
years later. These fixed capital investments, what Marx would call “dead labor” are here figured 
as an active, determining force in the conditions of workers lives and the maintenance of a social 
organization along class lines. The Preamble’s establishment of machines as the great facts of 
present industry, rather than the concentration of workers in factory settings, signals a different 
attitude to the role of fixed capital in the maintenance of class power. At a moment when the 
knowledge “under the workman’s cap”, as Haywood put it, was being concentrated in the hands 
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of management or crystalized in capital intensive machinery, sabotage presented another type of 
knowledge and a rerouting of skill into destructive—or at least disruptive—rather than 
productive processes. Conjuring the power of this collective repurposing of the skills of the 
“unskilled,” the Industrial Worker offered the following provocation: “Imagine [if] thousands of 
workers in every field of protection, instead of using their brains and strength to make profits for 
the bosses, would use it against them by saboting [sic] at every opportunity.”35 
While proponents of scientific management could study production, analyze the 
component parts of a skilled operation, and thereby divide, rearrange or mechanize that task, the 
set of skills held by the saboteur could not be similarly transferred. In fact, the increase of 
management control through “the displacement of human skill by machines” would have created 
an environment where everyday forms of resistance might thrive. The dispersal of production 
processes into a series of simple tasks by ‘unskilled’ and presumably unorganized workers would 
obviate worker control over the production process as a whole. As Davis noted in his discussion 
of Taylorism and the I.W.W., the goal of these management principles was that “the inter-
dependency of workers—previously expressed through their teamwork of conscious 
cooperation—would be replaced by a set of detailed task instructions…without requiring any 
initiative from the bottom up.”36  But it was precisely this environment that provided all the 
advantages of tacit resistance. No longer could management locate the source of disruption in a 
coherent body of craftsmen. Instead, one of the machines just broke. “If only,” Pouget 
sarcastically remarked, “workers were as compliant as steel.”37 But workers never have been 
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particularly compliant and worker complaints against machinery—against particular machines as 
well as the social transformation brought about by technological progress—were not new. 
Machine wrecking had a long history that is bound up with the establishment and evolution of 
capitalist production.38  
 One possible reason for the retrospective dismissal of sabotage (or the I.W.W.’s positions 
more generally) may be its imbrication with a critique of machine technology. In a society where 
technological progress is conflated with progress itself, criticizing technological rationality 
almost automatically appears naïve or even, as Herbert Marcuse has suggested, “neurotic.”39 The 
return to the machine question embedded in a program of sabotage might actually be read as a 
revival, conscious or not, of an old debate about the role of technology in unemployment and 
impoverishment—an issue raised repeatedly by the workers ejected from industry by progress—
that has always, and continues to be, dismissed as shortsighted and unsophisticated. Decoupling 
progress from technology is counterintuitive because the notion of efficiency is so thoroughly 
embedded in the cultural logic of capitalism.  
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Taylor began his experiments with scientific management in the late 19th century but did 
not publish The Principles until 1911. It would be a mistake to imagine that Taylorism was 
suddenly and unilaterally imposed on industry, but Taylorism remains an important corollary to 
sabotage. As Taylor’s testimony about his time at Midvale Steel reveals, his management 
theories were as much a response to sabotage as sabotage was a reaction to Taylorism. In fact, 
Taylor saw scientific management as the inverse of sabotage; not simply a matter of increased 
efficiency as such, but as a means of appropriating and converting modes of shop floor resistance 
into productive capacity. The goal of a well-managed shop, according to Taylor’s congressional 
testimony, was to get workers to use “their ingenuity to see how they can turn out as much work 
as possible, instead of using their ingenuity, as they ordinarily do, to convince their employers 
that they are working hard and yet not work enough.”40 Taylor’s attempt to convince the U.S. 
House of Representatives of the revolutionary outcome that could be expected of fully 
implemented scientific management was not dissimilar from the elaboration of sabotage as a 
philosophy. Both were acutely aware of the power and knowledge that workers possessed.  
In the final report, the Special Committee noted several reasons that the imposition of an 
entirely new system of production was not practical. Most tellingly though, Taylorism was 
rejected for its tendency to dehumanize workers by conceiving of them as machines themselves, 
indicating a general uneasiness with the very idea of efficiency and perhaps with the progressive 
impulse towards social engineering more generally. Echoing the complaints of workers that 
machinery was dehumanizing, the report concluded that:  
…a margin exists between the work performed by a loafer and the maximum task 
for a man, and in that margin lies a proper day’s work. What constitutes a 
reasonable day’s work can only be determined by practical experience and 
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intelligent observation….the time study of the operations of any machine can be 
made with a reasonable degree of accuracy, because all of the elements can be 
taken into consideration in making the computation. A machine is an inanimate 
thing—it has no life, no brain, no sentiment and no place in the social order.41  
 
Taylor saw his project in utopian terms. Scientific management did not aspire to absolute 
efficiency for the purpose of increasing profits, but for the production of abundance that would 
be shared more equitably between workers, managers, and owners. Higher rates of production 
could only help the poor by giving them “a higher standard of living [making] the luxuries of one 
generation the necessities of the next.” Furthermore, Taylor did not see himself as an ally of the 
capitalist class any more than he saw himself as an interested member of the working class. “The 
most important fact of this whole subject,” he told Congress, “is that any association…any men 
who deliberately restrict the output in any industry are robbing the people.”42 Taylor never used 
the word sabotage during his testimony, but he reiterated and dramatized his point by accusing 
those who would “prevent wealth from coming into the world” of “robbing the working people.” 
Whether it is at the behest of workingmen or the manufacturer, “to restrict the world’s output...is 
mere robbery.”43 Like sabotage, scientific management sought to remedy unjust confiscation. 
But the doctrine of efficiency, convinced as it was of its extra-economic position could not name, 
let alone locate, either the thief or its victim.  
Taylor must have thought that Congress had missed his point entirely—stopwatches and 
machine speeds were simply not the issue, even less so the relationship between human workers 
and the machines that they tended. The technocratic worldview held by Taylor and Veblen did 
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not accommodate outmoded, republican definitions of manhood and humanity. This was, in part, 
because neither Taylor nor Veblen, for all of their obsessive attention to factory organization, 
paid any attention to the qualitative experience of human workers at work. Veblen’s Engineers 
focuses almost entirely on capitalist sabotage. This appears to be a politically sympathetic 
move—a correction to the years of negative attention paid to worker sabotage. This may have 
been Veblen’s intention, but the effect is the total disappearance of workers, and any agency they 
may have had, from the text. Taylor, like many present day, techno-socialists, even suggested 
that the working day might be dramatically shortened if scientific management were perfectly 
realized, but even this laudable goal implies that the workplace and the place of the worker in it 
is negligible. For both men, it seems, living occurred outside of work and one’s quality of life 
was therefore defined by consumption and would be improved by increased wages. And because 
social relations were established and regulated in the realm of consumption and exchange, 
cooperation between classes was possible if only they would stop arguing for long enough to 
produce more stuff at lower prices and efficiently enough to spend more on workers’ wages.  
That mechanization required fewer workers and depressed wages by deskilling and adding to the 
population of job seekers, was a reality that utopian efficiency could not accommodate. In 1906, 
Veblen wrote a competent, and sympathetic review of the first volume of Marx’s Capital in 
which he made two telling mistakes. The first, that the class struggle is only material in a 
“metaphorical” sense and the second is that the “industrial reserve army” implies population 
growth rather than what we would now refer to as ‘technological unemployment’.44 
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It was not through time studies, Taylor argued, but through cooperation that abundance 
would be achieved. Despite the obvious contradictions with his own management practices and 
the recommendations made in his writings, efficiency was not something to be imposed on 
workers but would organically arise as a byproduct of class harmony. “Scientific management,” 
Taylor explained, “is not any efficiency device, not a device of any kind for securing efficiency; 
nor is it any such group of efficiency devices…. It is not holding a stopwatch on a man writing 
things down about him; it is not a time study; it is not a motion study.” Rather it was a “complete 
mental revolution” on the part of both workers and managers.45 When “the great 
revolution…takes place under scientific management,” both workers and managers will “take 
their eyes off the division of surplus as the all important matter and together turn their attention 
toward increasing the size of the surplus until this surplus becomes so large that it is unnecessary 
to quarrel over how it shall be divided.”46  
The technologized value system that underwrites Veblen’s call for revolutionary 
engineers—wherein the preponderance of rational technological processes organically brings 
about a superior, rational, and secular society—fails, in some sense, to take machinery seriously 
enough. It does not recognize the fact of mechanization, which is a literal appropriation of 
workers’ bodily movements. If sabotage was an educational tool that offered a critique of private 
ownership, it also articulated the claim that workers, as both individuals and a class, had on 
industrial processes and focused rebellion on the refusal to work like a machine. The use of 
sabotage was, in its most grandiose formulation, the ‘guerrilla warfare of the working class,’ but 
it was often a good way to take a break when the weather made it miserable to harvest. This 
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latter, more prosaic function was, vis-à-vis machine logics, radical, in and of itself, as it asserted 
one’s right to control their own movement. And worker’s movements were central to the 
transition from simple tools to complex machines. Marx, while writing at a much earlier phase in 
industrial development, is useful here for his attention to the relationship of workers to machines. 
The automatic system of machinery is the means of production “adequate to fixed capital and to 
capital as such.” As the only system of production adequate to capital, its “distinguishing 
characteristic” is to place workers in such a relation to it, that their activity is no longer 
transmitted to an object but to the “machine’s own action.” The industrial potential that Veblen 
and Taylor see so clearly is, at its most efficient, a “machine which possesses skill and strength 
in place of the worker, it itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own,” in relation to which the 
living laborer can only be cast “as its conscious linkages.” The workers activity is “determined 
and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery.” All of this mechanical movement 
issues from the workers’ movements, whose labor must be divided into specific tasks and 
recombined into the automatic machine systems which are then represented to the worker as “the 
character of the production process itself.” This “transformation of the means of labor [means of 
production] into machinery” is not a mechanical and apolitical scientific evolution but a 
reflection of the necessary tendency of capital to increase the productive force of labor while 
decreasing necessary labor in order to realize profit.  Machine production and therefore machines 
themselves originate from the appropriation of workers’ bodies and the needs of capital:  
The development of the means of labor into machinery is not an accidental 
moment of capital, but is rather the historical reshaping of the traditional, 
inherited means of labour into a form adequate to capital. The accumulation of 





absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute of 
capital, and more specifically, of fixed capital.47 
 
The very idea that machine efficiency might provide a solution to social conflict is a product of 
the capitalist mode of production. The reification of machinery enables capitalism to present 
itself as a scientific or natural process rather than a labor process. The presence of machinery 
has, like sabotage, a practical as well as a propagandistic function: “fixed capital appears as a 
machine within the production process, opposite labour: and the entire production process 
appears as not subsumed under the direct skillfulness of the worker, but rather as the 
technological application of science.”48 In other words, the crystallization of labor in technology 
serves multiple functions. In addition to deskilling and control, it plays an important part in 
obfuscating the role of workers in production at large. Production as a purely technological 
application is tantamount to the removal of workers from production at the level of the social 
imagination. Thus, the very existence of the worker is elided in even the most sympathetic and 
socialistic visions of technocracy. 
This process of knowledge appropriation was ongoing. Taylor recognized that the 
working class owned something valuable and took the idea of knowledge hidden under the 
workman’s cap very seriously. Furthermore, he recognized it as a collective form of ownership. 
“The workmen,” he noted, “had their knowledge handed down to them by word of mouth, 
through the many years in which their trade has been developed from the primitive condition.” It 
has been the “ingenuity of each generation [that] has developed quicker and better methods for 
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doing...work in every trade.”49 Scientific management needed, first and foremost, to expropriate 
this collective knowledge, which was “the principle asset or possession of every tradesman.”50 
The working class as the collective owner of productive knowledge was the main obstacle to be 
overcome before his frictionless, capitalist utopia could be realized. The class needed, therefore, 
to be decomposed into individuals: “In dealing with workmen under this type of management, it 
is an inflexible rule to talk to and deal with only one man at a time.”51 And, in turn, those 
individuals needed to be decomposed into limbs and bodily movements. This is something that 
Marx recognized long before the Taylor system was introduced and it was something that was 
necessary, not simply for the ordering of workers within a continuous manufacturing process, but 
for the invention of machinery itself.  
Machines are categorically alienating in their representation of workers movements to the 
workers who tend them. Capitalist alienation is “erected on the foundation of machinery.”52 
Mechanization is, in itself, an expression of domination and control. Even Samuel Gompers, 
certainly no radical proponent of sabotage, was concerned that if this “Taylor system is put into 
operation, as we see it and as we understand it, it will mean great production in goods and things, 
but in so far as man is concerned, it means destruction.”53 
 As David Noble has carefully shown, decisions concerning machine design often have 
less to do with short-term, economic consideration than they do with management control of 
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workers in the long-term.54 But in order to understand the existential threat posed by the 
suggestion of sabotage as a strategy of worker control, it is crucial to recognize the role that 
increasingly large investments in fixed capital played in the maintenance and reproduction of 
class power. Sabotage, by way of its refusal of progress, recognized the position of the worker 
within the industrial apparatus at an individual, material level, as well the role of workers 
collectively in this social “machine.” And in placing the mode of disruption in the hands of a 
machine operator, it threatened the very basis of its functioning. Sabotage crystalized the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat who “only since the introduction of machinery…fought 
against the instrument of labor itself, capital’s material mode of existence.”55 
Noble suggests that the technology question cannot be separated from questions of shop-
floor control. “Denying steadfastly that they were against technology, union leaders strove to 
avoid media charges of Luddism and either conceded the futility of opposition and yielded or 
endorsed the notion that technological changes were the surest route to prosperity.”56 Union 
leadership throughout the 1970s and 1980s regularly conceded to advances in automation 
because “to be taken seriously, to be listened to…one had to demonstrate allegiance to 
technological progress”, and in demonstrating such allegiance, unions effectively sold workers 
down the river. In a self-reinforcing fashion, ignoring the machinery question ignores the 
experience of workers at the point of production and further consolidates the decision-making 
authority of union management, which proceeds to make decisions that ignore the experience of 
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workers. Once “the issue was removed from the point of production to executive offices and 
research centers, where it was fitted into ideological and political agendas of future progress. The 
result was a loss not just of an understanding of the reality confronting workers but of a strategy 
for dealing with it—in the present.57 Or, as Pouget wrote:  
Up to now the workers have confirmed their revolutionary attitude, but most of 
the time they have remained on purely theoretical ground. They have worked for 
the diffusion of the idea of emancipation and elaborated a plan of future society 
from which human exploitation is eliminated….Our meetings always adjourn 
with the cry of “Long live the Social Revolution” a cry that is very far from 
materializing in any way whatever…This committee believes that there are other 






58 Pouget, 22-23. 
! 196!
Conclusion: Afterlives 
The word ‘sabotage’ is common enough today. You can sabotage, it seems, pretty much 
anything: healthcare, military operations, your romantic relationship, America’s image 
abroad, or a political campaign. Since its disappearance from the language of labor 
struggle, it has reemerged as a synonym for resistance, interruption, and failure in 
general. It’s meaning is so inclusive and its context so flexible that it has lost any of the 
specificity that once gave it significance. While sabotage has always included many 
different activities, its solid connection to working class power—the intention of the 
saboteur—gave it a shape whose edges become indistinct in the absence of certain actors.  
There is, however, one contemporary use of the term that seems worthy of 
consideration because it retains a residue of the workplace where sabotage was brought 
into being: ‘self-sabotage’. I would not have thought much about this term had it not, by 
tedious repetition, been forced into my consciousness in the form of a joke about 
dissertation writing.  It wasn’t a very clever joke, but jokes, as Freud pointed out, should 
be taken seriously. And the notion that one might sabotage their self is, upon 
consideration, a strange proposition. That sabotage has become a very popular way to 
describe personal failure is equally curious. If we consider what the word meant for its 
early twentieth century advocates, “the conscious withdrawal of worker efficiency,” the 
term seems symptomatic of a shift towards an increasingly monadic and precarious gig 
economy where I conceive of myself simultaneously as proprietor, worker, and machine. 
Wendy Brown has suggested, rightly I think, that the neoliberal subject is not the worker 
but ‘human capital’—a self in which we invest in hopes of reaping some future profit 
from it. Self-sabotage is something to be fixed in therapy. Rather than a source of worker 
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power it is a major liability for the subject as investment opportunity. There is a tricky 
confusion of agency here. On the one hand, a ‘conscious withdrawal of efficiency’ has 
become the symptom of an unconscious rebellion—an uncontrollable expression of the 
desire to stop working in a world that has transformed everything, even social ties, into a 
form of work and source of profit. Social interaction doubles as a networking opportunity 
and intimacy is cultivated in the course of producing intellectual property for internet 
moguls. Another formulation might be self-sabotage as the return of the repressed “right 
to be lazy” asserted by the French anarchist Paul Lafargue. On the other hand, the 
unconscious operations that are so vexing in our conscious lives are necessarily 
conceived as intentional because a culture defined by the very individualism that 
accommodates a concept such as self-sabotage forecloses on the possibility the one might 
not be full in control of one’s ‘assets’. The clunky term used to refer to the transference 
of authority from institutions to individuals, “responsibilization,” comes to mind. The 
only possibility we seem to have for conceptualizing these lapses in our working order is 
to medicalize them through the ever-expanding scope of disability studies. 
Self-sabotage does interesting work on work itself. It implies that work and 
resistance to work are no longer social relations but an anti-social relation. Sabotage has 
reemerged in the arena of labor as solipsism—one more reason to fix that broken 
machine of the self.  In a market where I am the one responsible for converting my labor 
power into capital, I absorb the managerial function and when I discover that the ‘ready-
made man’ of Taylor’s fantasy is nowhere to be found, I have only myself to blame as 
well as any number of options for tracking my own efficiency in different areas of self-
hood: Fitbits, journaling, calorie counting, budgeting apps…. Nevertheless, I cannot 
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organize my way out of undermining myself by recognizing my class position and 
building power through solidarity.  
Sabotage though, has not shed all of its associations with rebellion. Self-sabotage 
is at once a particularly cruel formulation of individual responsibility and a helpful clue. 
Like any symptom, it has a diagnostic function. Rather than indicating pathology (and we 
might recall here that plenty of people saw radicals as pathological), it might also indicate 
a problem with work itself. It may suggest that I do not wholeheartedly believe that my 
failure actually indicates a problem with myself. It is telling that we are not simply 
procrastinating, shirking, or being lazy. We are engaging in sabotage and as such, there is 
room in that word to begin to conceive of this widespread pathology as a form of real, 
political resistance.    
*** 
Sabotage, as in breaking things, is also still with us. The place where sabotage, as 
conceived by the I.W.W., has reappeared with the most force is not in the workplace, but 
the radical branches of the environmental movement. The press office of the Earth 
Liberation Front still proudly announces acts of sabotage. The sabotage of pipelines in 
the U.S. is more common than one might think. In yet another fulfillment of Walker 
Smith’s proclamation that sabotage is too dangerous to be openly discussed, pipeline 
sabotage gets such little news coverage that two Catholic Workers, Jessica Reznicek and 
Ruby Montoya, who had been engaging in regular acts of sabotage against the Iowa 
portion of the  Dakota Access Pipeline, publicly confessed to draw attention to their 
actions. The public confession also failed to garner much media attention.  
The imperative to accumulate and expand is fundamental to capitalism. No 
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version of a system organized around constantly expanding frontiers is compatible with 
sustaining life on earth. The need to revisit political theories that look beyond the horizon 
of what seems possible is now a matter of life and death. Reforming consumerism and 
greening oil companies is not an option.  
The employment of sabotage in the environmental movement involves similar 
claims about the legitimacy of private ownership. We have, for example, a legitimate 
collective claim on clean water. Sabotaging natural gas pipelines in order to prevent the 
almost inevitable poisoning of groundwater is illegal, but it is also morally sound. 
Groundwater does not belong to an oil conglomerate.  
Pipeline accidents are also a perfect example of what Pouget and others meant by 
“capitalist sabotage” and pipeline sabotage by workers and citizens is an admirable 
example of how sabotage, when done for the right reasons, not only causes no harm but 
protects consumers and workers. Reform and regulation of industry are necessary and 
important things to work towards. But sabotage draws our attention to a reality that is 
incompatible with capitalism: extractive industries, as they are currently configured, 
simply have no right to exist. Their property represents ill-gotten gains and the rightful 
owners of that property are simply exercising their prerogative by preventing the 
activities of trespassers. 
The reactions to effective and collective activism have been met with similar 
forms of state intervention and repression at the behest of capitalists. During the 1990’s, 
members of E.L.F. were tried for terrorism in federal court, the late twentieth century’s 
answer to the Espionage trials of I.W.W. members. And there are now “criminal 
infrastructure sabotage” bills under consideration in several states in reaction to the 
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Dakota Access Pipeline protests that resemble, in their language and logic, the anti-
criminal syndicalism laws passed to eliminate I.W.W. organizing. The relationship 
between property protection and the restriction of political speech thus has a new 
importance and the state has responded with an old answer. Given this landscape, we 
might once again consider what a politics of property destruction might offer. At the very 
least, taking sabotage seriously seems a promising way to begin disentangling narratives 
of social progress from the twin mandates of ecologically devastating infrastructure 
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Preamble to the I.W.W. Constitution 
1905 
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no 
peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of the working people and 
the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life. 
Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organise 
as a class, take possession of the means of production, abolish the wage system, and live 
in harmony with the Earth. 
We find that the centering of the management of industries into fewer and fewer hands 
makes the trade unions unable to cope with the ever growing power of the employing 
class. The trade unions foster a state of affairs which allows one set of workers to be 
pitted against another set of workers in the same industry, thereby helping defeat one 
another in wage wars. Moreover, the trade unions aid the employing class to mislead the 
workers into the belief that the working class have interests in common with their 
employers. 
These conditions can be changed and the interest of the working class upheld only by an 
organisation formed in such a way that all its members in any one industry, or in all 
industries if necessary, cease work whenever a strike or lockout is on in any department 
thereof, thus making an injury to one an injury to all. 
Instead of the conservative motto, “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work,” we must 
inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, “Abolition of the wage system.” 
It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. The army of 
production must be organised, not only for everyday struggle with capitalists, but also to 
carry on production when capitalism shall have been overthrown. By organising 
industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old. 
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Industrial Union Manifesto 
Issued by Conference of Industrial Unionists at Chicago, January 2, 3 and 4, 1905 
Social relations and groupings only reflect mechanical and industrial conditions. The 
great facts of present industry are the displacement of human skill by machines and the 
increase of capitalist power through concentration in the possession of the tools with 
which wealth is produced and distributed. 
Because of these facts trade divisions among laborers and competition among capitalists 
are alike disappearing. Class divisions grow ever more fixed and class antagonisms more 
sharp. Trade lines have been swallowed up in a common servitude of all workers to the 
machines which they tend. New machines, ever replacing less productive ones, wipe out 
whole trades and plunge new bodies of workers into the ever-growing army of trade-less, 
hopeless unemployed. As human beings and human skill are displaced by mechanical 
progress, the capitalists need use the workers only during that brief period when muscles 
and nerve respond most intensely. The moment the laborer no longer yields the maximum 
of profits he is thrown upon the scrap pile, to starve alongside the discarded machine. A 
dead line has been drawn, and an age limit established, to cross which, in this world of 
monopolized opportunities, means condemnation to industrial death. 
The worker, wholly separated from the land and the tools, with his skill of craftsmanship 
rendered useless, is sunk in the uniform mass of wage slaves. He sees his power of 
resistance broken by class divisions, perpetuated from outgrown industrial stages. His 
wages constantly grow less as his hours grow longer and monopolized prices grow 
higher. Shifted hither and thither by the demands of profit-takers, the laborer's home no 
longer exists. In this helpless condition he is forced to accept whatever humiliating 
conditions his master may impose. He is submitted to a physical and intellectual 
examination more searching than was the chattel slave when sold from the auction block. 
Laborers are no longer classified by difference in trade skill, but the employer assigns 
them according to the machines to which they are attached. These divisions, far from 
representing differences in skill or interests among the laborers, are imposed by the 
employer that workers may be pitted against one another and spurred to greater exertion 
in the shop, and that all resistance to capitalist tyranny may be weakened by artificial 
distinctions. 
While encouraging these outgrown divisions among the workers the capitalists carefully 
adjust themselves to the new conditions. They wipe out all differences among themselves 
and present a united front in their war upon labor. Through employers' associations, they 
seek to crush, with brutal force, by the injunctions of the judiciary and the use of military 
power, all efforts at resistance. Or when the other policy seems more profitable, they 
conceal their daggers beneath the Civic Federation and hoodwink and betray those whom 
they would rule and exploit. Both methods depend for success upon the blindness and 
internal dissensions of the working class. The employers' line of battle and methods of 
warfare correspond to the solidarity of the mechanical and industrial concentration, while 
laborers still form their fighting organizations on lines of long-gone trade divisions. The 
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battles of the past emphasize this lesson. The textile workers of Lowell, Philadelphia and 
Fall River; the butchers of Chicago, weakened by the disintegrating effects of trade 
divisions; the machinists on the Santa Fe, unsupported by their fellow-workers subject to 
the same masters; the long-struggling miners of Colorado, hampered by lack of unity and 
solidarity upon the industrial battlefield, all bear witness to the helplessness and 
impotency of labor as at present organized. 
This worn-out and corrupt system offers no promise of improvement and adaptation. 
There is no silver lining to the clouds of darkness and despair settling down upon the 
world of labor. 
This system offers only a perpetual struggle for slight relief from wage slavery. It is blind 
to the possibility of establishing an industrial democracy, wherein there shall be no wage 
slavery, but where the workers will own the tools which they operate, and the product of 
which they alone should enjoy. 
It shatters the ranks of the workers into fragments, rendering them helpless and impotent 
on the industrial battlefield. 
Separation of craft from craft renders industrial and financial solidarity impossible. 
Union men scab upon union men; hatred of worker for worker is engendered, and the 
workers are delivered helpless and disintegrated into the hands of the capitalists. 
Craft jealousy leads to the attempt to create trade monopolies. 
Prohibitive initiation fees are established that force men to become scabs against their 
will. Men whom manliness or circumstances have driven from one trade are thereby fined 
when they seek to transfer membership to the union of a new craft. 
Craft divisions foster political ignorance among the workers, thus dividing their class at 
the ballot box, as well as in the shop, mine and factory. 
Craft unions may be and have been used to assist employers in the establishment of 
monopolies and the raising of prices. One set of workers are thus used to make harder the 
conditions of life of another body of laborers. 
Craft divisions hinder the growth of class consciousness of the workers, foster the idea of 
harmony of interests between employing exploiter and employed slave. They permit the 
association of the misleaders of the workers with the capitalists in the Civic Federation, 
where plans are made for the perpetuation of capitalism, and the permanent enslavement 
of the workers through the wage system. 
Previous efforts for the betterment of the working class have proven abortive because 
limited in scope and disconnected in action. 
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Universal economic evils afflicting the working class can be eradicated only by a 
universal working class movement. Such a movement of the working class is impossible 
while separate craft and wage agreements are made favoring the employer against other 
crafts in the same industry, and while energies are wasted in fruitless jurisdiction 
struggles which serve only to further the personal aggrandizement of union officials. 
A movement to fulfill these conditions must consist of one great industrial union 
embracing all industries--providing for craft autonomy locally, industrial autonomy 
internationally, and working class unity generally. 
It must be founded on the class struggle, and its general administration must be 
conducted in harmony with the recognition of the irrepressible conflict between the 
capitalist class and the working class. 
It should be established as the economic organization of the working class, without 
affiliation with any political party. 
All power should rest in a collective membership. 
Local, national and general administration, including union labels, buttons, badges, 
transfer cards, initiation fees and per capita tax should be uniform throughout. 
All members must hold membership in the local, national or international union covering 
the industry in which they are employed, but transfers of membership between unions, 
local, national or international, should be universal. 
Workingmen bringing union cards from industrial unions in foreign countries should be 
freely admitted into the organization. 
The general administration should issue a publication representing the entire union and its 
principles which should reach all members in every industry at regular intervals. 
A central defense fund, to which all members contribute equally, should be established 
and maintained. 
All workers, therefore, who agree with the principles herein set forth, will meet in 
convention at Chicago the 27th day of June, 1905, for the purpose of forming an 
economic organization of the working class along the lines marked out in this manifesto. 
 
